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PREFACE

The author embarked on this study because most accounts of this Basuto
crisis do not uncover and properly interpret the events which transpired.
Historical thought on tha British Empire and Commonwealth in recent years has
shifted from dissemination of the "civilize the despicable and barbarous na
tive with a gun or a Bible for the glory of the Empire" line of thought to a
circulation of the "destruction

of the pure and innocent native tribes by the

gluttonous and malignant spread of European civilization" line of reasoning.
This work, it is hoped, will illustrate the fallacies in both schools of
thought in regard to Basutoland.
The basic argument in this
not caused by opposition of the

thesis contends that the Basuto conflict was
entire tribe to disarmament but rather by

civil insurrection and rebellion of one section of the tribe against lawful
authority.

Up to this time, there has been written no adequate history of the

Dasuto Rebellion, Civil War, and Reconstruction, 1800-1884.

Some secondary

works cited supply much of the background; other books are outdated, incom
plete, or inferior studies.

My thesis is intended to fill a gap in historical

thought and to rectify a historical error perpetuated since 1884.
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CHAPTER I

ADJUSTMENT OF BASUTOLAND TO EUROPEAN DOMINATION

BASUTOLAND UNDER BRITISH RULE

Ths Rasutos did not become an organised tribe and therefore not a promi
nent factor in British affairs until 1818, when Moshesh, a minor chief (Infra,
family tree, p. 239, PI. XXV ; illust., p. 225, PI. VII), unified remnants of
various clans scattered by Zulu and Matabele raids.

After these incursions

stopped, a greater threat arose from the trekker Boers, who coveted Basuto
land but refused to recognize the suzerainty of Moshesh.

Chief Moshesh because

of this threat continuously sought British protection, and his pleas became
more plaintful as the Boers seized more of his land"!1 When a military expedi
tion under a Major Warden from Cape Colony attempted to intimidate the tribe
into accepting definite boundaries with the Boers, Moshesh smashed this force

2

and soon after destroyed a punitive expedition commanded by a General Cathcart.
Chief Moshesh, nevertheless, desperately sought British protection in
3
4
1868, and, on March 12, 1868, Basutoland became British territory; the Duka of
Buckingham, then Colonial Secretary, yielding to the insistent pleas of Mo
shesh for protection when it appeared to London that the Boers threatened the

iBasutoland, Report for the Year 1963
(London: HMS0, 1964), p. 123.
2
Lord Hailey, The Republic of 5outh Africa and the High Commission Terri
tories
(London: Oxford University Press, 1263), pp. 15-l6.
3
Austin Coates, Basutoland
(London: HM5Q, 1966), p. 37; Richard P.
Stevens, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland
(New York: Frederick A- Praeger,
1967), pp. 24-25. Hereafter cited as Stavsns, Lesotho, etc.
^The Basutos became British subjnets but not protected persons until Ba
sutoland received protectorate status in 1884, W. E. 5imnett, The British Co
lonial Empire
(London: Geo. Allen &. Unwin Ltd., 1949), p. 108.
1

2
5
Basutos with extinction.

Britain had not wanted to increase the financial

burden of administering her Empire during this period, but the annexation of
Basutoland seemed the only method to maintain a peace on the frontiers of Cape
Colony and to protect the stability of the Empire^

Earlier, in 1B66, the

Orange Free State had closed mission stations in Basuto territory after Boer
commandos had overrun much of the region.

Another factor leading to the an

nexation was growing British fear that the Boer republic would secure an east
0
coast seaport.

The Colonial Secretary at first had thought that Governor Sir

Philip Wodehouse had exceeded his authority by annexing Basutoland but later
9
advised the governor to act at his own discretion.

Soon after, however, the

Cape"Parliament expressed some hostility to the Wodehouse actions, contending
that hs had exceeded his instructions.

The parliament berated London for con

senting to an annexation which excused the Imperial Government from financial

Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser.,
Vol. 257 (1881), p. 1073, 5ir Henry Holland speaking, January 20, 1881.
Here
after cited as Hansard, etc.; Great Britain, Parliament, Sessional Papers
(House of Commons), (1883), XLVIXI: "Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of
Basutoland," 330, Mr. ’
Wood speaking on^a memorandum of the Basutos in the House
of Representatives.
Hereafter cited as 13.j5.P., (date), etc.
^Margaret L. Hodgson and W. G. Ballinger, Indirect Rule in Southern Afri
ca , (Mo. 1) Basutoland
(Lovedale, Cape Colony: Lovedale Press, 1931), p. 7. ;
Hereafter cited as Hodgson and Ballinger, Indirect Rule.
^Orange Free State: This Boer republic bordered Cape Colony on tTie north
and Basutoland on the north and west, Eric Rosenthal, ed . , Encyclopedia of
Southern Africa -"(London: 1961), p. 374. Hereafter cited as Rosenthal, ed.,
Encyclopedia.

8

Stevens, Lesotho, etc.. pp. 23-24; J. Du Plessis, A History of Christian
Missions in South Africa
(Cape Town: C. Struik, 1965), p. 317.
Hereafter
cited as Du Plessis, Christian Missions in South Africa.
^George M. Theal, History of 5outh Africa- from 1795 to 1872, Vol. VIII of
"History of South Africa,"
(11 vols., 4th ed., rev.; Cape Town: G. Struik,
1964), p. 313: Being originally Vol. IV of History of South Africa from 1795
to 1872
(4th ed., rev.; London: George Allen &. Unwin Ltd., 1919).
Hereafter
cited as Theal, 5outh Africa.

3
or military demands'^ Most South Africans believed that this almost total re
versal of existing Imperial policy only served to protect obnoxious tribesmen
from deserved punishment and was detrimental to the Orange Free 5tate.

Only

a small minority perceived the action as not hostile to the Free State and
felt that the annexation was beneficial^" The annexation, nevertheless, re
mained a fact.

The proclamation of annexation was declared at Cape Town; de

tails regarding the future of Basuto territory were spared for future consi
deration, with the natives told that they could discuss detailed provisions
with the Cape Colony Governor in his capacity as High Commissioner of South
Africa^
13
The 3ritish initially had authorized Governor Sir Philip Wodehouse of .
Cape Colony to administer the territory temporarily.

London attempted to

evade further financial responsibility, for a lack of funds was already limi
ting Colonial Office involvement in the administration of areas of native
settlement to coastal cities and surrounding districts.

Richard Stevens agrees

with the British assumption that Basutoland was under direct British control
only until the death of Moshesh, that later, either Natal or Cape Colony would

.P.., (1883), XLVIII, 330, Mr. Wood speaking.
^"Theal, South Africa, VIII, 302-03.
*^3..3..P., (1880), LI: "Affairs of Basutoland," 600, ltr. carl of Kimber
ley to Governor Sir Bartle Frere, May 20, 1880.
13
Eric Rosenthal, comp,, Southern African Dictionary of Notional Biogra
phy
(London: 1966), p. 422.
Hereafter cited as
Sir Philip ’
W ode
house: Born in England, Wodehouse became Governor's Agent for the West Province
of Ceylon in 1843.
In 1851, he was appointed Superintendent of British Hon
duras, and three years later he became Governor of British Guiana.
He helped
settle the long conflict between the Basutos and Boers in 1869.
After fighting
against responsible government at Cape Colony, Wodehouse left to assume the
post of Governor of Bombay in 1872.

4
assume administrative and financial responsibility for native territories on
14
the frontier.
According to Austin Coates, Sir Philip opposed Basuto annexa15
tion to Natal.
In that British administration aided the Basutos at the expense of the
Boers, the Orange Free State thought itself et the mercy of Sir Philip, who,
though blamed by some influential Englishmen for allowing the Boers to mis
treat the natives, had allowed the Basutos to rearm and also unjustly had re
versed the situation won in the wars against these mischievous and aggressor
n a t i v e s ^ Wodehouse had interfered in one of these conflicts in 1868 by sen
ding colonial troops into Basutoland‘S

The Basutos had welcomed this interven

tion, because, otherwise, the Boers would have scattered the natives into

3L8
Kaffraria, a native region in Caps Colony, forcing Basutos to live on charity
19
and perhaps forcing M.oshash to raid European settlements.
The Free State,
inhibited by the British and therefore anxious to end the wars, reluctantly
recognized the annexation and signed with the Basutos the Second Treaty of
Aliwal North in 1869, by which all conquered territory east of the Caledon
20
River reverted to Basutoland.
The British annexation ended the Boer,retalia14

Stevens, Lesotho, etc., pp. 24-25; George M. Theal, The South Africa
Republic from 1870 to 1872, Vol. IX of "History of South Africa,” (11 vols.,
4th ed., rev.; Cape Town: C. Struik, 1964), p. 67: Being originally Vol. V of
History of South Africa from 1795 to 1872
(3rd e d . , rev.: London: George
Allen &. Unwin Ltd., 1920). Hereafter cited as Theal, South Africa,
15
Coates, Basutoland, p. 37.
l6Thaal, South Africa, VIII, 318, 305; B.S.P., (1880), LI, 601, ltr.
Kimberley to Frere, May 20, 1880.
^ D u Plessis, Christian Missions in South Africa, p. 317.
1D
,3._5.£., (1880), LI, 598, ltr. William Ayliffe, Secretary for Native
Affairs, to J. Gordon Sprigg, Prime Minister of Cape Colony, April 12, 1880.
19
Hodgson and Ballinger, Indirect Rule, p. 7.

20

Stevens, Lesotho, etc., p. 24.

21
tion against the Basutos but not Basuto raids into the Free State.
Regarding the confusion surrounding the provisions of the annexation, one
member of the British Parliament alleged that Moshesh wanted Basutoland to be
an exclusive native reserve and his tribe dependent upon the High Commissioner

22

only.

A proclamation issued by Governor Napier of Cape Colony on September 7,

23
1842, promised that Britain would disallow European ownership of Basuto land.
Since 1843, the British repeatedly had assured Moshesh of his right to the
24
lands of his people under grants of terminable leases.
After the annexation,
the chief, naturally, bargained with Natal and Cape Colony for the best ar25
rangements for continued protection and was assuming that Basutoland was not
held in possession by the Crown.

The natives feared that the British would

surrender Basuto territory to outsiders, as previously had been done far the
benefit of the Orange Free State.

The British were claiming absolute posses

sion of the country based on the fact that colonial Government Blue Books
failed to show Basutoland restricted to only natives.

Basutoland, advised

26
'Wodehouse, had devolved directly to the Crown, and Government documents of

. , (1883), XLVIII, 330, Mr. ’
Wood speaking.

22

Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1 074r Sir Henry Holland speaking,
January 20, 1881.
., (1881), LXVI: ’’The Affairs of Basutoland, ” 174, Cape Argus reporting on Mr.Orpen speaking in the June 30, 1880, House Assembly session.
24
All Basuto land belonged to the people with tha paramount chief as
trustee.
He controlled its use, distribution, and was responsible for its
protection, Hugh Ashton, The Basuto
(London: Oxford University Press, 1952),
p. 144.
25
, (1881), LXVI, 178, Cape Argus reporting on Mr. Solomon speaking
in theHouse Assembly,
July 1, 1880; Theal, South Africa,VIII, 315.
2 ft
_B.S_.£., (1881), LXVI, 174-75, Cape Argus reporting on Mr. Orpen and the
Attorney-General speaking in the House Assembly, July 1, 1880.
Coates main
tains that Wodehouse wanted Basutoland governed as a separate native state
and that the Colonial Office later agreed, Coates, Basutoland, p. 37.

6
communication between Sir Philip and Moshesh mentioned the absolute cession of
27
Basuto territory to the Queen.
In contrast to this interpretation, the Earl

20

of Kimberley, the new Colonial Secretary in 188D, considered Basutoland prac
tically a native reserve and presumed that Wodehouse, in order to end border
29
skirmishes and to demarcate for the Basutos their territory, felt likewise.
Concerning native feelings and objectives, since the disastrous War of
1865 with the Boers, the Basuto economy had become basically agricultural,
supplemented by increased service to whites.

Basutos had expected to receive

back all their land after the war, but instead the tribe had lost its best
30
pasturage and farmland. Lack of land had left the Basutos disappointed and
31
provided a source of friction. Under the Aliwal Treaty, the governor instead
->
of the paramount chief assigned land to clans and individuals.

Most of the

chiefs detested this treaty, and many of them refused to move from ceded lands,
27

E[.j3.JP., (1880), LI, 563-64, ltr. Undersecretary for Native Affairs
Bright to Adolphe Mabille, February 26, 1880.
^ W h o Was Who 1897-1915
(London: 1935), pp. 397-98. Earl of Kimberley:
John Wodehouse, 1st Earl of Kimberley, was born in England in 1826.
He was
Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs from 1852-56, from 1859-61, and from 189495.
Undersecretary of the India Office in 1864, he became Lord-Lieutenant of
Ireland from 1864-66, during which time he acted firmly against the Fenians.
Kimberley was Lord of the Privy Seal from 1868-70, Secretary of State for the
Colonies from 1870-74 and from 1880-82, and Secretary for Foreign Affairs from
1894-95.
He became the leader of the Liberal Party in the House of Lords in
1897 and Chancellor of London University in 1899 after service as a member of
its Senate since 1859; Clarence L. Barnhart, ed., The Hew Century Cyclopedia
of Names
(New York: 1954), Vol. Ill, 4158.
As Colonial Secretary, Kimberley
formed Rupert*s Land into the Province of Manitoba and brought British Or;lumbia
into Candda.
Kimberley, South Africa, was named for him in 1872, and the earl
upheld self-government for the Boers in South Africa in 1831.
29B.S.P., (1880), LI, 601, ltr. Kimberley to Frere, May 20, 1880.
30
Stevens, Lesotho, etc., pp. 24-25.
JP., (1880), LI, 601, ltr. Kimberley to Frere, May 20, 1880; Theal,
South Africa, VIII, 323.

7
from which they ceaselessly raided Boer farms in the Free State for cattle.
Boer farmers did not pursue the natives back across the Basuto border for fear
of antagonizing the British, whose rule over the tribe they thought too le32
nient.
The Basutos, secretly bellicose since before the War of 1865, waited
33
for an opportunity to begin a quarrel between their white neighbors.
Regarding different accounts of the French missionary attitude towards
the then current political events, George M. Theal, noted South African his34
torian of the Settler School, contends that the Aborigines Protection 5ociety
and French mission facilitated native disregard for the Aliwal treaty and thus
35

perpetuated crime and anarchy.

The Boers, notes J. Du Plessis, after the War

of 1865 expelled the French from Basutoland temporarily after the missionaries
indignantly refused counsel from the Free State Volksraad.

Du Plessis found

no reliable evidence to prove Boer charges that these missionaries had inter
fered in political affairs and had become a menace to the republic but rather
36
discovered that the mission attempted to promote peace.
The French, said Sir
Bartle Frere, later Governor of Cape Colony, encouraged the Basutos to accept
37
British annexation provisions.

32Theal, South Africa, VIII, 306, 314, 322, 324-27; IX, 65.
33
Du Plessis, Christian Missions in South Africa, p. 315.
34
Aborigines Protection Society (frequently referred to in the following
text as APS): This English philanthropical society founded by Sir T. F. Buxton
in 1837 sought to protect indigenous native tribes from extermination by white
men or from other causes, C. £. Carrington, Making of the Empire, Pt. I of
"The British Overseas"
(Cambridge, England: University Press, 1968), p. 298.
The zeal of the organization outstripped its knowledge and discretion, Eric A.
Walker, The British Empire
(2nd ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1956), p. 107*
35Theal, South Africa, VIII, 325.
36
Du Plessis. Christian Missions in South Africa, pp. 317-18.
37B.S.P.,

(1881), LXVI, 201, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, July 27, 1B80.

8
Ths British, aside from the French influence, never adequately enforced
their rule, and conflict of authority arose.

The Imperial Government intro-

38
duced indirect rule through the amenable Chief Moshesh, who wanted benefits of
British rule without the regulations, interference, or responsibilities.
don administered Basutoland at a profit, but anarchy reigned.

Lon

The chiefs were

disgruntled over loss of so much land to the Free State and thought their
positions as chiefs ignored.

They wanted only protection from the British,

for themselves they desired territory for expansion and retention of all pos39
sible authority. Moshesh had consolidated his rule during tribal adjustment
to annexation but never had dominated absolutely.

Important tribal decisions

40
required the opinions of the royal family and other chiefs at a pitso. The
renowned "Laws of Moshesh” prohibited the sale of liquor, punished witchcraft,
41
and forbade white settlement in the country. British arrests of chiefs who
38
39

Coates, Basutoland, p. 40.

Theal, South Africa, IX, 56, 63-64, 66, 68; VIII, 311; Coates, Basuto
land , p. 35.
40
Pitso: A meeting called by a chief or chiefs to which all adult males
were invited to discuss matters already debated by a chief or chiefs and coun
cilors, Ashton, The Basuto, pp. 215-16; Chiefs, of prime Importance in the
leadership of the tribe, could delegate authority to subordinate chiefs, sub
chiefs, and headmen.
A few advisers, mostly relatives, guided a chief. A
proper, generous, and brave leader was one who accepted advice freely from
councilors.
Deciding minor matters by himself, a chief, after meeting with
his councilors, discussed more important issues with his people at a pitso.
The chief could announce a decision at the end of a pitso but would not per
sist in an issue facing stiff opposition. Dissatisfied natives could join
another chief or set up another clan under a more popular man, such as a
younger brother or son of the clan leader.
In critical circumstances, dissi
dents might murder their chief.
The Basutos, remarked one French missionary,
almost superstitiously worshipped chiefs with a reverence that paralleled the
divine right of kings.
Such reverence for their chiefs, without who the na
tive community would doubtlessly become anarchic, did not excuse the failings
of leaders or prevent tribesmen from joining another chief.
Ibid., pp. 144,
215-17, 220.
41
Stevens, Lesotho, etc., p. 26.

9
stole cattle caused animosity to British justice, as cattle thievery was deep
ly ingrained in tribal custom.

Officials continued to strictly enforce neither

British nor Basuto law, however, except to halt liquor traffic.
freely roamed the Countryside and reaped huge profits.
they pleased*

Gun smugglers

Tha chiefs acted as

Despite 100 policeman temporarily stationed in Basutoland, clan

quarrels erupted, and, as time passed, numerous Basutos thought they had
42
gained nothing as British subjects*
The British annexation, in conclusion, should have involved more preci
sion so that all parties fully would have understood the compact.

The annexa

tion seemed not to protect the Basutos from the Boers so much as to guard Cape
Colony from refugee Basutos.

Indirect rule was inadequate and too permissive

for the deceitful Basutos, and worse* the British refused to support their own
actions decisively.

Britain owned Basutoland; it was not a native reserve.

The tribe ungratefully chafed under agreed procedures once the merited Boer
threat dissipated.

The Boers themselves incurred a disadvantage strategically

and deserved to retain more of their spoils.

BASUTOLAND UNDER CAPE COLONY RULE

The Cape legislature, as expected by London, outmaneuvered Natal and an
nexed Basutoland on August 10, 1871.

The colony did not directiy incorporate

Basutoland, unlike British administration in Kaffraria*

The governor, subject

43
to parliamentary veto, became the legislative authority. With full knowledge

^ T h e a l , South Africa, VIII, 315-16, 322; IX, 63; Ashton, The Basuto.
172.

p.

10
44
of its responsibilities, Cope Colony annexed Basutoland from a grateful Bri
tain, which encouraged extension of the successful colonial native policy to
45

the Basutos.

Colonial decrees did not apply to Basutoland unless specified or

subject to proclamation by the governor.

Basutos, assumed Governor Sir Henry

Barkly, realized that colonial annexation would come eventually, and the ap46
propriation, which the natives comprehended, gave them no unfair burden.
47
Barkly in early 1871 had visited Letsie, the eldest son of Moshesh and para
mount chief after the death of his father in 1870, and had warned him of the
48
impending decision by Cape Colony to annex Basutoland.
On August 16, 1871, a
pitso called by Basuto chiefs learned of the annexation, which did not alter
49
their tribal status, and no natives objected to the decision. While Colonial
50
Secretary Kimberley agreed that the attainment of responsible government at
43

Edgar H. Brookes, The History of Native Policy in South Africa from
1830 to the Present Day
(Pretoria: J. L. Van Scbaik Ltd., 1927), p. 99. Here
after cited as Brookes, History of Native Policy.
44
B._5.p. , (1883), XLVIII, 330, Mr. Wood speaking.
45
Walker, The British Empire, p. 64.
46
Hansard. 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1075-76, Lord Holland speaking,
January 20, 1881.
47
* P • 215. Letsie: His son Lerothodi soon relegated this weak
and colorless chief;
Theal contends that only British authority prevented the
brothers of Letsie from declaring independence from him, Theal, South Africa,
IX, 60.
^ 5 tevens, Lesotho, etc., p. 26.
^T.heal, South Africa, IX, 69.
50
In British constitutional machinery, responsible government is distin
guished from representative government by the need for the executive to retain
the confidence of the majority in parliament and receive parliamentary permis
sion for all expenditures and all executive actions.
Therefore, a government
must resign or hold elections if it fails to get support from the legislature.
Under representative government in Cape Colony from 1854-72, the executive
acted independently of the legislature, Hector M. Robertson, South Africa
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 140.

11
Cape Town allowed the governor mo3t authority in Basuto matters, he felt that
the natives had been neither notified nor consulted on the annexation and that
51
Basutos believed that London still directly ruled them.
The 1871 annexation in fact caused immediate controversy.

The annexation

bill met stiff initial resistance in Cape Colony, as its Government allegedly
had neither the experience nor resources to deal with Basutoland, and some
colonial politicians resented the burden.

52
Joseph Orpen, a life-time friend of

Moshesh, persuaded reluctant Letsie to petition for direct representation in
the Cape Parliament, although the Basutos wanted only a voice in considering
legal measures applied to them.

Representation would subject Basutoland to

all colonial law3 and European ownership of land, which the "Laws of Moshesh”
and the prasent chiefs would not accept.

The Cape Parliament rejected the

53
petition. The Act of 1871 did not recognize the right of Basuto chiefs to
cede or negotiate tribal land belonging to individuals, although tribal pro
perty had no registered titles, and although the chiefs always had ruled
54
supreme in land matters.
Application of colonial native policy under the 1371 statute became bog-

^Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1066-67, Sir Wilfrid Lawson spea
king, January 20, 1881.
52
•» P* 280. Joseph Orpen: Born in Dublin, Orpen emigrated to
South Africa in 1846 where he fought in several native wars.
In 1850, he be
came a government surveyor.
In 1853, he was elected to the first Volksraad of
the Orange Free State, helped write a constitution, served on the Free State
Supreme Court, and negotiated with Chief Moshesh. After serving as Chief Ma
gistrate in Basutoland, he won election to the Caps Parliament in'1871.
In
1373, he moved to St. John's Territory on the Transkei coast to serve as
British Resident Magistrate.
53
Coates, Basutoland, pp. 39-40; Stevens, Lesotho, etc., p. 27.
54
A 4» (1881), LXVI, 175-76, Cape Argus reporting on the AttorneyGeneral speaking in the House Assembly, July 1, 1880.

12
gsd down in a quagmire.

John X. Merriman, Charles Brownlee, and Colonel

Charles Griffith had formulated a unique system for native policy in 5outh
Africa which failed in Basutoland because of magistrate mistakes, ignorance of
colonial politicians, party politics, and changes of government.

Critics

questioned the rapid spread of magistrate authority which had belonged to the
chiefs.

The Basutos ware stubborn; thus, this transition required.time.

Host

judicial cases gravitated to the chiefs because of active or passive coercion;
thus, few natives appealed to the magistrates.

55
A chief could "eat up” an

appellant, and the magistrates had no power to correct this injustice.

A

chief, only if he wanted relief from the routine of presiding, assented to the
native tendency to bring legal matters to a magistrate, but if magistrate con
fronted chief, tribesmen backed the chief.

Colonial rule, however, reformed

and revised other native customs.
These alterations may seem liberal and enlightened, yet they undermined
the entire Basuto legal and social structure.

Administrators made no effort

to conciliate public opinion and made sudden reforms which should have awaited
mollification of the public.

Natives considered marriage and cattle matters

private; these affairs should have remained so.

One beneficial measure sought

in vain to halt the ietsima— forced labor for the chiefs.

Surprisingly, the

natives seemed more attached to their chiefs than averse to this work.

In an

attempt to enlighten the magistrates, a commission compiled a handbook of Ba
suto customs in 1873.

This hurried and mediocre effort made some erroneous

conclusions on native life, and regulations already in force further hamstrung
55

"Eat up": Refers to a Basuto custom by which a chief could deprive an
offender of livestock, land, home, and sometimes life, _B.S..P., (1881), LXVI,

201.
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innovations.

The speed with which the Government collected a hut tax of 10s.

a year directly correlated with the kickbacks retained by the chiefs for col
lecting it.
jurisdiction.

This adequate allowance reconciled them^somewhat to magistrate
Unfortunately, the hut tax rose too soon to 3Ll a year, and,

though common enough procedure today, this tax hike did not constitute diplomatic procedure in native policy.

56
The tribe became sullen.

V

Governor Darkly, nevertheless, in the roid-lBTCPs declared, among the posi
tive impressions, that the approximately 150,000 Basutos who only a few years
before had terrorized their neighbors now resided in a peaceful, contented,
and prosperous manner under the guidance of six European magistrates who for
57
soma time had no European police protection.
Barkly had formed a Basuto police
58
force of eleven officers and 100 privates in 1872.
A model farm and schools
appeared, and surplus revenue from taxation enabled construction of roads and
59
bridges to facilitate trade.
Officials easily detected cattle theft, settled
neighborhood squabbles, and magistrates, schools, and some churches worked
together for p r o g r e s s ^ The Basuto government functioned orderly, economic
conditions were good, and public revenue gleaned mostly from the hut tax rose
toS.18,000 in 1879^X

^ B r o okes, History of Native Policy, pp. 100-03; Theal, South Africa,
IX, 71, 74, 76, 79.
57
P . A . Moltsno, The Life and Times of Sir John lharles Molteno, II
(London: 5mith, Elder S. Co., 1900), p. 424.
Hereafter cited as Molteno, Molteno.
^ T h s a l , South Africa, IX, 77.
59
EL 5..P,., (1381), LXVI, 229, ltr. Bright to Griffith, February 26, 1880.
^B.S.P^., (1880), LI, 600, ltr. Kimberley to Frere, May 20, 1880.
^^Stevens, Lesotho, etc., p. 27; George M. Theal, History of South Africa
from 1873 to 1 884, Vol. XI of "History of South Africa,"
(11 vols., 4th e d . ,
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Some authors, to the contrary, observed alleged colonial mistakes and
Basuto displeasure.

The Cape Government did not realize the evils of its hasty

62
and injudicious actions, says A. Aylward, and Governor Sir Bartle Frere,
successor to Barkly, replied to Basuto complaints by advising the tribe to
63
migrate to Zululand.
The Chief Magistrate of Basutoland of fended v.the natives
by making Chiefs Masupha and Molappo appear equal to Letsie.

By 1875, Basuto

land had become a granary instead of a pasturage, as overmuch cultivated land
curtailed sufficient grazing for tribal cattle.

Land hunger was evident the

next year, and Basutos complained that their land had not supported them since
1869.

The natives paid taxas without representation, and surplus funds taken

without their consent filled the colonial treasury.

Numerous natives believed

without substantiation that sale of Basuto property at the magistracies was
contrary to tribal law and custom and against the conditions of British an
nexation,

Knowing the wealth of Basutoland, traders moved there in droves.

It was a mistaken notion, continues Aylward, to believe that Europeanization
could transform a savage into a civilized being.
rev.; London:
II of History
win Ltd., 1919).
62

A pagan reaction set in,

George Allen &. Unwin Ltd., 1964),p. 55: Being originally Vol.
of South Africa
from 1873 to 1884(London: George
Allen &.Un
Hereafter cited as Theal, South Africa.

» PP- 129-30.
Sir Bartle Frere: Born in England in 1815,
Frere became Governor and High Commissioner of C&pa Colony in 1877. Adverse
English criticism surrounded his native policy, especially that towards the
Zulus.
He sanctioned the annexation of the Transvaal but promised to allevi
ate Boer grievances.
The colonists supported the Frere programs, and his re
call in 1880 angered them. He published a defense of his policies in 1881
and forewarned of the First Anglo-Boer War.
63
A. Aylward, "Basuto," Fraser's Magazine, March, 1882, p. 339;
N.B., p. 12. Alfred Aylward: Aylward, alias Murphy, was a South African ad
venturer associated with the Fenian movement, and in the 1860's he helped lead
the diamond laborers on the Vaal River who wanted to establish a republic.
He then moved to the Transvaal to fight in the Sekukuni War and to aid the
Boer cause.
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■%

heathen ceremonies resumed, and children quit school.

Missionaries complained

to Cape Town that the chiefs instigated the retrogression in order to preserve
ancient modes to sustain tribal authority and hereditary power against en64
croachments by European magistrates and law.
The Cape Government, failing to
support its few Basuto officials, never established'absolute control over
B a s u t o l a nd^
The natives undoubtedly were severely restricted domestically.

Basuto

land was the most heavily populated territory in South Africa, and natives
cultivated all the arable l a n d ^ But only a small portion of Basutoland was
habitable: s otrip, unequally fertile, 1 to 20 miles wide, and 150 miles long.
In such cramped circumstances, the Basutos with difficulty adjusted to Euro67
pean restrictions, particularly when suffering from a severe drought in 1879.
Because of uncontrolled grazing, land in numerous parts above arable areas

68

became empty of grass cover.

Regarding conclusions at this point, the Earl of Kimberley was mistaken
in his interpretation, as the tribe wanted control of its destiny in parlia
ment but selfishly wanted to remain independent with preferential treatment.

^ E d w i n W. Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland
ton Ltd., 1939), pp. 247-48.

(London: Hodder and Stough

65

Eric A. Walker, ed., South Africa, Rhodesia, and the High Commission
Territories, Vol. VIII of "The Cambridge History of the British Empire,"
(8
vols., 2nd ed.; London: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 490.
Hereafter
cited as Walker, ed., South Africa.
^*A. Gordon-Brown, ed., The Yearbook and Guide to Southern Africa
(1958
ed.; London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1958), p. 202.
67
C.
W. De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa
(London: Frank
Cass &. Co., Ltd., 1965), pp. 263-65.
Hereafter cited as Be Kiewiet, The
Imperial Factor.
68
3asutoland, Report for the Year 1963, p. 122.
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Secondly, Basutoland, if directly incorporated, would have contracted more se
vere restrictions to its voice in its government; the tribe already had ade
quate legislative representation.

The chiefs used maladjustment to colonial

rule to stir up dissension when actually tribal obnoxiousnass had caused the
loss of so much land.

Next, Cape Colony should have studied more carefully

Basuto culture before promoting Europeanization.

Europeanization, neverthe

less, helped to pacify and civilize the tribe, which now had an opportunity to
prosper.

BASUTO LABOR IN THE DIAMOND FIELDS

As previously mentioned, the Basuto economy depended somewhat on service
to whites.

The growth of the Kimberley diamond fields provided profitable

employment for Basutos, who migrated there to secure a cash salary.

Although

69
the Basuto chiefs supposedly voiced opposition to this service, Governor Frere
countered that the chiefs instructed their men not to return from the fields

7C

until they had earned a gun and ammunition.

The native workers, following

such chiefly advice because they feared the future, helped Basutoland gain the
reputation as the "powder magazine" of South Africa!^ Basutos prized guns and

72

worked diligently to buy them.

The policies of the Cape Government and the

Stevens, Lesotho, e t c ., p. 27.

70

Sir Bartle Frere, "The Basutos and the Constitution of the Cape of Good
Hope," The Nineteenth Century, IX (Jan.-June, 1881), 181. Hereafter cited
as Frere, HThe Basutos . . .. Cape of Good Hope."
^Hailey, The Republic of South Africa and the High Commission Territories,
p. 19; Coates, Basutoland, p. 40.
^Theal, South Africa, IX, 81.
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mine companies stimulated the armaments trade and thereby assured a large re
venue J^because Basutos had to accept guns instead of moneyl^ Cecil Rhodes noted
that natives would walk 100 miles to earn wages to buy the Mwhite m a n fs magic,”
yet he failed to emphasize that guns were tha white tnan's major enticement for
75
workers to coma to the diamond fields.
Thus, while the diamond fields generously provided a benaficial source of
employment, the natives intentionally armed themselves with guns and allowed
the chiefs to sustain despotism.

THE QUTHINS QUESTION

The Basuto hoarding of guns only made more ominous the later native grie
vances about overcrowding.

Morasi, chief of ths Baphutis in Quthinq^(Infra,

77
map, p. 234, PI. XX ), sought and received British protection in 1870, but
suddenly the chief became restless.

78
Chief Magistrate Charles Griffith of Ba-

73

Hansard, 3rd ser*, Vol. 252 (1880), 453-54, Mr. Lyulph Stanley speaking,
May 25, 1880.
74
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1068, Sir Wilfrid Lawson speaking,
January 20, 1B81.
75

Sarah G.■Millin, Rhodes

(Rev. ed.; London: Cbatto &. Windus, 1952), pp.

47-48.
7^The Baphutis consisted of two tribes. The first were original Baphu
tis; the second were Matsitsi.
Both were of Zulu origin, though each origina
ted from different areas, J. C. MacGregor, Basuto Traditions
(Cape Town: C.
5truik, 1505), p. 46.
77Theal, South Africa, IX, 61-62.
78
~
P.'il'Sl.'ili’M.*» P* 3-50* Chief Mayia Irate Griffith: Colonel Charles D*
Griffith was a British soldier and administrator.
An emigrant from England to
Caps Colony, he fought in the War of the Axe in 1846, in the 1851 Kaffir War,
and was inspector in the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police in 1852.
He re
ceived citations in the Tembuland campaign and in 1871 became Chief Magistrate
of Basutoland.
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sutoland requested the help of Letsie in settling the problem with Morosi.
Chief Letsie in vain sent messengers to dissuade Morosi from rebellious action,
and, on March B, 1879, a party of Basutos, probably at the instigation of
Morosi, raided across the border into Cape Colony,

Griffith arrived there

79
with 2,000 loyal Basuto tribesmen immediately after the skirmish.
Unaware of
80
possible consequences, Prime Hi,lister J. Gordon Sprigg of Cape Colony mobi81
lized the Easutos against Morosi.
One Basuto tribesman said that the chief
had discerned the Zulu successes and that his own rebellion provided an op
portunity for him to escape punishment.

Morosi did not consider himself a

British subject or subservient to Letsie, and he told his people that the Ba82
sutos would support them in rebellion, which seemed unlikely, for the Basutos
83
did not hold the Baphutis in high esteem.
John Martineau, furthermore, believes that British decisions at this
juncture did irreparable harm.

Missionaries advising Zulu Chief Cetewayo ex

aggerated the report of the British military disaster at Isandhlwana in Zululand, and the rumor spread among all the South African natives.

The British

army supposedly had suffered total destruction and could no longer maintain
79

13.3^.P . , (1880), LI, 551,'ltr. APS to Colonial Office, April 5, 1879.

80

» P- 357. Prime Minister 5prigg: Sir John Gordon Sprigg was
born in England.
He became a shorthand clerk at Gurney and taunted the Par
liament.
In 1853, ha visited Cape Colony and decided to remain.
A prominent
dairy nd sheep farmer, he served as MP for East London in the House Assembly
in 18o9.
Governor Frere asked him to form a cabinet in 1878 to replace Sir
John Molteno.
Prime Minister until 1881, he was Colonial Treasurer from 188486, and from 1886-90 served again as Prime Minister and Colonial Treasurer.
81
G. Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto
(Cape Town: Juta & Co., Ltd., 1950),

p 151
w

+

A*£.•» (1881), LXVI, 234, 240, ltr. Mofetude to Magistrate John Austen,
March 3, 1880.
S3
Sylward, ’’Basuto," p. 338.
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control*

Two regiments marching through Basutoland could have dissolved the

rumor quickly, the moral effect produced would have outweighed the fractional
expenditure, and Britain might have averted the future Basuto crisis.

But Sir

84
Garnet Wolseley, Commander-in-Chief of all South African Imperial troops, de
nied the request of Frere for this march, just as he refused to dispatch 200300 British infantry to help attack Morosi.

Colonial troops alone stormed the

rebel Baphuti stronghold on Movember 20, 1879, suffering a much greater loss
85
in men and money than otherwise necessary.
The Baphutis, morally sapped,

86

ware completely dispersed.

The native police under a white officer, moreover, were the only Basutos
who fought earnestly in the mountain assault.

The operation provided Lero~

87
thodi (Infra, illust., p. 226, PI. IX ), son of Letsie, with a superb view of
a European attack covered by desultory Basuto gunfire, and he noted the quality

88

of the colonial forces which he soon would battle.

The tribe feigned loyalty

by assisting the troops but later would use the training gained.to direct their
84

> P* 423. Sir Garnet Wolseley: Field-Marshal Viscount Garnet
J. Wolseley was born in Dublin.
In the British army he served in Burma, the
Crimea, Indie, and China. He smashed the Red River rebellion in Canada in
1870, then led an expedition against the Ashantis in 1873. Wolseley almost
replaced Lord Chelmsford during the Zulu 'War and captured Chief Cetewayo. He
became Governor of Natal, then as Governor of the Transvaal wrote a new con
stitution for that colony. He failed to relieve in time General Gordon at
Khartoum. Wolseley implemented many reforms in tha arrnv, despite opposition.
Thereafter, he became Commander-in-Chief of the British army from 1895— 9985
John Hartineau, The Life and Correspondence of Sir Bartle Frere, II
(London: John Murray, 1895), p. 348. Hereafter cited as Martineau, Frere.

86

Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 137.

87

A_.1).^.13., p. 214. Lerothodi: Son of Letsie I, who he succeeded in
1891, Lerothodi had great capability and was responsible for the creation of
the Basuto National Council.
RR

Tylden. The Rise of the Ba3uto. pp. 132-33.

89
weapons against the colony.
Mo doubt the Basutos thought they could evade
90
tuture disarmament by aiding the troops.
The major point to examine involved disposal of land overrun by troops in
Quthing.

91
Sprigg at first did not allow Basutos to settle in the area, which

92
was attached administratively to Basutoland. Moshesh never completely had
conquered the area, and Morosi had pledged only nominal allegiance to him.

The

Cape Prime Minister and Secretary for Native Affairs visited Quthing and after
much consideration agreed to divide the land into individual lots for sale by
auction to whites and blacks.

This action would give the Basutos an opportu

nity to buy land and would place orderly farms in a frontier area then sparss93
ly populated, though capable of supporting a large agricultural papulation.
Some Basuto chiefs and Europeans who disliked this decision asserted that
Wodehouse had promised Moshesh that Quthing would become an integral part of
Basutoland.
agreement.

Sir Bartle countered that he could find no record of such an p
The chiefs wanted to select people for Quthing settlements and

thereby manipulate the feelings of their subjects in order to retain as much
of their wilting chiefly power a3 possible.

Chief Letsie argued that his

tribe readily helpsd isolate Morosi; thus, he hoped that the overpopulated
Basutos could occupy all Quthing.

Basutos, thought Frere, had displayed in

sufficient loyalty in the Morosi campaign and therefore did not warrant a land
Aylward, "Basuto,” p. 339.
90

Theal, South Africa, XI, 45.

f (1881), LXVI, 257, ltr. Sprigg to Griffith; November 23, 1879.
92
J B . J 5 . , (1880), LI, 582-83, Minutes of Frere, January 3, 1880.
93
Ibid., 581-82, ltr. Frere to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir
Michael Hicks-3sach, March 18, 1380; Theal, South Africa, XI, 42, 57-58.
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reward from the forfeited rebel territory.

Wo rights existed or warranted

recognition that allowed a distant chief, such as Letsie, or group to occupy
property forfeited from a related clan.

Basutos never wholly had occupied

Quthing, an area largely inhabited by Baphutia and Moputis.

Sir Bartle thought

that land sales by auction would repay Cepe Colony for war expenditures*

He

also challenged the dissenting Chief Magistrate Griffith to find a Wodehouse
statement that promised exclusion of all other tribes from Basutoland proper
in the future, but the governor reassured Letsie that his tribe would not lose
its own land.

If Basutos felt crowded, they could settle with the assistance

of their magistrate on empty lands further south along the Orange River.
In spite of reassurances by Frere, Griffith, upon whom the Basutos looked
94
95
as their guardian and savior from the Boers, said that the deprivation of
Quthing would alienate the Basuto tribe and cause it to think it would lose
all its land.

Also, Europeans in that rugged district would feel isolated and

unprotected, panic, and become useless for defense.

A latter found by Griffith

sent from Moshesh to Wodehouse and dated April

21, 1368, referred to a law

proposed that would make illegal alienation of

land then occupied by the Basu-

96
tos.
The 1868 annexation proclamation unfortunately had not defined Basuto
borders?7
Sprigg, in the legislative debates, offered a resolution in the House
94

B..5..P,*, (1880), LI, 586, ltr. Letsie to
Griffith, December 9, 1879;
Ibid., 582-83, Minutes of Frere, January 3, 1880.
95
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto. p. 177.
96
(1880), L I , 584-85, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, November 27, 1879*
97Theal, South Africa, VIII, 304.
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Assembly that European farms fill part of Quthing, with Basutos or other na
tives filling the large remainder.

He argued that Griffith wanted Quthing for

only the Basutos because of expediency, power to select the occupants, and a
promise to give Basutos land if'they aided against Morosi.

Griffith denied

90
the last accusation.
Another member, Mr. Grpen, thought that a law must ac
knowledge that Quthing belonged to the Crown and that the district could not
devolve to Letsie, and the Attorney-General of the colony believed that Letsie
99
had no rights in the district.
The Earl of Kimberley, the ultimate authority, favored the Griffith pro
posals and thought that the Frere policy destroyed the atmosphere of isolation
in which Basutoland was governed.

The secretary narnsd that Quthing, because

of Frere actions, might attract a considerable settlement of whites in the
immediate vicinity of dense Basuto localities.

Colonel Griffith in 1878 had

persuaded Kimberley that in other areas of Cape Colony, integration of the
races caused native drunkenness, cattle thievery, and black degradation.
Though the immediate responsibility of dealing with Cape Colony natives, con
tinued Kimberley, still rested with tha colonial ministers^?he earl advised
that, after the Cape Mounted Rifles^garrison in Quthing had routed squatters,
98

The Paris Evangelical Society alleged that Griffith told the tribe that
it would lose title to Quthing by not fighting Morosi, jB,3_._P., (1881), LXVI,
703.
99
Ibid., 176-80, Cape House Assembly, June 307 1380.
^°°B_.5^.P>., (108Q), LI, 599-600, ltr. Kimberley to Frere, May 20, 1880.
Cape Mounted Rifles: This semi-military unit evolved from the Frontier
Armed and Mounted Police established in 1878.
Capable of rapid movement, its
members were responsible for their own horses and supplies.
They gained honor
in the Morosi campaign and Basuto Rebellion.
Hereafter referred to as CMR,
Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 88.
In Basutoland, Magistrate Arthur Darkly,
son of Governor Sir Henry Barkly, thought the CMR a fine corps, composed most
ly of sons of gentlemen, Fanny Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos
(London:

23
102
loyal 3asutos must have tbs right to occupy the territory, and he forced tem
porary suspension of Cape colonization plans after disallowing the confiscation?
Another issue ultimately overshadowed the land controversy.

Frere con

tended that the Morosi rebellion convinced Cape Colony that it could no'1longer
delay in extending to Basutoland the disarmament act in force among other
104
tribes, an act needed to protect the colony against native disturbances.
The Basutos, in conclusion, missed an opportunity to demonstrate their
loyalty by earnestly fighting Morosi; by showing untrustworthiness, the tribe
became suspect and liable to more rigid control.

The British should have ai

ded against the Baphutis to show solidarity with Cape Colony.

Kimberley mis

takenly still believed Basutoland a native reserve and shamelessly compromised
the colony in Basuto eyes.

As an example to the Basutos of punishment for

rebellion, Cape Town should have received permission to profitably colonize
Quthing immediately, as was the usual procedure.

European settlers might have

felt isolated in primitive Quthing, but they had every right to settle there.

Remington &. Co., Ltd., 1BB3), p. 237. G. Tylden otherwise contends that in
1878 a new commando law sanctioned the enlistment of untrained men in a unit
for only particular wars.
The title given the established force was the Cape
Mounted Rifles, a revival of the name of a disbanded Imperial unit.
The troop
was understrength, and its artillery needed new equipment and training. Three
regiments of the Cape Mounted Yeomanry (hereafter referred to as CMY), a local
militia, also formed.
It was expensive and impractical to call up more than
half the yeomanry at ones for service outside its recruiting territory.
The
volunteers, mostly infantry, were awkward recruits, and the entire force
carried outdated Snider carbines. There was provision for the CMY to impress
natives as levies, Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, pp. 129-30.

102

Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 252 (1880), 1619, Mr. Grant Duff speaking,
June 10, 1880.
^ ^ T h e a l , 5outh Africa, XI, 57-58.
104
B...5.JP., (1880), LI, 600, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Deach, March 2, 1880.

CHAPTER II

PRELUDE TO CRISIS

THE SPRIGG VISIT TO BASUTOLAND AND THE PROCLAMATION
OF THEE PEACE PRESERVATION ACT

Prime Minister Sprigg in October, 1879, made his annual visit to Basuto
land, this time to discuss with the natives the application to the tribe of the
provisions of the Peace Preservation Act of 1876^ of which the Basutos had
received warning in 1868.

Evidently, Governor Frere felt the importance of

2
the Sprigg visit, because he gave it publicity in Cape Colony.

Sir Gordon

attended two pitsos and was stunned to see an assembled cavalry legion of ap
proximately 7,000-8,000 trained men.

He thought it deplorable that Basutoland

3
could muster such a large unit of cavalry.
4
disparaging reception at Maseru.

Sprigg obliviously weathered a

Ignorant of the native language and customs,

he did not notice that many of the chiefs and throng did not show good will
towards or agreement with him but spoke derisively in their native language.
Magistrate Arthur Barkly, on intimate terms with the tribe, contended that the
5
Basutos were restless because of the battle of Isandhlwana and would not disarm.
Sir Gordon, following his agenda, summarily thanked the tribe for assis-

Peace Preservation Act (frequently referred to in the following text as
PPA): Cape Colony enacted this measure to remove guns from native tribes.
A
reproduction of the entire proclamation is in J3.5JP., (1880), LI, 577-80.

2

Ibid., 571, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, March 15, 1880; Ibid., 358, ltr.
Frere to Kimberley, n.d., r. August 5, 1879.
3
Martineau, Frere, II, 381.
4
Maseru: A town in western Basutoland which is the administrative capital
of the country.
5
Darkly, Among Boars and Basutos, pp. 112-13, 116.
24

25
tance against Morosi and in ths same manner announced the PPA and the doubling
of the hut tax to provide for Basuto education, roads, bridges, and enough
police protection to end cattle thefts in and adjacent to Basutoland.

These

provisions did not invoke a violent reaction at the time, but junior chiefs
did seize ths opportunity to voice their accumulated grievances loudly in
order to keep silent older chiefs.

Letsie, nevertheless, asked 5ir Gordon

who the tribe had offended to deserve disarmament.

Sprigg, in his confusion,

assumed that the Basutos had assented to his proposals, and he thanked thsrn.
The second day, he mat with numerous chiefs and councilors; these, however,
made apparent their opposition to the PPA.

Chief Tsekelo argued that Frere

and his ministers purposely wanted to break faith with the Basutos.

The major

chiefs, Letsie, Masupha, and ’“lolappo, who did not attend, allegedly because
of illnsssf were conspicuous by their absence.

The Prime Minister thought it

sufficient to mention that the Queen and British Government and people approved
of the PPA.

He also indicated that the Cape Government would trust Basuto

loyalty in the future as in the past and that Cape Colony did not believe the
tribe so sentimentally attached to its arms that it would not surrender them!
Sir Godfrey Lagden, The Basutos, II
(New York: D. Appleton and Co.,
1910), pp. 493-97;
, pp. 206-07;
Born in England, 5ir Godfrey Yeatman Lagden came to South Africa in 1878 to serve as chief clerk to the Secre
tary of State for the Transvaal.
During the Majuba campaign, he withstood a
siege at Pretoria.
After working for the Colonial Office in Sierra Leone and
in the Gold Coast, L%gden in 1884 secured a post in Basutoland and became
Chief Magistrate in 1890 and again from 1893-1901.
As chairman of the Inter
colonial South African Native Affairs Commission in 1902-04, he authored a
noteworthy paper on native problems.
Lagden distinguished himself in the
5econd Anglo-Boer War and thereafter wrote a standard text on the Basuto tribe
in 1909; Smith, The Habilles of Basutoland, p. 248; Molteno, Molteno, II, 425.
7

S_,_D._N.Bi., p. 227. Adolphe Mabille: After joining the Paris Evangeli
cal Mission in 1856, Mabille married a daughter of Eugene Casaiis find came to
Basutoland in 1860. He worked as a missionary there and in the Transvaal, and
he held great political influence among the Bantu,

After the pitso, the reverend Mr. Adolphe MabilleJ a French missionary,
added to the confusion by exposing alleged Government misconduct.

He com

plained that the Prime Minister deleted from the official report comments that
the Government would not forcibly disarm the Basutos but would await surrender
of guns at native discretion and contended that Sprigg intentionally omitted
the last statement as a pretext to use farea against Basutoland to end its
status as a native territory.

Besides these allegations, the pastor recalled

only two pjtsos to which the Basutos had come armed; usually they had instruc-

8

tions from chiefs to leave weapons behind.

Colonial Undersecretary for Native Affairs Bright- in answer to the Mabille accusations, reported that the pitso instructions had been printed in
Sesuto in a pamphlet and distributed to the tribe in order to prevent miscon
ception and to announce that the Government would wait for calmer times to act
on disarmament.

The Government, convinced that Basutos would see that the PPA

was to their own advantage, therefore stood firm on its policy and instructed
9
the magistrates to eventually disarm the natives.
Concerning opinion on the Sprigg journey, C. W. De Kiewiet alleges that
the protesting Basutos had the better platform and that the Prime Minister,
had he consulted with Basuto magistrates, would have disavowed speedy disarms-

10

ment.

Edgar Brookes, an authority on South African native policy, terms

Sprigg t a c t l e s s ^
8

Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, pp. 246-48.

^B_.S_.P_., (1880), LI', 563, ltr. Bright, February 26, 1880.
■^De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 266.
*^Brookes, History of Native Policy, p. 103.
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In final appraisal, the increased hut tax would obviously benefit the
tribe.

Prime Minister Sprigg sincerely wanted to discuss this and other is

sues with the natives and did not want to employ force.
sented the pitsos and status of Basutoland.

Mr. Mabille misrepre

The chiefs probably pretended

their illness for personal reasons and knew very well that the PPA was neither
an insult nor stemmed from tribal offense.

The Basutos produced no valid ar

guments at the pitsos against disarmament, a decree discussed next in detail.
The Sprigg journey fit into a larger perspective.

The climax of Cape

Colony policy of direct rule over the Basutos came in an attempt to disarm the.

12

tribe under the Peace Preservation Act of 1876.

The Basutos were excellent

13
marksmen and much better armed than the Zulus. Over 20,000 tribesmen owned
14
guns, many of them superior weapons.. William Greswall declares that some ob
servers felt that Basuto war spirit had increased over a long period and that
guns heavily bolstered native confidence.

The tribe had increased its self-

respect and had learned European battle tactics, and knowledgeable tribesmen
15
with guns could easily defend cliffs and natural fortresses like Thaba Bosigo.
Armed with guns, many Basutos thought that they could push the Europeans into
16
the sea.
A. lAylward believes that, had Cape Colony correctly appraised the
performance of tribal infantry and cavalry in irregular warfare, the Govern
ment might have governed Basutoland more c a r e f u l l y ^ Guns in the hands of the

12

Stevens, Lesotho, e tc., p. 27.

13

Kathleen Shervintan, The Shervintons: Soldiers of fortune
(London: T.
fisher Unwin, 1899), p. 59. Hereafter cited as Shervinton, The Shervintons.
14
Theal, South Africa, XI, 55.
^ W i l l i a m Oreswell, Our South African Empire, II
Hall, Ltd., 1885), p. 78.
^ W a l k e r , ed., South Africa, p. 49Q.
■^Aylward, MBasuto,” pp. 330, 339.

(London: Chapman and

28
strong and self-conscious 3asuto3 was an incentive to war and rebellion.

To

rule this large tribe rampant with quarrels, Cape Colony wanted positive
guarantees for peace.

Disarmament was part of a process to extend Cape Colony

control over all native tribes up to the Natal border.

One irate colonist

complained that, although the previous Cape administration had illegally al
lowed unlimited sales of guns to the natives while the Transvaal and Orange
18
Free State objected, loyal natives like the Fingos had been disarmed and even
Europeans in

the colony held

magistrates denied that arms

gun licenses.

De Kiewiet indicates that Bssuto

made the natives rebellious and that the colony

used the PPA

19
in 1880 to force war on the Basutos, but the original dispatch

of the Natal

Mercury relates that the tribe would not have had to disarm had

its loyalty been unquestionable.

Griffith added that guns were toys to these

natives and that this incisive proclamation might eradicate polygamy, native
mischief, and heathenism.

Disarmament was a prerequisite for Europeanization

20

of traditional Basuto customs.

Brookes, nevertheless, relates that the timing

of disarmament was poor because of the affect of Isandhlwana and because of
the slow spread of news regarding the British victory over the Zulus at Ulundi.

21

The Zulu War had created the impression that whites feared blacks.

Governor Frere, giving additional reasons for disarmament, asserted that
it was impossible for a colonial ministry to uphold law and order when whole

18

Fingos: A native tribe in the Eastern Province of Cape Colony, these
nomads united as a result of Zulu aggressions by Chief Chaka. Older tribes
regarded them with disdain, Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 167.
19
De Kiewiet, Tha Imperial Factor, pp. 263, 266; The Times (London),
September 24, 1880, p. 4.

20

The Times (London), January 1, 1879, p. 5.

21

Brookes, History of Native Policy, p. 103.

29
tribes secreted arms.

Basutos were fully-armed and obedient to a few young

22
chiefs and their own dignity. A 3 the last three years had shown how firearms
aided native fighting power, he deprecated people who fictionalized arguments
to prove that the Government should not worry about tribes purchasing guns and
that natives would not learn their use and posed a more dangerous threat with
23
assegais.
The Basutos, in reality, since early in the century had increased
and organized their cavalry and marksmanship.

In a few days thejr could muster

thousands of men and avalanche from the mountains towards European settlements.
The Basutos, felt Sir Bartle, had noivalid excuse for hoarding guns and posing
a military threat to Cape Colony and merely wanted to cast off colonial domi
nation.

Basutos from Natal had joined Natal native units against the Zulus

and had fought bravely, but the behavior of a few, felt the governor, did not
24
vouch for the loyalty of the entire tribe. Frere maintained that the Basutos
were loyal to the Crown in an abstract fashion but that they mistrusted or ig
nored colonial camnunds, an aversion which time and experience hopefully would
alter.

Tbe tribe believed itself disarmed as a punishment and that the colony

deemed all guns evil, but Frere thought that Chief Letsie realized the true
25
reason for disarmament.
Sir Bartle did not delay disarmament, because he did
not trust the tribe.

26
Other Cape officials did not agrea on Basuto constancy.

22B .5.P., (1881), LXVI, 204-05, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, July 26, 1880.
23
Assegai: A South African native spear which takes its name from a Latin
origin.
The older type is a throwing assegai, the newer model is a stabbing
spear having a broad and sharp blade on a short handle, Rosenthal, ad., Ency
clopedia, pp. 24-25.
24
Frere, "The Basutos . . . Cape of Good Hope," pp. 168, 182.
25B.SiP.%

26

(1880), LI, 557-58, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, March 2, 1380.

Ibid., 597, ltr. Ayliffe to Sprigg, April 12, 1880.

30
London could have compelled Frere to dispatch a special commission to investi
gate Basuto feelings on the PPA, but Wolseley refused to permit the use of
British officers.

27
Thus, Frere had to accept reports of Basutoland officials.

The governor, furthermore, was convinced of the virtuous intentions of
the Cape Government and of the necessity of the PPA.

The British Government

approved the PPA, and Prime Minister Sprigg merely effected a practical theory
used before and approved by his predecessors.

People qualified to judge, in-

28
eluding those who sought native advancement, supported the Government. On
December 22, 1879, Colonel Griffith ordered the tribe to disarm and receive
compensation within a month following.

29
Only a few natives obliged.
The Chief

Magistrate said that a PPA circular carrying the order to the chiefs was not
30
very successful but that natives from different areas brought in guns. Frere
therefore thought the PPA a success thus far.

The tribesmen claimed a senti

mental attachment to their arms; thus, Cape Colony bad to act like a parent
taking a knife from a child.

Frcere thought that the measure would civilize

the Basutos.

If disarmament was as difficult as some said, its attainment was

more urgent.

The failure of the magistrates and missionaries to explain the

PPA properly offered no excuse for resistance.

Troops would mobilize if colo

nial ministers saw a risk of rebellion and would crush chiefs who disobeyed,
though the governor expected no turmoil unless the natives followed a trouble
maker.

If PPA adversaries voided the act, African civilization would suffer

.5^.JP., (1881), LXVI, 163, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, May 30, 1880.
^J3 »5_.£.,

(1880), LI, 591, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, n.d., r. April 15,

1880.
^ T h e a l , South Africa, XI, 58-59.
30
.B.J5.P_,, (1881), LXVI, 258, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, January 28, 1880.

31
a setback*^
The Cape Government, on April 6, 1880, thereupon proclaimed the provi
sions of the PPA in Basutoland.

Natives could voluntarily surrender arms for

32
compensation up to the extended deadline of May 21, 1880.
A permit for a
weapon would be issued only after a magistrate submitted a name to the Chief
Magistrate and to the colonial Secretary for Native Affairs along with the
33
reasons for recommendation,
A warranted officer could ask to see a permit,
and if a person could not or refused to show it, his arrest would immediately
follow.

Officials could carry arms; othsrs had to deposit thair weapons at

the office of thsir district magistrate.

The PPA covered guns, pistols,

swords, bayonets, daggers, pikes, spears, and all kinds of ammunition,

A com

petent appraiser appointed by the Chief Magistrate would value within one
month all arms given to the magistrates and compensate natives proving owner34
ship.
Undersecretary Bright added that a board of valuers comprising the
35
magistrate, a headman, and a trader supervised each district.
Compensation
for surrendered guns equalled the appraised value, though most Basutos had
bought guns with the sanction of British magistrates at more than the market
. 36
prrce.
One magistrate, however, offered beneficial but mostly ignored amendments,

^^13.S^P., (1880), LI, 588-91, ltr. Frare to Hicks-Beaeh, n.d., r. April
15, 1B8Q.
^ ^ ♦ S l.P,. , (1881), LXVI, 157, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, April 6, 1880.
33
Ibid.. 162, ltr. 5prigg, April 9, 1880.
34
Ibid.. 157-59, Proclamation by Frere.
^ I b i d ., 236, ltr. Bright to Griffith, March 4, 1880.
36
Theal, South Africa, XI, 56.

32
He believed that it was unnecessary to confiscate assegais and that a diploma
tic endeavor might enable superior chiefs to retain guns for hunting.

Traders

37
and other whites also needed to keep guns for self-defense.
The colonial Government, in any event, acted cautiously.

Frere decided

that a magistrate could humor chiefs by licensing theix' guns for sporting
purposes.

Ha noted the short time allowed for translation and distribution of

the PPA and realized that officials searching for arms without a warrant might
38
cause resistance.
Searches and seizures therefore were authorized only if the
39
public peace became endangered.
Sprigg said that an officer could seize a gun
without a warrant only if it was inconvenient to travel far for a warrant and
only if a wrongdoer could hide guns before the officer returned.

Sir Gordon

expected less danger of friction with the PPA in Basutoland than elsewhere,
because the few whites residing there did not seem to present a threat to the
40
trxbe.
The governor, nevertheless, felt that great danger would arise from post
ponement of disarmament and felt obliged to enforce disarmament immediately or
perpetuate what frontier colonists thought a continual source of danger to
public peace and governmental authority.

The rebellion of Morosi had showed

thB risk of allowing such a menace to remain.

To defenders of native rights

in the Government who opposed him, 5ir Bartle answered that delay would offer
inspiration to Basuto lackeys, including missionaries and professedly loyal
tribesmen.

These people believed that opposition to the PPA was small, sup-

37£.S.P>* , (1881), LXVI, 256, ltr. nharles H. Ball to Griffith, March 14,
1880.
38

Ibid., 160, ltr. Frere to Ministers.
> (1880), LI, 557, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, March 2, 1880.

40

B.5..P., (1881), LXVI, 161, ltr. Sprigg, April 9, 1880.

33
ported by groundless fears of the natives, and that unenforced disarmament would
41
reassure ignorant natives and allow easy implementation of the PPA.
Frere further noted that arms always had increased the native threat.

As

South African natives first bought guns, Cape Government policy deemed that
frontier tribes should not have access to arms or ammunition.

During wars,

the Cape Government enforced strict gun-control regulations, but in peacetime
the control was less stringent.

In 1870, it became the common practice of

public officials to pay natives with guns.

5ome traders liked this practice,

and missionaries argued that natives armed with guns would quickly decimate
the game, with the result that the tribes would became more settled and indus
trious,

Before Frere*s arrival in South Africa, a commission on border defense

noted the increasing danger from guns in the hands of frontier tribesmen.

Ex

perienced frontiersmen advised Frere to disarm natives and halt the sale of
guns.

Sir Bartle contended that the guns in a tribe did not diminish the im

portance of the assagai, the native weapon most commonly used.

It was a lethal

weapon, and most natives needed little practice in its employment.

Others, he

continued, erroneously thought a native ignorant of the use of guns less dan
gerous than if trained in the use of the assegai.
artillery was to Europeans.

Guns were to natives what

Guns increased martial pride and c o n c e i t c a u s i n g

insubordination and a feeling of invincibility.

Frere felt that it was impos

sible to know which natives, until they were informed of disarmament, were
friends or enemies of the Government.

During his service in India, rebellion

had not spread to districts where guns were inaccessible.

Frere did not,

however, seem to fear a union of tribes uniting against Cape C o l o n y ^

41

Frere, "The Basutos • . . Cape of Good Hope,” pp. 181-82, 190, 193.

34
In regard to unwarranted hindrance and imputation, portions of the press
and some missionaries encouraged native resistance.

British interference with

his ministers, said Frere, wouid tend to lessen their constitutional responsi43
bility.
Edwin Smith, apologist for the obnoxious French missionaries, mista
kenly remarks that Sprigg confirmed Basuto suspicions by distinguishing between
44
blacks and whites in application of disarmament.
Godfrey Lagden, a later
Basutoland Chief Magistrate, insists that Sprigg, formally pledged to apply
the PPA to Basutoland, had excellent reasons to withdraw the act and that the
governor announced that it was impossible to withdraw this erroneous applica
tion of the PPA.

Lagden alleges that most Basuto magistrates, missionaries,

traders, and other native officials detested tha PPA, which he believed caused
45
the tribesmen to distrust the Cape Government.
Sir Garnet Wolseley was the most outspoken critic in South Africa against
the PPA.

Sir George Grey, a former High Commissioner of South Africa, said

46
that few persons there differed from Wolseley regarding the view that indis
criminate ownership of guns by natives was dangerous.

Basutos, pointed out

Wolseley, had aided Cape Colony in the Zulu War, and he felt that it was asi
nine to reward such loyalty by disarmament.
ly would incur international censure.

To disarm natives indiscriminate

It was impolitic to disarm the Basutos

42

B . S J \ , (1880), LI, 567-70, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, March 15, 1680;
Theal, South Africa, XI, 55-56.
43
J3.5_.<P . , (1880), LI, 571-72, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, March 15, 1880.
44
Smith, Tha Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 255.
45
Lagden, The Basutos. II, 500, 502, 492.
4^Earl Grey, ’’South Africa,”
July, 1880), 935.
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35
and not neighboring tribes; disarmed Basutos would never again help Cape Colo
ny.

In addition, he indicated that enforcement of the PPA would require a

large military force, and Cape Colony did not have tha military capability to
47
handle a Basuto rebellion.
To start a war to confiscate guns from loyal Basu
tos, while leaving hundreds of thousands among neighboring tribes, was too
serious a risk.

Though Wolseley admitted that he may have overestimated the

48
future Basuto reaction, his unexpected rebuke caused embarrassment and rein
forced Opposition arguments in the Cape Parliament.
Frere, in defense of his management of the PPA, failed to find in Wolseley*s contentions anything that warranted a change in the position of the
Government.

Wolseley, in Frerefs view, might have warned Cape Colony earlier

of ths supposed danger of mass native uprisings or suggested a remedy against
indiscriminate Basuto ownership of guns.

Whereas colonial boundaries expanded,

the London Government constricted the area protected by British troops; there
fore, the PPA substituted for them as a guarantee of the peace.

While several

large districts of Kaffraria had successfully undergone disarmament, government
and military officers in England,
Frere method of disarmament.

India., and elsewhere had agreed VJith the

Three of Frere*s ministers, plus Sprigg and se-

49
veral local advisers with experience in frontier warfare, supported his views.
Cape Colony newspapers, moreover, reflected two viewpoints.

The Cape

50
Times espoused the Sprigg ministry cause, while the Cape Argus, the Opposition

^3,.S.P,», (1880), LI, 586-87, ltr. Wolseley to Hicks-Beach, March 10, 1B8Q.
A8
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1071, Mr. Fowler speaking, January
20, 1881.
, (1881), LXVI, 202-05, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, July 26, 1880.
50

The Times (London), September 6, 1880, p. 6.
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51
tabloid, condemned the PPA application to Basutoland.
52
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, predecessor to Kimberley as Colonial Secretary,
subsequently carefully delineated British jurisdiction in the PPA by recalling
that the British Parliament more than a year before had sanctioned the PPA and
53

would create trouble by its interference,

The secretary did not interfere with

the colonial ministers, who must have realized that Imperial troops could not
54
support them. Hicks-Deach in May, 1880, advised caution, as the Basutos were
loyal subjects, and he felt relieved that no one contemplated searching for
arms domestically.

Sir Michael realized that the colonial ministers were morB

intimate with the situation than himself and reminded the colony that it was
55
under responsible government and that he himself could offer only advice.
The Earl of Kimberley, in contrast, suddenly-altered his reaction to the
PPA.

He had said in February, 1880, that, while he supported a gradual and

cautious disarmament throughout South Africa, he feared that the PPA would
cause disaffection among B a s u t o s ^ After Kimberley succeeded to the Colonial
51

Ibid.» April 23, 1880, p. 5. Greswell fails to see how the Basutos
could constitutionally oppose the PPA, argues that guns in Basuto hands were
dangerous as there was no game nearby, and asserts that gun licenses might
have been introduced more gradually, Greswell, Our South African Empire, II,
86, 82. Natal officials and colonists in vain protested against the applica
tion of the PPA, Pall Mall Gazette
(London), July 23, 1880, p. 4. There was
also much opposition in radical English cliques to the disarmament, Walker,
ed., South Africa, p. 490.
52
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach: Born in London in 1837, Hicks-Beach entered
Parliament in 1864.
In 1878, he became Secretary of State for the Colonies.
During his tenure, he interviewed Boer delegates protesting the annexation of
the Transvaal and by his policy caused the First Anglo-Boer War, Rosenthal,
ed., Encyclopedia, p. 226.
53
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 251 (1880), 1205-06, Mr. Justin M ’Carthy and
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach speaking, f4arch 18, 1880.
54
B..S..P.., (1880), LI, 556, ltr. Hicks-Beach to Frere, March 10, 1880.
55
Hansard. 3rd ser., Vol. 252 (1880), 645, Mr. Grant Duff speaking, May
28, 1880.
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Office in the spring of 1880, he offered an official viewpoint similar to
Hicks-Beach.

Queen Victoria, he wrote, had decided that the PPA would not

humiliate the Basutos or degrade them in sight of their neighbors and that
civilization had reached the point where Basuto habits had to conform with
57
those of other subject peoples.
Kimberley saw no point in discussing the PPA,
since the colonial ministers favored the measure, which was already in force.
He thought that these ministers probably understood the situation better than
the Home Government and cautioned that the colony would have to handle subse—
58
quent contingencies without Imperial troops.
Kimberley, despite his turnabout, gave moral support to ths Basutos who
59
refused to disarm.
The secretary, disquieted, and aware of Wolseley objec-

60

tions to the PPA, himself disagreed on the manner of implementation of the
a c t ^ The earl showed his sympathy for the rebellious element by repudiating
62
British responsibility for disarmament.
The London Government had incurred
serious burdens in recent native wars and, necessarily, felt that it must take
63
a position on native relations which would assure peace in South Africa.
Kim
berley warned Cape Colony that the recent lengthy and bloody conflicts between

Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 250 (1880), 258-59, The Earl of Kimberley spea
king, February 9, 1880.
57
^j3.j5.P_., (1880), LI, 596, ltr. Kimberley to Frere, May 13, 1880,
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Ibid., 596-97, ltr. Kimberley to Frere, May 13, 1880.
)
59,
Lagden, The Basutos, II, 503
60
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Government of the Transvaal, May 26, 1880.
61
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 259 (1881), 1793, The Earl of Kimberley spea
king, March 24, 1881.
62
Walker, ed., South Africa, p. 490.
63
> (1880), LI, 601, ltr. Kimberley to Frere, May 20, 1880.
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natives and British troops in South Africa made it wise to avoid provocations
that might lead to new fighting.

He promised, however, not to interfere in

the PPA issue, as such action would make responsible government at Cape Colony
look r i d i c u l o u s ^
In conclusion, it seemed certain that guns reinforced rebelliousness and
insolence in the Basutos and that the tribe offered a clear and present mili
tary threat; therefore, the PPA was a test of loyalty.

The Basutos had no

sentimental attachment for their guns, and they disguised their disloyalty
with pretended confusion and wanted a special exemption from the PPA.
Cape Colony, furthermore, would have risked danger and contempt from na
tives by delaying the PPA, though the colony originally might have lengthened
the time for disarmament to allow adequate time for explanation to the natives.
The Government might have reimbursed natives for the purchase price of a gun,
and Basutos might have been'.allowed to retain the assegai, an integral part of
their culture.

It was a sound idea to allow chiefs, who could help disarm the

tribe, to keep guns.

The colony took measures to avoid violent confrontation

but did not prepare to meet resistance that was better to have been faced im
mediately than later with self-reliant colonial military forces which had
proved themselves capable in the past.

Frere councilors had first-hand know

ledge of the capabilities of natives armed with guns; ha and Sprigg never regretted the PPA, though the former was overconfident.

As the Home Government

questioned the PPA, British officers might have helped investigate conditions
for disarmament.

^ H a n s a r d , 3rd ser., Vol. 254 (1880), 1108, Mr. Grant Duff speaking,
July 22, 1880.
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BASUTQ OPPOSITION TO DISARMAMENT AND THE RESPONSE OF THE CAPE PARLIAMENT

Cape Colony was in a better position than the Home Government to react to
Basuto feelings about the PPA.

Chief Letsie sent to the Cape Parliament peti-

65
tions opposing disarmament, which were presented on May 14, 1880.
The Basutos
in their first application expressed sadness at the intimations of their mis
conduct.

The natives professed obadience to Christianity and protective colo

nial laws and recalled their submission to Government demands at every yearly
pitso.

They could not understand the reason for their disarmament, because

arms by themselves seemed harmless.

Neighboring tribes would think Basutos

had offended the Government and, because the Queen allegedly lost prestige
from the PPA, might fear to seek British protection.

The petition promised

that tribal guns, which had aided the Queen against Morosi andiihtf Zulus, would
never endanger the Crown.

The natives sensed disgrace and even ventured that

their disarmament resulted because they were b l a c k ^ They feared virtual sla
very under the P P A ^ In addition, a subordinate petition protested an alleged

68

confiscation of Quthing on the grounds that Wodehouse had defined exactly the
69
limits of Basutoland to include the Baphuti lands.
The Grahamstown Journal (Cape Colony) indicated that an educated native
leader, Chief Tsekelo, had originated the first petition, which also reflected
the sentiments of his royal brothers that thsir power was being eroded.

Tse-

^ T h e a l , South Africa, XI, 50.
.S_.PL , (1880), LI, 559-62, Petition of Basuto chiefs and people to
Frere.
^ ^J3.S_.JP., (1881), LXVI, 166-67, Petition of Letsie . . . House Assembly.
68
Ibid., 165, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, June 8, I860.
Ibid., 166, Petition of Letsie . • . House Assembly.
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kelo and others wanted a national Basuto assembly and accused the Government
of failing to provide the Basutos with the means needed to express their com
plaints and opinions in parliamentary style.

The tribe wanted reform without

loss of reverence for and obedience to the chiefsi*"*
Governor Frere, in the Government recoilment, believed that the natives
seemed more prone to emotion than reasonP* Griffith had blasted a similar pe
tition he had received in 1879 as
. . . the most impertinent and insolent letter ha had ever read, and
if he had been in the office when it was brought he would have thrown
it back in the faces of the bearers of it, and kicked them out of the
office.
Those who had written and signed it were . . . rebels, who
had insulted the Queen*s Government.
72
Griffith now planned to tighten the lax rule in Basutoland.
Chief Letsie, in further native reaction, gathered representatives from
every part of his .country for a delegation to Cape Town.

He gave Griffith a

list of names and asked advice and recommendations for delegation members.
7J
Though Secretary for Native Affairs Ayliffe consented to the scheme, Undersec74
retary Bright informed Letsie that a delegation could not secure advantages.
The paramount chief then bewailed the alleged deprivation of his right to com
plain to the Crown and thought that Cape Colony must await a royal judgement
75
of the PPA.
Griffith replied that the petitions would not alter the situation

^ T h e Timas (London), January 1, 1B79, p. 5; Edwin Smith argues that
Adolphe Mabille inspired, if not actually wrote, the Basuto petitions, Smith,
The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 255.
* (1880), LI, 557, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, March 2, 1880.
72

The Times (London), January 1, 1879, p. 5.

73B.S.£., (1881), LXVI,. 245, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, April 11, 1880;
Ibid.. 245, ltr. Letsie to Griffith, April 11, 1880.
^ Ibid., 237, ltr. Bright to Griffith, March 31, 188G.
^~*Ibid., 248, ltr. Letsie to Griffith, April 11, 1880.
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and that the magistrates did not have to await a reply from the Queen or the
76
Cape Government.
The paramount chief then said that the short time given in
which to surrender his guns frightened him and that the Basutos were demonstra
ting good faith by their willingness to send a group to Cape Town instead of
fleeing to the mountains.

Letsie later told Assistant Magistrate Davies of

Thaba Bosigo District that the Government was deliberately, but in vain, at
tempting to make the Basutos appear rebels.

Davies thought that the tribe

would send a delegation, even at the risk of losing compensation for withheld
77
guns.
Discourse did take place between the delegation and Cape Government.
Seven Basutos led by a Pastor Cochet from the Paris Evangelical 5ociety left
78
79
for Cape Town on April 29, 1B80. Sprigg met with the deputation and, while
80
restricting its activities, granted a one-month extension for the surrender of
arms.

Cochet, acting as interpreter, thought the delay not only would have a

beneficial effect on the disarmament efforts of the chiefs but also would mean
that the Cape Parliament would take time to discuss the issue.

Frere met with

the delegation and held several lengthy conversations with Cochet, who men
tioned nothing of alarrn?^
The colony acted magnanimously in the face of the obstinacy in Basutoland.

82
One recalcitrant chief, David Masupha (Infra, illust., p.

227>' P 1 * ^

^ I b i d ., 245-46, ltr. Griffith to Letsie, April 16, 1880.
^ I b i d ., 250-51, ltr. Davies to Griffith, April 23, 1880.
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13.3_.P_., (1881), LXVI, 162-63, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, n.b., r.
24, 1880.

June

)>
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led the dissidents who ordered the tribe to keep its guns until the delegation
returned.

83
Griffith carried out his instructions amidst a worsening situation

84
and reported that the sons of Chief Letsie had joined Masupha.
Letsie sought
anothar deadline continuance so that the deputation could return and report to
the tribe.

The Chief Magistrate also thought that the prescribed period was

too short to collect the Basuto guns and that another extension of time seemed
85
feasible.
The ministry again extended the date of disarmament, from June 21
to July 12, to enable the Basuto deputation to return and divulge the procee-

86

dings.

M ’tho, a chief councilor to Letsie, and Cochet were confident that the

87
tribe would obey the PPA if given more time.
Colonel Griffith, in assessment, was angered at the petitions because
they bypassed his authority and reeked of cunning.

The Basutos had ample

channels to voice grievances and realized that tribal petitions and a delega
tion did not constitute customary protests and that the Queen and British
Parliament had only indirect control over the tribe.

To allow the delegation

to report its activities before a disarmament deadline was prudent, because
go
* P* 242.
David Masupha: The third son of Hashesh, Masupha
was a disobedient heir. When Moshesh died, Letsie could not move to the capi
tal at Thaba Bosigo, because Masupha had usurped the mountain.
Involved in
numerous quarrels with neighboring clans, Masupha defied the colonial Govern
ment continuously.
The Times printed that Masupha had once tortured a horsa
thief by squeezing the man's head between two poles.
The chief, after agree
ing to a cease-fire in the War of 1865, had massacred a fores of Bastards and
had carried off their women, The Times (London), October 28, 1880, p. 4.
, (1881), LXVI, 167-68, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, June 29, 1880.
84

Ibid., 168, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, June 25, 1880.

85

Ibid., 168, Cape Times reporting on Sprigg speaking in the June 18,
1830, House Assembly session.
86
Theal, South Africa, XI, 59*
, (1881), LXVI, 186, ltr. Frere to Ministers.

the tribe would listen to its own members.
The Cape Parliament, aside from Basuto protests, heatedly debated the al
ready operative PPA application in the spring and summer of 1080.

The discus

sion was the longest in Cape parliamentary history, with 45 of the 67 Assembly
members paiticipating.

The Prime Minister, believes Edwin Smith, purposely

wanted to observe the PPA in Basutoland before Parliament convened.

Sprigg

announced in the House Assembly that he had never believed the Basutos willing
to surrender their arms, because the tribe for years had prepared to rebel by
purchasing the best guns and ammunition.
Both the negrophiles led by Saul Solomon and the Afrikaner faction led by
Jan Hofmeyr, as expected, carried on vigorous opposition in the House Assembly
83
to the PPA.
5olomon alleged thct Letsie had exceeded his authority by disar
ming before tha delegation returned and that Masupha had acted constitutionally
89
according to tribal law. Opposition observers thought Sir Gordon had urged
Frere to proclaim the PPA before Parliament met, because that body reluctantly
would veto a law already effected.

The people then would have to suffer the

90
consequences of a policy which they did not originate or sanction.
The major
ity of the Assembly, declared Thomas Fuller, believed that this unwarranted
PPA application was dictatorial and unconstitutional, because no emergency had
arisen.

The Government had spent a large amount of funds unauthorized by Par

liament and had assumed a policy which required great consideration by the
legislature?^*
aa

Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, pp. 245-46, 257, 260.
89
J3«5 ^ . , (1881), LXVI, 180, Cape Argus reporting the June 30, 1880,
House Assembly session.
90
The Times (London), May 17, 1880, p. 10.

44
Cecil Rhodes, on ;\pril 19, in his first speech in the Cape Parliament,
condemned the PPA but nevertheless supported the Prime Minister*

He argued

that the PPA was unjust and that its enactment would cause war, because B isuto
laborers at the diamond fields planned to forcibly resist the act.

The member

compared the situation to the Sepoy Mutiny, in which greased cartridges imme—
92
diately caused the outbreak.
The loyal Basutos, asserted Bhodes, were purpose93

ly out of turn disarmed of guns valued as modern status symbols.

He warned of

wasting millions in toying with serious native problems and objected to sub94
jection of natives to the vacillation of successive Cape Governments. The
member drew praise from the Assembly by criticizing the Sprigg policy of not
95
warning in advance the natives of new laws such as the PPA. There seemed
little in the PPA concerned with the Basuto right to defend themselves against
the Orange Free Stats.

Officials, said Rhodes, would realize soon that better-

armed natives injured each other less while they defended themselves better
against Boer and Portuguese marauders.

He praised the Sprigg Government,

96
however, for its work in preventing guns from reaching natives.
Despite other
members charging the Prime Minister with slavish humiliation to the Basutos,
Rhodes supported the Sprigg gestures if they meant to preserve peace.

The

91The3l, South Africa, XI, 59.
92
Vindex, Cecil Rhodes. His Political Life and Speeches, 1881-1900
(Lon
don: Chapman 8, Hall, Ltd., 1900), pp. 31-33. Hereafter cited as Vindex, Cecil
Rhodes; J. L. S. Green, Rhodes Goes North
(London: G. Bell &. Sons, Ltd.,
1936), p. 11.
93
Sir Thomas E. Fuller, Cecil _J. Rhodes
(London: Longmans Green and C o . ,
1910), p. 17.. Hereafter cited as Fuller, Rhodes.
94
Millin, Rhodes, pp. 47-48, 221.
G. McDonald, Rhodes

96.

(New York: Robert M. McBride &. Cti., 1928), p. 58.

Green, Rhodes Goes North, pp. 108-09.
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tribe, by rejecting such accommodation, would show its desire to fight.
Stuart Cloete believes that Rhodes was motivated to gamble the labor sup
ply in his diamond fields against the certainty of war.

Rhodes then would

magnify the danger from natives armed with guns and later would start a con
flict in which he could escape blame for massacring spear-carrying natives
with well-armed troops.

He would be able afterwards to consolidate the terri-

98
tory north of the Limpopo River for himself.
After three weeks of debate, the Capa Parliament, by a 37-28 vote, ap99
proved the application of the PPA to Basutoland, thus supporting the Prime
Minister, who had already hurriedly effected the PPA application as a result
of his pa3t experience with natives and because the situation needed immediate
attention.

THE FRENCH MISSIONARIES OPPOSE THE DISARMAMENT POLICY

Cecil Rhodes was not alone in facing impugnation of his position.

William

Greswell reflected in 1885 on the circumstance of the Paris Evangelical Society^in its favorite locale, Basutoland.
97

It was difficult for a missionary

Vindex, Cecil Rhodes, pp. 33-35; Millin, Rhodes, p. 221.

98

Stuart Cloete, Against These Three
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1945), p. 263.
□g
, (1881), LXVI, 207-08, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, July 14, 18B0.
^ ^ P a r i s Evangelical Society (frequently referred to in the following
text as PE5): The order entered 3asutoland in 1833 it the request of Moshesh,
but six years elapsed before the first baptism occurred.
Intertribal warfare
halted the beginning of a formal church until 1860.
In 1866, the victorious
Free State expelled the mission from Basutoland for abetting the Basutos, but
the British allowed it to return in 1868.
By 1871, 1,831 natives had conver
ted, and from the next year the Government cooperated with the mission to

46
in a foreign land to preach only abstract religious dogma; usually, he advised
the native leader nearby, who sought him as a confidential adviser, especially
on external affairs.
and confusing problem.

Missionaries who held political power presented a novel
Their guiding principle was self-protection, as their

safety depended on their toleration by the natives.

Basutos, however, were

generally unresponsive to preaching^^
With its influence, the PES in 1879 and 1880 condemned before the Colo
nial Office the ''reckless" disarmament policy being pursued on the frontiers
of Cape Colony.

The Government, indicated the community, was making no dis

tinction between loyal and hostile tribes, although a previous Basuto Chief
Magistrate had said that the PPA would apply to only rebel tribes.

One mis

sionary wrote Kimberley that the Basutos since February, 1879, had felt shocked
and unhappy at the prospect of disarmament, because guns cost the natives much

102

money.

The society alleged that the governor had issued no PPA proclamation

103
for Basutoland, thus making the disarmament illegal.
Now only by terrifying
the natives with armed force or allowing them to become demoralized could Cape
Colony maintain order.

104
The prestige of the British Government was at stake,

105
and the PES feared its own position compromised by the PPA.
The PPA shocked
educate the tribe; thus, the church expanded rapidly, R. K. Orchard, The High
Commission Territories of South Africa
(London: World Dominion Press, 1951),
p. 21.

101
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jB.!5.F_., (1880), LI, 551, ltr. F. W. Chesson, Secretary of the APS to
Colonial Office, April 5, 1879; J3-S.P» , (1881), LXVI, 704, ltr. PES to Kimber
ley, December 9, 1880.
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the native sense of justice ana was premature, and compensation for confiscated
Basuto guns and assegais arrived slowly.

Delays caused the natives to mistrust

the G o v e r n m e n t ^ ^ u t , educated to loyalty, they did not contemplate hostilities.
Though the Basutos feared disarmament like other tribes, the PES nevertheless
.

had

urged them to disarm before the PPA reached
The Colonial Office replied that Sir Bartle

disarm the Basutos.

107

them.

Frere had taken great care to

The society, remarked Secretary Hicks-Beach, misunderstood

the policy adopted for the security of both Europeans and blacks in Cape Colony.
The PPA was not intended to punish disloyalty and provided for the award of
- .
.
.
108
fair compensation.
Abolphe Mabille was the most vociferous PES
of French mission

activities.

critic of the PPA anddefender

He was on his way to France when he read a

Sprigg speech extremely hostile to the French mission.

Mabille reported that

Chief Magistrate Griffith had once praised French care for the religious and
secular needs of the Basutos and had hoped that Mabille could explain the PPA
to the tribe and advise Letsie.

The missionaries, insisted Mabille, alone

taught the law to the blacks, who all other Europeans allegedly despised.

The

pastor told Letsie that, as chief, he possessed definite rights as a British
subject and that he could petition or send a delegation to protest the PPA.
Mabille did not oppose the PPA but favored a prohibitive gun tax which, he
109
argued, would accomplish disarmament within six to eight years.
However, ha

^^B>5>P.», (1880), LI, 553, ltr. Chesson to Colonial Office, May 14, 1879.
P_., (1881), LXVI, 702, 704, ltr. PES to Kimberley, December 9, 1880,
108B.S.JP., (X6S0), LI, 552, ltr. Colonial Office to APS, April 17, 1879.
109
_8.l5.iP., (1081), LXVI, 169-70, ltr. Mabille to 5prigg, June 22, 1880.
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supposedly exhorted the natives not to refuse the PPA or fight the Government,
warning that resistance would cause their dispersion.

Mabille considered

warnings of the PPA to the Basutos as weak and juvenile and asserted that all
the magistrates, traders, and missionaries in Basutoland opposed the PPA, des
pite the intransigence of the Sprigg ministry.

Ironically, pagan tribesmen

accused Mabille of assisting the PPA, while the Christians defended him.

He

thought that his society, though blamed for meddling, had a right to express
political opinions'!'^ The rapid application of the PPA before parliamentary
consideration of the Basuto petitions alarmed Mabille.

The tribe, now calmed

in belief that their supplications would receive contemplation^would become

112

deeply discontented, according to Letsie.

The pastor, furthermore, in his tirade against Prime Minister Sprigg,
accused Sir Gordon of purposely silencing Cape parliamentary opposition, ig
noring Basuto rights, discouraging petitions or a delegation, and instead ru
ling the tribe tyrannically.

The evangelist warned that Sprigg, desiring a

Basuto rebellion in order to confiscate native land, alone was responsible for
consequent Basuto actions.

Liberality to and proper means of redress for the

113
tribe, Mabille said, could have stabilized European influence.
Mabille, moreover, raised the constitutional question of the right of
Cape Colony to legislate for Basutoland, whose inhabitants, he thought, had
not consented to colonial rule or known of it until 1879 when Letsie viewed

■^^Smith, The Mabilles of B a s u t o l a n d , pp. 250-51, 245, 254.
» (1881), LXVI, 261, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, April 4, 1880.
^ ^ Ibid., 223, ltr. Mabille to Frere.
113
Ibid., 170-71, ltr. Mabille to Sprigg, June 22, 1880.
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the documents.

Smith surprisingly argues that Mr. Herbert, permanent British

Undersecretary at the Colonial Office, admitted to Mabille that Basutoland
never was transferred officially or publicly to colonial jurisdiction^^ The
Cape Parliament, declared Governor Frere, enacted all the laws for Basutoland,
the High Commissioner had no authority there, and Letsie knew that Griffith
received instructions from the colonial Secretary for Native Affairs'}^
Adolphe Mabille, in his efforts, received initial succor from his supe
rior but alienated the Cape Government.

Sprigg told Griffith that a delay in

printing the PPA would hurt the Government efforts.

The pastor refused to

print the PPA on the mission press as ha had all other Government documents
relating to Basutoland, yet he contended that Griffith thanked him for past
assistance and for valuable service among the Sasut a s ^ ^ The Chief Magistrate,
in reality, fumed at the Mabille refusal, reproached the PES, and complained
to the Government, which inquired if the views of the evangelist reflected the
117
total french community feeling in Basutoland.
As the Chief Magistrate could
not dissuade Mabille, officials printed the act at Bloemfontein, Orange Free
118
State.
Sprigg believed that Mabille had insulted the Government by refusing
119
to translate and print the PPA, allowing the gloating Boers the duties.
The
PES severely offended the colony by printing only Government documents which
114

Smith, The Mobilles of Basutoland, pp. 248n, 253; Tylden, The Rise of
the Basuto, p. 141; Herbert says otherwise in another source, 17. David McIntyre,
The Imperial Factor in tha Tropics, 1865-1B75
(London: Macmillan, 1967), pp.
237-38.
1 1 5 B.5.P.., (1880),

LI, 558-59, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, March 2, 1860.

.£., (1381), LXV/I, 170, ltr. Mabille to Sprigg, June 22, 1880; Ibid.,
260, ltr. Sprigg to Griffith, March 30, 1880.
^ ^Ibid., 244, ltr. Griffith to Mabille, April 2, 1880.
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Ibid., 242, ltr. Griffith to Ayiiffe, April 5, 1880.
Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 263.

50
agreed with the views of the mission; therefore, the Government sent its own
press to Basutoland^^ L. Duvoisin, the chairman of the PES, confirmed and
approved the actions of Mabille and feared that the Basutos might think that

121

Mabille was aiding the "obnoxious and subversive” PPA.

A PES conference at

122

Morija, nonetheless, advised Mabille to leave the country, ostensibly for a
vacation, but more likely in order to assure his escape from Government chas
t i s e ment^^
More general condemnation of the PES followed.

Secretary for Native Af

fairs Ayliffe castigated the society for not supporting the Government.

The

PES knew that Cape Colony spent funds to administer Basuto laws, to protect
and improve native life, and to support missionaries who did not unsettle the
natives.

The French mission by not instructing natives to obey the law caused

124
danger and much delay in recovery of arms.
Cecil Headlam, a modern historian,
125
alleges that the French mission urged the Basutos to keep their guns, and, al
legedly, these missionaries gave Basutos superior arms so that chiefs would
126
heed the PES.
The mission, said Frere, also opposed colonial administration
127
and did the most to stir British and Basuto public opinion against the PPA.
The society considered its members above the law, and Mabille traveled to

1 2 0 B-5.P.t

121

(1881), LXVI, 247-48, ltr. Bright to Griffith, May 7, 1880.

Ibid., 247, ltr. L. Duvoisin to Griffith, April 10, 1880.
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Morija: French Protestant missionaries in Basutoland used this town as
thair headquarters.
Founded in 1833, it3 -name derives from the Biblical
Moriah, Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 344.
123
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124
B.5.F\, (1890), LI, 598-99, ltr. Ayliffe to Sprigg, April 12, 1880.
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£L3^.P\ , (1880), LI, 590, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, April 15, 1880.
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X28
Europe to raise money for Basuto dissidents.
Frere graphically exposed the Cape parliamentary Opposition and the ominouss ignorance of the PE5 position.

He insisted that the vain Basutos depen-

129
ded too much on the PE5, which knew little of colonial laws.
Mr. Cochet was
surprised to find the Basutos not under the personal direction of Queen Victoria
or the High Commissioner, and, according to Frere, he should have consulted
130
with advisers, not opponents, of the governor.
Others presumed that the Chief
Magistrate ruled the Basutos.

Residing in remote missions, the French had

131
little notion of the effects of political change.
The PES also did not rea132
lize the real reasons why the tribe wanted to retain guns.
Espousing the PES
rationale, the Opposition blasted the Government through the prass to an ex133
cited colonial populace.
5ir Bartle observed that, "The amount of sedition
preached by their £$asutgJT friends, from Saul Solomon at Sea Point up to the
reverend Frenchmen on the skirts of the Drakensburg is enough to inflame a
much less excitable population.”

The blame for hostilities, warned the gover

nor, would lie less with colonial ministers and Basuto 3 than with the instiga
tors of insurrection.

Frere continued that the Government knew best how to

handle natives, who must obey.
Sir Gordon 5prigg likewise understood as Frere.

He charged with ’’infan-

tilism" persons who disagreed with his policy and added,
1

Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 140.
129
130
131
132
133

1 *5.P., (1880), LI, 557, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, March 2, 1880.
B^S-F^* , (1881), LXVI, 165-66, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, June 8 , 1880.
Ibid., 201, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, July 27, 1880.
Frera,

"The Basutos . . . Cape of Good Hope,” p. 184.

B^.5_.P^., (1881), LXVI, 201-02, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, July 27, 1880,

^ ^ S m i t h , The Mabilles of Basutolandt pp. 249, 254, 252-53, 263.
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But there can be little doubt that if it had not been for the sympathy
shown to the insurgent party by the Aborigines Protection Society and
the British Parliament clique who were working with it, by the Cape
Opposition, and lastly, by Lord Kimberley, there would
been no
serious resistance to the disarmament, and no Basuto ’
war.
G. Tylden, the "father" of Basuto historians, in defense of the PES,
thought it unjustified to think that these missionaries encouraged Basuto re136
sistance.
John X. Merriman argued that the mission could not aid a tyrannized
137
population without incurring censure for spreading sedition.
The PES, in final appraisal, having already aggravated the adaptation to
annexation, provoked the Basutos to ignore Cape Colony sovereignty.

The so

ciety, prone to exaggeration, spread sedition; its entire conduct was uncon
scionable.

The PE5 acted brazenly in opposing the PPA in order to protect its

investment and influence the tribe.

Though Cape Colony had assisted the PES

in the past, the mission obstructed the law which it urged the natives to
disobey.

Treasonous society actions induced violence and nurtured rebellious

ness; the mission suffered from acute tunnel vision not to see Basutos arming
for war.

Mabille misrepresented Europeans, especially officials, in Basuto

land, and advised the tribe in the use of tainted legal procedures.

Solomon

and his cronies in Parliament undermined an essential and ticklish Government
effort and together with the PES bolstered Basuto intransigence.

135
136
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Martineau, Frere, II, 383.
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 141.
Smith, The iMahilles of Basutoland, p. 241.

CHAPTER III

THE THREATENING TEMPEST

THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT DEBATES THE PEACE PRESERVATION ACT

As ths crisis deepened, concern over the PPA intensified in and outside
Basutoland.

French mission arguments found concurrence among members of the

British House of Commons as early as February, 1880.

Joseph Chamberlain at

that time denounced the ac^ and complained that Prime Minister 5prigg prema
turely had told Chief Letsie that the Queen and British people desired Basuto

2

disarmament.

R. W. Fowler and Lyulph Stanley asked that London quickly in

vestigate the PPA and said that Frere was too severe in ordering disarmament
of the Basutos, because these loyal and satisfied natives were vulnerable to
3
aggression by hostile Free State tribes.

Griffith, said Sir Wilfrid Lawson

months later, believed that the PPA would lead to war and might tend to en
courage hostilities by other tribes.

Mr. Grant Duff considered the PPA a

serious error and believed that Cape Colony was ignoring British warnings and
advice.

Guns in native hands caused uneasiness, because Natal, he noted, had

passed ten laws against native use or possession of guns, and the Orange Free
State also maintained severe restrictions.

The 500 whites in Basutoland jus

tifiably felt uncomfortable among 128,000 blacks.

Loyal Basutos, however,

seeing white overlords everywhere armed, would naturally attempt to retain

^Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 275.
^Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 250 (1880), 1195, Mr. Chamberlain speaking,
February 23, 1880.
3
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 252 (1880), 451, 453-54, Mr. Fowler and Mr.
Stanley speaking, May 25, 1880.
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guns.

The Earl of Belmore indicated that, though the Basutos must disarm just

as their loyal neighbors in Natal, the selected time and procedure of -the PPA
was regrettable”?
Mr. Donald Currie, in defense of the PPA, countered that Cape Colony only
protected itself by initiating a plan on the frontier which it thought neces#
sary and that the Basutos could not claim an exemption from disarmament.

Bri

tain, he continued, must reinforce responsible government at Cape Town and not
interfere with the PPA, because a majority in the Cape Parliament supported
the measure.

Sir George Balfour added that disarmament prevented war and that

numerous factors induced the natives to accept the PPA^
Prime Minister William Gladstone, moreovar, declared that the PPA appli
cation had progressed toe far for the Home Government whan first in office to
consider it.

He thought that the act did not forcibly deprive natives of guns

but ended the practice of habitually carrying weapons.

Similar to the English

act of disarmament, tha PPA seemed conducive to the peace and prosperity of
Basutoland and did not imply tribal disloyalty.

Britain, furthermore, had pre

viously urged disarmament in all Cape territory? and the Liberal Government
could not interfere with Home Rule in a colony when Gladstone was about to

8

propose the same rule for Ireland.

Members of the British Parliament opposed to the PPA, in conclusion, did

^Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1068, 1084-86, Sir Wilfrid Lawson
and Mr. Grant Duff speaking, January 20, 1881.
5
Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 259 (1881), 1790, The Earl of Belmore speaking,
January 20, 1881.
^Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1079-80, 1082-83, Mr. Donald Currie
and General 5ir George Balfour speaking, January 20, 1881.
^Hansard. 3rd ser., Vol. 252 (1880), 457-58, Mr. Gladstone speaking, May
25, 1880.
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55
not understand the true Basuto turbulence, because they had insufficient facts
to judge well the circumstances, and they misrepresented colonial officials.
Kimberley mistakenly made unofficial personal statements on the PPA at the same
time that Prime Minister Gladstone decided that government policy would not
interfere with the act.

HEIGHTENED BA5UTQ RESISTANCE TO DISARMAMENT

Controversy outside Basutoland did not equal the intensified response
among the tribe.

Adamant in his position and views, Chief Magistrate Griffith

encouraged the tribe to employ constitutional means to reverse the PPA but con
sidered it dangerous policy to allow Basutos to abuse these privileges which
they did not understand.

Government by magistrate would become stagnant if tha

Basutos did not comply with the PPA because of their appeal to the British
Parliament.

The Chief Magistrate reported that the bewildered natives suspec

ted the magistrates who enforced disarmament.

Paradoxically, the natives re

sisted disarmament, because they sow no stringfentA enforcement of the PPA.
Tribesmen, who in the past had fled to magistrates for protection and advice,
now supported powerful chiefs who disobeyed the PPA.

Colonel Griffith could

9
not protect loyal natives and angrily said that the policy of moral force,
which he unwillingly accepted as the method to govern Basutoland, had dissolved?
The Chief Magistrate, nevertheless, obeyed his orders but deplored the strain
on the Basutos and the loss of his admirable reputation among the natives ac-

9 3.S.P.,

(1881), LXVI, 249, ltr. Griffith to Bright, April 27, 1880.

De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 267.
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quired during thirty-two years in the Queen’s s e r v i c e d
Governor Frere, regarding his interpretation of the progression of the
PPA application, replied that it was Griffith who partly caused the negative
results of the PPA, because, though the Chief Magistrate protested that the
Cape Government gave him no security, actually he influenced the disarmament
date and effect.

Cape Town promised the irate Griffith a leave of absence

after the Basuto crisis had ended.

Future plans, indicated Frere, also called

for a commission on Basutoland to impress the Cape Parliament by dealing with
discontented natives, forfeited land, overcrowding, and by ascertaining what

12

was actually traditional or merely feigned as traditional by the tribe.

Sir

Bartle ordered the Basuto police not to provoke incidents by seizing guns un
less by Government commanci^and urged the issuance of gun licenses to trusted
natives.14
The discordant Chief Masupha, during colonial alarm, began outright diso
bedience.

Fingo Chief Mpoba had collected all the guns in his village for

relinquishment.

Masupha dispatched 300-400 men who surprised the hamlet on

the morning these Fingos were to surrender their weapons.

A son of Masupha

led the marauders and bullied a meeting of neighborhood natives into not sur
rendering their guns until the Cape Government answered the Basuto petitions.
Magistrate Charles Harland Bell of Leribe District scolded Masupha for calling
an armed meeting of.his own clan without authorization; the chief answered
disrespectfully and tried to justify the gathering.

1 1 ]0.5L.P., (1801),

12
13
14

It was not unlike Masupha

LXVI, 229-30, ltr. Griffith to Bright, January 26, 1880.

Ibid., 195-97, ltr. Frere on Griffith dispatches, July 6 and 7, 1890.
Ibid., 187, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, July 20, 1880.
Ibid ., 187, ltr. Frere to Ministers.
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to frighten natives and disobey his magistrate while the country was unstable.
He thought that by distracting the Government he could regain his waning power.
15
Magistrate Bell asked Griffith to reprimand Masupha, who also had obstructed
collection of ths hut t a x ^
Colonel Griffith, in further Government reprobation, accused Masupha of
misconstruing the role of a chief under the Cape Government; a chief had to ob
tain permission to hold an armed assembly.

Chief Masupha, who had fabricated

reasons for refusing disarmament and had intimidated tribesmen, incurred res
ponsibility for future t r o u b l e d Undersecretary Bright considered it foolhardy
JL8
to allow Masupha to carry arms.
He accused the chief of fomenting violence and
threatened to arrest him if he again dispatched an armed force without autho19
rization, because chiefs inciting rebellion were subject to deposition.
Sprigg

20

stopped Government allowances to Masupha in abeyance of improved conduct, and

21

Letsie scolded his half-brother and told him to apologize.

Prime Minister Sprigg, acting against Basuto truculence, remarked that the

22

tribe understood the new July deadline for the PPA.

He thought that Letsie

promoted dangerous delay by insistently using every constitutional means to
stop the PPA.

Sir Gordon informed Letsie that the C 3 pe Parliament had sanc-

23
tioned the PPA and that the chief was listening to misguiding counsel.
Sprigg

~^Ibid., 231-32, ltr. Bell to Griffith, February 3, 1880.

3.6

Theal, South Africa, IX, 65-66.
17
_3._S._P., (1881), LXVI, 232-33, ltr. Griffith to Masupha, February 10,
1880.
18
19

20

Ibid., 228, ltr. Bright to Griffith, February 26, 1880.
Ibid.. 233, ltr. Bright to Griffith, February 24, 1880.
Ibid.. 259, ltr. Sprigg to Griffith, February 28, 1880.

^ I b i d ., 234, ltr. Letsie to Griffith, March 1, 1880.
*^Ibid., 161, ltr. Sprigg, April 9, 1880.
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announced that his ministry would enforce the PPA, and he gave Griffith the
right to ask for primed military forces to support the Government and loyal
24
Basutos against the chiefs.
25
Chief Magistrate Charles Brownlee in Griqualand Cast District (Infra, map,
p. 230 , PI. XVI ), commenting on his convictions and on agitation in other
areas, reported that Basuto agents arrived in his district to muster support
to resist the PPA.

26

He believed that Masupha ddv.ised Letsie, who, in April,

1880, had sent two envoys to other tribes, who all gave adherence to the dis
sident Basuto stand on disarmament.

Basuto Chiefs Sofonia and George had

disarmed, but most chiefs and the majority of the tribe at least disliked the
PPA.

Compensation of less than half the value of a gun nurtured native anger.

Brownlee thought that the PPA, if enforceable, was the best method to obtain
peace; still, Cape Colony until then had disarmed only loyal tribes like the

27

Gaikas, who voluntarily had abandoned their rebel chiefs, and the Fingos.

Magistrate John Austen, moreover, in still-turbulent Quthing District,
reported that all chiefs in his area except the Tembu Chief Tyali had offered
23
24

Ibid.. 261, ltr. Sprigg to Griffith, March 30, I860.
Ibid.. 259. ltr. Sprigg to Griffith, February 8 , 1880.

25

Dictionary of South African Biography (1968), I, 126-28.
Hereafter
cited as D.*S.».A*iL* Charles Brownlee: Brownlee grew up among the Xhosa tribe and
held great influence among the Bantu.
He became such an authority on Bantu
laws and customs that chiefs asked his advice.
A commando during the War of
the Axe in 1846, Brownlee later served as commissioner to the Gaika tribe and
persuaded it to accept European magistrates and to understand the benefits of
Cape Colony rule.
Ha served as Secretary for Native Affairs, then as Chief
Magistrate of Griqualand East starting in 1078.
An insurgency occurred in
four Griqua districts in 1BB0 in conjunction with the Basuto Rebellion, but the
Chief Magistrate quickly crushed the rebels.
2 6 B.5.P., (1001), LXVI,

27

263, ltr* Sprigg to Griffith, April 10, 1880.

Charles Brownlee* A Chapter on the Basuto War
(Lovedale, Cape Colony:
South Africa Mission Press, 1889), pp. 4, 6 - 8 . Hereafter cited as Brownlee,
Basuto War.
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to surrender their guns, but they feared the warlike in the district*

While

they asked if they might register and retain their guns to protect their live
stock, Tyali insisted that he kept guns of Chief Letsie by his order, and he
28
would not surrender the arms without his permission.
The colonial Secretary
for Native Affairs requested Austen to investigate Tyali and to gather evi29
dence to convict the chief of treachery in the Morosi Rebellion*
Letsie re
ceived consent for a pitso on March 12 in order to inform natives in Quthing
30
of his feelings.
E. Ayliff, acting magistrate at Quthing, had registered and
returned guns to loyal natives, because Griffith had warned Austen of danger,
31
but Undersecretary Bright then ordered Ayliff to stop returning guns.
The Home
Government did not want natives armed in Quthing, because colonial troops would
protect thenu^
To illustrate how well colonial officials informed Letsie and other
anxious Basutos to no avail about the PPA, Assistant Magistrate Davies of
Thaba Bosigo District gave chiefs and headmen in his area copies of the PPA in
Sesuto and held a meeting at the village of Letsie to discuss the act.

Basuto

33
tribesmen anxiously attended.
The recalcitrant Lerothodi excused himself but
sent a delegate, and most other chiefs attended.

Magistrate Arthur Barkly,

convening the meeting on April 20, 1880, recalled the motives for disarmament

, (1881), LXVI, 238, ltr. Austen to Griffith, March 3, 1880.
^ I b i d ., 241-42, ltr. Bright to Griffith, April 3, 1880; Chief Tyali had
planned to attack in the rear the first colonial forces that crossed the Telle
River, then assault the troop camp at Palmietfontein, Ibid., 239, Mofetudi to
Austen.
30
Ibid.,
259, ltr. Griffith to 5prigg, February 28, 1880.
^ I b i d ,,

241, ltr. Bright to

Griffith, April 29, 1880.

^ Ibid..

241, ltr. Bright to

Griffith, March 31, 1880.

"^Ibid.,

250, ltr. Davies to

Griffith, April 23, 1880.
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and said that the Queen would not likely interfere in the matter.

Barkly read

and explained the PPA, for which he offered no hope of alteration or revoca
tion.

He did not sway the natives, who accepted volatile suggestions from

dissidents and stalled3^
Some magistrates, moreover, offered explanations for native hesitancy
about the PPA.

Bell considered moral force useless in his circumstances.

Several loyal Basutos asked him at Berea village what protection the Govern
ment would offer them if their chiefs abused them.

Tribesmen would obey the

PPA if Cape Colony used more than moral force to protect them.

Natives, who

rather would risk loss of compensation than risk being "eaten up,n henceforth
waited for orders from a chief to surrender guns, and several natives asked
to retain their guns until Chief Letsie, the only visible authority, acted.
35
Masupha resisted, and some neighboring headmen followed his example. Magis
trate William Henry Surmon of Cornet Sprui^District held a native meeting on
April 20 to explain the PPA.

He acquired the impression that all would follow

37
Letsie, who would wait to act until the delegation returned from Cape Town.
Chief Letsie thought that all loyal natives would simultaneously disarm with

38

him and that a divided tribe could not function.

Basutos, believed Barkly,

disliked the PPA just as much as their chiefs did, though people would have
surrendered guns if the chiefs had not gained back some of their old power
over the tribe.
Magistrate Barkly, noting the hesitancy quickening into native turbulence,

3 ^ Ibid., 251-52,

ltr. Barkly to Griffith, April 26, 1880.

3 5 Ibid.. 253, ltr*

36

Spruit: a small river, dry for periods, then subject to sudden floods.

3 7 3.S.P., (1081),

38

Bell to Griffith, April 29, 1880.

LXVI, 254, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, April 30, 1800.

5mith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 261.
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supported a delay in the PPA.
give up his arms.

Chief Lerothodi loved warfare and refused to

When Barkly called another pitso to investigate strife in

the Mafeteng area, Lerothodi led hundreds of charging mounted natives all
39
screaming war crias into Mafeteng town. Nearby chiefs insisted Uiat Basuto
40
servants of Barkly quit their jobs.
Regarding the tribal debate over the PPA at the July 3 pitso of Letsie at
41
Thaba Bosigo, Mphoma, reflecting the attitude of the wary, asked Griffith to
intercede on behalf of the tribe against the PPA, and Ramatseatsana wanted
someone to travel to England to make representation against the act.

Lerothodi

reiterated that Basutos had not sought to unite with Natal because of the gun
laws there and that by tradition Basutos chorished their arms.

Khomaleburn

suggested the pitso vote on the PPA just as the Cape Parliament, and Mama
Letsie voiced anger, because the Basuto delegation had not been allowed to
speak in Parliament.

Mapeshoane never heard of a tribe becoming prosperous

after disarmament, and Letsumi superstitiously contended that guns must embody
some odious aura.

Masupha argued that natives could desert a chief who acted

unjustly and that 5prigg had promised him that Basutos could surrender their
arms when they felt ready.

Conversely, the Basuto delegation to Cape Town,

echoing different sentiments, advised disarming.

42
Chief Jonathan Molappo sur-

39

Mafeteng: the name of this district headquarters in southwest Basuto
land means place of unmarried women, Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 310.
40
Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, pp. 143-44.
41
Thaba Bosigo: a great fortified mountain and an object of Basuto pil
grimages, because French-Swiss missionaries had buried Moshesh here, Poultney
3igelow, Pt. V, "The Last of a Great Black Nation,” Harperfs New Monthly Maga
zine , Dec. 1896-May, 1897', p. 634.
42
j-L'A-Ji-Ii*.§.•» P* 189.
Jonathan Molappo: Successor to his father Molappo
in 1880, Jonathan aided Natal in 1873 against Langalibalele and helped capture
him.
He served with Cape Colony against Morosi and in the Basuto Rebellion.
Frequently fighting his brother Joel, Jonathan periodically fled to the Orange
Free State but was ultimately victorious.

rendered his guns as his father had instructed and followed Letsie, because the
latter was the paramount Chief, and because peace had brought prosperity.
5ofonia Moshesh reminded his fellows that guns had not helped to fight the
Boers,

Tsekelo Moshesh rebuked the treasonous talk of others and said that

the tribe had exhausted every legal means of redress.

Letsie told his people

to disarm if they still followed him and asked for a document promising the
tribe the same quality of life after disarmament.

The Queen, replied Griffith,

unfortunately had seen bloodshed in other armed tribes, such as the Zulus and
Galekas, tribes crushed because they held guns; therefore, he accepted respon
sibility for future harm done to the disarmed tribe.

He, however, noted that

the Basutos cleverly concealed their feelings when expressing themselves and
43
that the tribe opposed giving up weapons and did not intend to.
i
Lagden, in further contemplation of Basuto behavior, suggests that per
haps the tribesmen honestly could not understand constitutional alterations
which superseded promises made in the past,

Letsie, however, so perfidiously

conducted himself that the Government trusted him while he encouraged resis
tance to the PPA.

His treachery so disoriented the tribe that numerous loyal

'
44
natives surrendered their guns without his permission.
The confusion of other
Basutos turned to anger, and the subsequent demoralization in Basutoland ne45
cessitated the use of troops.
Basutoland, said Griffith, also suffered from external threats.

Some

white agitators against the PPA, one a correspondent for the Cape Argus, slinked

4 3 B.5.P., (1881), LXVI, 207-13, ltr. Griffith to Bright, July 14, 1880;
cf., Theal, South Africa, XI, 59; Ibid., 186, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, June
29, 18B0.
44
Lagden, The Basutos, II, 509, 511.
45
De Kiewiet, ^he Imperial Factor, pp. 266-67.
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46
47
into Basutoland.
Gunrunners from surrounding areas flocked to the country,
48
and all gun traders actively opposed the PPA.
Griffith complained that Free
State burghers freely sold guns and ammunition to the Basutos and rumored that
49
Cape Colony could not muster an army.
Orange Free State law, replied Johannes
Brand, president of that country, forbade selling arms and ammunition to a na
tive without a special order from the president, and he promised to prosecute
transgressors of this l a w ^
The Basutos, to be sure, clearly conceived the PPA and realized that Grif
fith had appealed their case to the limit and that they had lost their appeal.
Moral force was worthless in enforcement, as some natives would not voluntarily
disarm; thus, dissidents gathered allies.

Weak Letsie countenanced rebellion

and deceived his own tribe into mistrusting the Government.

Lerothodi was on

the verge of rebellion, and Masupha ignored fair warning for his misbehavior.
One cannot blame Basutos for disbelieving that the Sprigg ministry would pro
tect them after disarmament, because the Cape Government' could not assist them
during this period.
guns.

Magistrates rightly suggested that loyal natives retain

Colonial troops might have entered the country by July, 1880, at the re

quest of Griffith, to demonstrate tapchiefs and tribesmen the will and ability
of Cape Colony to enforce the PPA.

Frere might have acted more decisively,

and a commission to investigate tribal unrest should have inspected Basutoland
before the PPA application.

Colonial officials did not make known the alar

ming events soon enough, especially to the British Parliament.

46

^

J3.S..P., (1881), LXVI, 258, ltr. Griffith to 5prigg, January 26, 1880.

47

Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto. p. 137.

4B
49
50

> (1880), LI, 591, ltr. Frere to Hicks-Beach, April 15, 1880.
B.5 a P . , (1881), LXVI, 221, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, August 7, 1880.
Ibid., 265, ltr. President Johannes Brand to Frere.
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0A5UTQ MILITIA AND POLICE

ThB agitation by dissident Basutos called attention to the inadequate pro
tection given loyal natives and colonial officials in Basutoland.

The 1877

annexation of the Transvaal to the British Empire had caused the too thin de51
ployment of the already inadequate South African Imperial garrisons. Governor
Frere later alleged that London was purposely maintaining only enough soldiers
in Cape Colony to defend Cape Town, Simons Bay, and Table Bay.

As British

troops would not aid in frontier defense, it was more imperative to disarm the
52
Basutos.
Sir George Grey instead regretted that, whenever war began between
colonists and natives, it was almost impossible to exclude British troops from
the f i g h t i n g ^
Various notions, therefore, unfolded for an effective Bssuto defense
force.

54
Prime Minister Gladstone supported the initiation of a Basuto militia,

and Kimberley agreed that a native force would demonstrate colonial trust for
55
the Basutos and colonial protection for native land.
ihe Earl of Belmore en
visioned a Basuto yeomanry to accustom the tribe to regard the ownership of
guns as a privilege allowed only to the militia which was raised to defend its
environs.

The Cape Parliament might sanction the operation, after which this

yeomanry might help colonial troops maintain o r d e r ^ 5prigg, at the 1879 pitso,
51
52
53

Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 129.
Frere, ’’The Basutos . . .

Cape 6f Good Hope,” pp. 185-86, 188.

Grey, ’’South Africa,” p. 936.

54

Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 252 (1880), 458, Mr. Gladstone speaking, May
25, 1880.
^ I b i d ., 645, Mr. Grant Duff speaking, May 28, 1880.
5 ^Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 259 (1881), 1790-91, The Earl of Belmore spea
king, March 24, 1881.
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57
had offered his idea for a native militia.
He announced that Basutos could
serve the Cape Government in a militia but would have to surrender their own
58
guns. Frere authorized Griffith to license, arm, and equip a Basuto militia.
The existing Basuto enforcement agency, the police force, exhibited a
59
dismal image, and the governor ordered the number of police increased.
The
police numbered 1 1 1 men, of which the officers were sons of chiefs, and the
magistrate of each district raised one contingent. Magistrate Bell in 1873 had
alleged that the police were submissive to the ch i e f s ^ a n d another official in
1874 had advised against arming Basuto police with breechloaders or Snider
rifles from the magistracies, because disloyal chiefs easily could steal these
gunsf^ Bell in June, I860, complained that his police were only partially
equipped with guns and ammunition, that some of the guns were damaged, and that
62
his force was not in readiness.
Magistrate Surmon had no Snider ammunition
63
for his police and urgently asked for same. Griffith never warned Governor
Frere of the inferior condition of the police until Sir Bartle asked the Chief
Magistrate to acknowledge arms needs, destinations for police arms shipments,
and conditions of police weapons in all Basutoland districts.

Frere ordered

the police to block interference with Government officials and traders or Ba
sutos who surrendered a r m s ^

, (1880), LI, 565, ltr. Bright, February 26, 1880.
, (1881), LXVI, 161-62, ltr. Sprigg, April 9, 1880.
59

Ibid., 187, ltr. Frere to Ministers.

.^Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 232.
^ T h e a l , South Africa, XI, 54.
62 J3LS.FL , (1881), LXVI,

63
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193, ltr. Bell to Griffith, June 12, 1800.

Ibid., 194, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, June 24, 1880.
Ibid., 195-96, ltr. Frere on Griffith dispatches, July 6 and 7, 1880.
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A native militia, after all, was complimentary, but militiamen and police
men had to prove their reliability.
their proper perspective.

The tribe then would perceive guns in

Though Griffith previously might have adequately

equipped and strengthened the police, it might have been unwilling to enforce
the PPA.

CHAPTER IV

THE BASUTO CIVIL WAR

CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR AND LATER REBELLION

The causes of the Basuto struggle stemmed from accumulated tribal opposi
tion to European rule and influence and reaction to adverse situations for
which the tribe held Europeans responsible.

Governor Frere desired to enforce

the British land tenure system in Basutoland, thus, lessening the power of
hereditary chiefs and, contrary to their wishes, making it possible for indi
viduals to buy and receive title to land.

After the suppression of tribal

land communism, whites and blacks were to live together with equal rights and
opportunities for social and political success!’ A British law passed in 1880
recognized individual rights of property in Basutoland.

Thus, each tribesman

owned the property upon which his house and kraa? stood?
Sir Bartle and others offered additional reasons for the rebelliousness
of the Basuto chiefs.

While the Cape Government, for the benefit of the en

tire tribal group, was slowly limiting the power of clan chiefs , Chiefs Masupha,
Ramanslla, and Joel were, in fact, becoming more unruly under restraints
4
placed on them by the magistrates.

The chiefs for many years had thought that

European magistrates and European law undermined them.

Chief Sofonia believed

that Basutos must obey colonial laws and that, as witchcraft and superstition

^Frere, *'The Basutos . . .

Cape of Good Hope,1' pp. 195-96.

2

Kraal: A South African Bantu village with enclosures for livestock,
Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 279.
3
B.,5.£., (1881), LXVI, 174, Cape Argus reporting on Mr. Qrpen speaking in
the June 30, 1880, House Assembly session.
4
Theal, South Africa. XI, 54.
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5
were obnoxious influences, the chiefs would soon be superfluous.

Masupha led

the reactionary party favoring independence and expulsion of whites from Basu
toland and supporting the right to raid for cattle^ which was a major source
of wealth to B&sutos.

Before 1868, natives acquired cattle by tribal warfare,

cattle raids, and outright looting.

The chiefs took all booty, kept some cat

tle for themselves, and distributed the remainder to the leaders of the raid
7
and others.

These dissident Basutos used European plows and guns but refused

to accept British social or political institutions.

Discordant chiefs ruled

absolutely, confiscated cattle from opponents, and consigned wives and chil-

8

dren of their adversaries to slavery in their kraals.
ted no magistrate or hut tax.

Rebellious Basutos wan

The chiefs and their close comrades, declared

Magistrate Barkly, always had opposed colonial rule but never had won the
9
people to support :the?n until the disarmament issue.
An internal factor which sharpened hostility to Cape Colony rule was
tribal dissension caused by resentment within the ruling family of the tribe.
There were three branches in the family of Chief Moshesh (Infra, p. 239 ♦ PI.
XXV ).

The first and foremost branch consisted of, among others, Chiefs Let-

sie, Masupha, Lerothodi, Alexander Letsie, Bereng Letsie, and Mama Letsie.
second part of the family exerted little influence over the tribe.

A

The third

branch included Chiefs Jonathan, Joel, Nehemiah, Putsane, Sofonia, George,
and Tsekelo.

5

The entire first branch was disaffected from the others, although

Greswell, Our South African Empire, II, 78-79.

g
Frere,

"The Basutos . . .

Cape of Good Hope," p. 180.

^Ashton, The Basuto, p. 172.

0 Q
Frere,
g

"The Basutos . . . Cape of Good Hope,” p. 195*

Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, p . 148.

Paramount Chief Letsie allied himself ostensibly with the third group, most of
whom were Loyalists*

His brothers jealously feared that his desertion would

establish primacy for the third branch of the f a m i l y ^ According to Stevens,
several chiefs sought to gain independence from supreme tribal authority by
starting a civil warl^
One member of the British House of Commons, speaking in reference to
other reasons for anti-European belligerency, supported the theory that the
tribe had rebelled because of an unresolved and legitimate grievance*

Grif

fith, he said, warned to no avail that, although complaints included the ap
propriation of 112,500 in Basuto tax revenues, the attempted confiscation of
Quthing, and the doubling of the hut tax, it was the PPA which actually ignited
the outbreak.

Basuto hostilities, contended another member, resulted from the

protective reaction borne out of the fear that the tribe would undergo mili
tary conquest as had been the case with the Z u l u s ^ V"

O

?

The Cape Colony annexation of Basutoland, in reflection, had invalidated
the Napier proclamation concerning tribal land (Supra, p. 5, n. 23), and the
Government should have installed to paramountcy the champions of Europeaniza
tion in the third branch as soon as the first branch became seditious.
Major reasons for the Basuto Civil War and Rebellion, in summation, in
cluded the erosion of chiefly power under the influence of European law, the
imposition of magistrates, the forced halt to cattle raiding, the dissident
desire for independence and explusion of all whites, the royal family quarrel,

.S_,JP., (1881), LXVI, 306, Cape Times, August 25, 1880; cf., Vindex,
Cecil Rhodes, p. 46.
^ S t e v e n s , Lesotho. etc*, p. 27.
"^ H a n s a r d , 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1881), 1066-67, Sir Wilfrid Lawson and Mr.
Fowler speaking, January 20, 1881; Molteno, Molteno, II, 424.
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and the effects of the Zulu campaign.

Minor causes were the opposition to the

hut tax, land hunger, drought, non-receipt of Quthing, colonial supervision of
the Basuto treasury, chiefly opposition to native labor in the diamond fields
and in other employment under whites, and incitement from French Protestant
missionaries.

A too rapid doubling of the hut tax, unfair compensation for

guns, and confiscation of cherished assegais constituted the only valid Basuto
grievances.

Objection to the PPA was, as a whale, merely an eacuse and cata

lyst for disaffection.

THE BASUTO CIVIL M A R , JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1880

In June, 1880, dissident Basuto elements took advantage of grievances to
initiate a bitter civil war in their country.

Relatives assailed each other,

and family and clan quarrels erupted openly and violently.

Basutos themselves

named the Loyalists Matiketa, the chosen people, and the rebels f'iabelete, the
13
wild people.
Chief Magistrate Griffith reported that Loyalist chiefs were re14
ceiving threats of punishment for supporting the Cape Government, and one loyal
15
headman feared murder by his own clan.
Heathens and Christians, declared As
sistant Magistrate Davies, intended to attack his residency and murder all who
had disarmed.

Some Loyalists feared fleeing to Maseru, because they would

thereby risk death as informers^ Rebels shot at other natives for no apparent
13

Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 271.

^^•SLP.•, (1881), LXVI, 169, Itr. Griffith to Sprigg, n.d.j., r. June 25,
1BBU.
1 5 Ibid., 188,

ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, June 28, 1880.

^^Ibid., 172, ltr. Davies to Griffith, June 21, 1880.
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17
reason.
G. Tylden;.asserts that, as civil affairs in Berea District deteriorated,

10

the death of Loyalist Chief Molappo strengthened the rebels, as did the fact
that, locally, only natives working in Government service and those from the
19
clan of Jonathan surrendered their weapons.
Rebel Chief Joel, the second son
of Molappo, did not surrender his arms, and some natives under his brother

20

Jonathan who would not disarm joined Masupha.

As Jonathan and Joel began figh

ting in Leribe District for paramountcy in their clan, Masupha arid Joel easily
drove Loyalists out of the area and plundered homes.

Most of the refugees fled

to Masaru and begged protection from Colonel Griffith, who obliged and forti-

21

fied the town.

Magistrate Bell, as the magistrates initially responded to this premedi
tated rebel plotting, told of natives in the Berea and Leribe Districts plea
ding for the return of their guns to protect themselves from a threatened at
tack, but he refused the requests pending verification of the intimidation.
He promised to return guns to Chief Jonathan upon verification that Masupha in
tended to kill this Loyalist chief, who considered himself the legitimate suc
cessor to his deceased father.
the PPA.

Chiefs meanwhile coerced tribesmen to disobey

22

Masupha had bought gunpowder, and his sons hoarded guns.

He grazed

^ I b i d ., 175, Cape Argus reporting on Mr. Orpen speaking in the June 30,
1880, House Assembly session.
18
#
*
Tyldsn, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 142.
19
Theal, South Africa, XI, 60.

20

B.S^.P., (1881), LXVI, 271, ltr. Beli to Griffith, July 10, 1880.

21

Theal, South Africa, XI, 60; cf., Neil Orpen, Prince Alfredfs Guard
1856-1966 (Cape Town: Books of Africa, Ltd., 1967), p. 27.
2 2 a.5_.£.,

(1881), LXVI, 271, ltr. Bell to Griffith, July 10, 1880; Ibid..
184, ltr. Bell to Griffith, June 25, 1880.
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his cavalry horses in preparation for future c o m b a ^ a n d planned to attiick the
Oerea magistracy and two Loyalist villages*

The rebels, seeking to capture the

24
surrendered guns at the magistracy, intended to face colonial troops. .Chiefs
Lerothodi, Moletsane, Putsane,- Joel, Khetise, Smith, and Chopo planned to join
25
Masupha.
Bell finally ordered £oyal Chief Matsla to remain armed temporarily

26

in order to prevent Joel from intimidating others.

Magistrate Surmon, however,

27
was unable to safeguard Loyalists or to stifle dissidents in his district.
Magistrate Barkly, in addition, faced the stalwart defiance of Lerothodi,
who ordered the murder of tribesmen who gave up their guns, and who commanded

20

the rebels to keep under their supervision guns in Loyalist villages.

After

Magistrate Barkly charged Lerothodi with transgression of the PPA, the chief
answered seditiously, boldly challenged the Cape Government to wrest his guns,
and ordered his clan to shoot policemen or Government officials who attempted
to seize arms,

Lerothodi did not want civil war, thought Barkly, but was de

fying Cape Colony only to postpone the PPA,

The magistrate told the Loyalists

29
to rely on Government protection and condemned the menacing intimidation.
The sole Government official who acted decisively in the initial turmoil
was Colonel Griffith.

To protect whites and Loyalists until troops arrived,

he requested the shipment of Snider carbines and ammunition to Maseru and asked
23
24
25

Ibid., 1B5, ltr. Lefuyane to Bell, June 25, 1880.
Ibid., 185, ltr. Umahasle to Bell, June 26, I860.
Ibid., 185, ltr. Lefuyane to Bell, June 25, 1880.

^ I b i d ., 271, ltr. Bell to Griffith, July 10, 1880.
27
Ibid., 191, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, June 24, 1880; Ibid.. 191, Mpusi
before Surmon, June 24, 1880; Ibid.. 191-92, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, June 28,
1880.
28
Ibid., 190, Masinyane before Barkly, June 25, 1880.
29
Ibid., 169, ltr. Barkly to Griffith, June 28, 1880.

permission to muster 200 local w h i t e s t The Chief Magistrate housed refugees
from different parts of Thaba Bosigo District and some recently rearmed Fingos,
31
who had lost cattle to rebels.
Rebels, related Griffith on July 20, were at32
tacking Loyalists in all districts.
Active among the rebel faction, meanwhile, some sons of the ineffectual
Letsie ambushed a cart full of surrendered guns belonging to their father.
33
After Letsie summoned two of his Loyalist sons to aid him, his rebel offspring
34
promised to kill anyone who attempted to surrender the guns.
His sons Bereng,
Mama, his brother-in-law Ramanella, and numerous other truculent chiefs opposed
the PPA.

Letsie then said that tribesmen would think him insincere if he gave

35
up his arms and, maintaining that he could not find anyone to transport his
36
weapons, only pretended to disarm and surrendered only three guns by July 13,
37
one day after the PPA deadline.
The Chief Magistrate admitted that trie autho
rity of Letsie was gone and that the entire country was anarchic.
Energetic Masupha, offering outrageous excuses for his true intentions,
planned to silently resist the PPA until either troops supported the magistrates
or the police searched for weapons, then, together with his forces, proposed to
30
rebel, plunder trading stares, and kill whites.
Masupha, remarked natives,

^°Ibid. , 103, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, June 29, 1880.
31
Ibid., 198-99, Cape Argus reporting on Sprigg speaking in the July 24,
1880, House Assembly session; Orpen, Prince Alfred*s Guard 1856-1966, p. 27.
3 2 B.S.P.,

(1881), LXVI, 197, ltr. Brand to Sprigg, July 20, 1880.

* ^ Ibid., 206-07, Motemekoane Mchela before Maitin, July 8 , 1B8Q; cf.,
Orpen, Prince Alfred*s Guard 1856-1966, p. 27.
34
S.5.P., (1881), LXVI, 172, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, June 23, 1880.
35
Theal, South Africa, XI, 60.
36
Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, p. 142.
, (1881), LXVI, 276, ltr. Davies to Griffith, July 13, 1880.

38

Ibid., 206, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, July 13, 1880.
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39
purposely precipitated war involving the whole country.
As this time seemed
to him the last opportunity to expel the whites, the chief planned to massacre
40
all Christian missionaries and magistrates.
On the PPA deadline date, Magis
trate Bell, who had received only 103 Basuto guns, sent his chief constable to
remind Masupha of the deadline and the consequences for disobedience.

The re

bel whined that Cape Colony had not provided him enough time and that the tribe
was not accustomed to observe precise dates.

Masupha kept armed retainers at

41
his village for protection against arrest and, though his efforts to retain
power for the chiefs had failed so far, held pitsos to encourage obedience to
the chiefs.

Magistrate Bell described Masupha as arbitrary and whimsical, a

42
man who disclaimed subordination to colonial authority.
Magistrate Surmon later in the summer desperately needed assistance for
himself and Loyalists in the similarly deteriorating predicament in Cornet
.
.
43
Spruit District.
Loyalist Moshiangala in July attended a rebel pitso, where
several speakers criticized him for surrendering his guns, another assailed
him for inviting an Anglican missionary to the area without permission from
rebel Chief P'loletsane, and the assemblage prohibited this Loyalist from farming.
44
Moshiangala upon his return home found that his clan had fled to the mountains.
Rebels "arrested" one native for giving up hi 3 guns without permission from
45
Chief Moletsane; some of the abductors wanted to kill him.
Surmon reported
39
40
41
42

Ibid.. 189, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, June 29, 1880.
Ibid.. 193, Zakaria Mokhithlanyane before Maitin, June 29, 1880.
Ibid., 214, ltr. Bell to Griffith, July 13, 1880.

The Times (London), September 28, 1080, p. 11.
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J3.JL.P.. t (1881), LXVI, 281, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, July 17, 1880.
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Ibid., 274-75, Moshiangala before Surmon, July 18, 1880.
45
Ibid., 284, Gideon Lebaking before Surmon, July 20, 1880.
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46
further that rebels had waylaid some refugees and that local insurgents had
seized cattle and other property of Loyalists.

The magistrate, desiring im—

47
mediate protection, had few police to protect Loyalists who were flocking to
his station and wanted to enlist 30 European volunteers or secure 30 CMR from
48 .
Palmietfontein until large numbers of troops arrived.
insurgents who guarded
the border in strength would not allow white messengers to pass.

For Surmon

to move Loyalist cattle to the Free State without a skirmish was now impossible,
and, in August, he urgently requested the aicl^of 500 Fingos in order to pro50
tect Loyalists and his post. He reported that every chief in his district,
except those of the Baphutis, had joined the rebels, who sent their own women,
51
children, and cattle to refuges in the mountains.
Magistrate Barkly, also preparing for hostilities at his post, told coun52
cilors of Letsie that he would defend himself if attacked.
The outbreaks in
53
his district he thought only temporary and was optimistic.

The magistrate had

f
l
inadequate arms and ammunition but, with eight Europeans, sixteen native po
lice, and some Loyalists, could repel at least one attack on his station.

To

54
bolster his defenses, he called for the CMR, and Government officials alerted
46
47
48
49
50

Ibid., 283, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, July 26, 1880.
Ibid., 281, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, July 17, 1880.
Ibid., 200, ltr. Surmon to Sprigg, July 25, 1880.
Ibid., 217, ltr. Surmon to Sprigg, n.d., r. August 2, 1880.
Ibid. , 307, Cape Times, September 1, 1880.
Ibid.t 299-300, ltr. Surmon, August 2, 1880.
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Ibid., 199, Cape Argus reporting on Sprigg speaking in the July 24,
1880, House Assembly session.
53
Ibid., 215, Cape Argus reporting on Sprigg speaking in the July 28,
1S8Q, House Assembly session.
54
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elements of the CMY.

Barkly received new armaments and some Boer reinforce-

55
56
ments from Wepener, just across the border.
The colonial House Assembly, meanwhile deliberated on the Basuto civil
strife.

Prime Minister Sprigg considered a small armed incursion into Basuto

land dangerous, as it might excite the numerous rebels or spell disaster, and
without immediately sending troops into Basutoland, wanted both Lerothodi and
Masupha arrested.

While not wanting to unnecessarily alarm the Assembly, 5ir

Gordon feared that he might have to spend funds for war before the next ses
sion.

Opposition member J. X. Merriman asked that House members be allowed

to voice their opinions on the expenditure needed to crush a Basuto uprising,
and Saul Solomon quickly requested assurance for a vote on funding for hosti
lities^
The rebels all the while continued their hostile activities.

Lerothodi,

soon to be a victim of a setback, harbored Loyalist cattle, and most natives
50
in Thaba Bosigo District sent their cattle to the mountains as he directed.
Having promised to confer with his magistrate, drunken Lerothodi unsuccessfully
asked the belligerent warriors filling his village to accompany him on his
visit.

Upon his arrival, he offered to hand back the Loyalist cattle only if

Barkly returned guns to some rebels.

Later, as malcontents did surround Mafa-

teng, Lerothodi planned to attack the town, but most supporters deserted him.
A majority of the natives in 7haba Bosigo District opposed and fortified their
55

Wepener: a town in the eastern Orange Free State named after Commandant
Louw Wepener, who led the Boer attack on Thaba Bosigo in the War of 1865,
Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 576.
-s
jB.S_.P., (18.81), LXVI, 199, ltr. Civil Commissioner Aliwal North to
Sprigg, n.d., r. July 25, 1880.
57
Ibid.. 214-15, Cape Argus reporting on Sprigg speaking in the July 28,
1880, House Assembly session.
58
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villages against the rebels.

Lerothodi then begrudgingly gava up most of his

stolen cattle to Barkly, who distributed them to their owners and told Lero59
thodi to disband his 150 warriors in order to satisfy the Government.
Peace
would come, replied the chief, only if he could harm L o y a l i s t s ^ b u t he warned
Masupha that stealing
Masupha and son 3

cattle forced natives to the Government sidef^
of Letsie were the major agitators.

Griffith appealed

to Masupha that women

and children of rebel clans would suffer in a war and

offered the insurgent

chief one last chance to return Loyalist property and

surrender guilty persons before formally declaring him a rebel liable for
62

punishment.

Masupha, thereupon, seized cattle in Thaba Bosigo District, es-

63
pecially from Basuto policemen.
Colonel Griffith later acknowledged that
64
Masupha, joined by rebel Baphuti remnants, would fight to the death.
Letsie
stopped an attack by his sons Alexander and Bereng on the Loyalists at Maseru
village.

Alexander, frustrated, announced his submission, but Masupha ordered

him to kill more Loyalists.

Chief Koadi Makhobalo, his village full of rebel

spies, pledged himself to Masupha for safety.

Bereng asked Koadi to help for

tify Masitisi Mountain and attack George Moshesh; then Alexander requested
Koadi to help oppose European troops about to cross the Little Caledon River
(a false a l a r m ) ^ A c c o r d i n g to Assistant Magistrate Davies, only a large force
could manage the arrest of Bereng, who burned his court summons and did not

^ Ibid.. 277-78, ltr. Barkly to Griffith, July 25, 1880.
6 0 Earkly,

Among Boers and Basutos. p. 147.

^ " 4 3 . P^., (1881), LXVI, 272, Moleko before Maitin, July 22, 1880,
62
Ibid*, 653, ltr. Griffith to Masupha, July 22, 1880.
63
Ibid., 279, Jacob Motseki before Davies, July 27, 1880.
64
Ibid., 218, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, August 1, 1880.
^^Ibid., 279-80, Koadi Makhobalo before Davies, July 27, 1880.
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66
appear to answer charges made by Griffith.
The Chief Magistrate, in the face of this stubbornness, issued orders in
July for the somewhat undependable Letsie to seize the cattle stolen by Bereng
67
and to arrest this son and other rebels who had molested Loyalists.
Letsie
only recovered the stolen cattlef^insisting that it was not the proper time to
arrest Bereng and other r e b e l s T h e chief, nevertheless, forced five rebel
chiefs to reimburse Loyalists for damages, to restore all stolen property, and
to remove sentinels from the border!^ Magistrate Surmon soon was able to re
ceive armaments!^ Letsie also received orders to swiftly occupy Thaba Bosigo
and prevent the rebels from holding it; otherwise, Griffith would not guaran—
72
tee the stability of Basutoland or the safety of Letsie.
The Chief Magistrate
thought him too cowardly to occupy Thaba Bosigo, even though the Government
would assist and assume all responsibility for methods the chief used to cur73
tail rebellion.
If the majority supported the paramount chief at a pitso at
Thaba Bosigo, conjectured Griffith, the fortifications there would vanish;
74

otherwise, troops would have to help arrest both Masupha and Lerothodi.

The combative, offensive posture of Masupha also influenced Chief Magis
trate Griffith.

Masupha contended that Loyalists deserved punishment for gi-

75
ving up arms without permission and that, as a chief, he could seize cattle.
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Ibid., 288, ltr. Davies to Griffith, July 31, 1880.
Ibid. , 294, ltr. Griffith to Letsie, July 27, 1880.
Ibid.t 293, ltr. Letsie to Griffith, July 30, 1880.
Ibid.,

293, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, August 4, 1880.
267,

ltr. Surmon to Sprigg, August 11,

188D.

^ I b i d ., 269, ltr. Surmon to Sprigg, August 13,

1880.

^ Ibid., 294, ltr. Griffith to Letsie, July 31, 18S0.
73
Ibid., 218, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, August 1, 1880.
74
Ibid., 221, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, August 4, 1880.

79
Masupha said that a circular from Letsie, which called for expulsion from their
76
villages of all natives who did not surrender their guns upon command, was cir
culated at Thaba Bosigo in violation of tribal custom and that the actions of
the paramount chief were untraditional.
tribal mountain, Masupha angered Letsie.

By claiming Thaba Bosigo, the sacred

The rebel chief, though supposedly

only repairing the mountain fortress, at first refused to allow Griffith to
attend the pitso there and escorted him out of the village below.

Later re

ceiving the consent of the evasive Masupha to ascend the mountain by the only
path, Colonel Griffith at every bend found a stone wall and at the top found
77
battlements two layers thick and a clear water spring.
The Chief Magistrate,
after examining the fortress, definitely wanted troops committed.

Though Ma

supha had threatened to fight Letsie unless the paramount chief came alone,
yg
Letsie had induced Jonathan and other loyal chiefs to accompany him.
Letsie at the August pitso appeared powerless beside and just as deceit
ful as Masupha,

Jonathan attempted to persuade Masupha to behave, but thB

rebel feared transportation to Robben Islan<iPeventually!P Secretary Ayliffe
conveyed orders to Masupha, who would not have to face execution, to surrender
himself to Letsie.

According to his rank in the tribe, each rebel with Masu-

75

Ibid., 285, Cape Argus reporting on messages of Griffith, August 6 , 8 ,
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Ibid., 191, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, June 24, 1880.

77

Ibid., 285-86, Cape Argus reporting on messages of Griffith, August 6 ,

8 , 1 1 , 1880.

^ I h i d ., 221, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, August 7, 1880.
79
Robben Island: an island in Table Bay comprising about three square
miles, where political prisoners and the incurably sick resided, Rosenthal,
e d . ,-Encyclopedia, p. 437.
on
E . S_.jP., (1881), LXVI, 268, Telegram from Webster Special Correspondent
in Basutoland, August 10, 13, 1880.

80
pha would pay a fine, and Letsie would surrender all documents found with the
rebels.

If Masupha balked, the paramount chief would hold the mountain until

81
the CMR arrived. Letsie stalled for time and, if the Government did not force
an arrest, which would strain too much his authority, promised to fine Masu82
pha, but natives present doubted his sincerity.
The rebel chiefs, continued
Chief Letsie, feared punishment, and, preferring to settle matters by himself,
83
he asked Cape Town not to exile Masupha, who vowed to hand back all stolen
B4
cattle only if Letsie announced opposition to the PPA.
After the pitso, the rebels briefly restricted Letsia to Thaba Bosigo in
05
order to use his name to stir rebellion.
Pleading inability to coerce Masupha,
the paramount chief wanted to leave the mountain to bring back a stronger
86

force.

Griffith ordered him to remain and send for more warriors but after-

Q7
wards allowed him to decide if it was wise to remain.
Letsie, returning to
his village, whined that his tribe did not support him and voiced fear that
88

Masupha would kill or imprison him.

The paramount chief, nevertheless, told

his sons of his intentions to alienate the whites against each other, because
Britain did not sympathize with the PPA, and because the act had become a
89
partisan issue in the Cape Parliament.
Magistrate Barkly, who decided that Letsie was too unreliable to control

^ I b i d ., 269, ltr. Ayliffe to Griffith, August 13, 1880.
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^ I b i d ., 658, N ’tho.
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87
Ibid., 658, ltr. Griffith to Letsie, August 17, 1880.

88
89

Ibid., 284, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, n.d., r. August 22, 1880.

Lagden, The Basutos, II, 514.

81
the situation, thought troops might bolster him.

If Letsie defected, however,

the civil war would spread, though troops on the Free State border could soon
90
clear the rebels. While the Letsie clan believed its chief fooling the Go
vernment until fully prepared to rebel, Barkly disbelieved this rumor but
thought timid Letsie must take stronger measures against the rebels.

The ma

gistrate doubted that the paramount chief would arrest Lerothodi, who would
only apologize and repeat his crimes; thus, Barkly hoped to arm loyal natives
and with Letsie surround and render Lerothodi impotent.
Arthur Barkly at the same time advised on colonial military strategy.
Sprigg did not want to defend isolated posts like Mafeteng, but Barkly argued
I
that the town was a haven for refugee traders and Loyalists, on the main road,
in open country, and an excellent base for military operations in western Ba
sutoland.

Masitisi Mountain, recently fortified by rebels, was only a one-

day journey from Mafeteng and was vulnerable to attack by troops from that
side and from the Maseru direction.

The Fraser store, only one and a half

miles from Mafeteng, needed protection, because the employees there were mili
tarily useless except for escort duty.

The magistrate advised against sending

troops into Cornet Spruit District from Quthing, because the road from Pathlalla to Mohales Hoek exhibited a number of configurations where a small force
could hold off numerous troops; instead, soldiers from Mafeteng could relieve
Surmon.

Colonial troops, according to Barkly, would have to invest Thaba Bo-

91
srgo.
Besides magistrates and Loyalists, Basutoland traders faced intimidation
in the Basuto Civil W^r.

At a' secret pitso of Masupha, who had decided to

90
J U S . , (1381) , LXVI, 222, ltr. Barkly to Sprigg, August 8 , 1880.
91
Ibid., 266-67, ltr. Barkly to Sprigg, August 11, i860.

82
attack trading posts, Chief Bereng Letsie also designed to assault the posts
92
in order to steal goods to outfit his clan.
Assistant Magistrate Davies re
ported that one trader, having received threats to abandon his store, asked
for protection and permission to withdraw to Maseru if danger increased.

The

merchant saw grain transported by rebels from the Telle River via Roman Hoek
93
to the Maluti Mountains for stockpiling.
A close friend to the Basutos was
Samuel Brummage, a trader at Korokoro.

The nearest chief, Koadi Makhobalo,

told Brummage that he feared assassination by other chiefs if he surrendered
94
hxs gun arid that the Brummage store was in danger.
In July, another trader,
Mr. Trower, and his helpers encountered harassment and thievery from Alexander
Letsie and his clan while attempting to remove goods from the abandoned Brum95
mage shop to Maseru and hence never transferred the merchandise.
Jonathan Molappo, in reaction to this menace, ordered his clan to tidy
the Brummage store and carry off the remaining goods for safekeeping.

He ap

pealed for Cape Colony to strictly enforce its rule over Basutoland?^ For ap
prehending the looters of the Brummage shop, Griffith thanked Letsie, and he
told the chief to levy fines to secure compensation for Brummage.

The Chief

Magistrate intended to arrest and send to Maseru for punishment the chiefs who
97
xnstxgated the Korokoro trouble and who received stolen merchandise.
Traders, nevertheless, considered themselves in a precarious position by
92
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98
remaining in Basutoland, and some fled to the Orange Free State.
Griffith,
prepared for the worst, noted that most traders had surrendered their arms and
99
were at the mercy of the insurgents. Magistrate 5urmon asked if whites in
Cornet Spruit District might retain their arms secretly until restoration of
peace.

Traders in the district wanted to keep their g u n s ^ a s the Government

refused to compensate shopowners for losses.

Surmon, asking merchants not to

remove their goods immediately, called for more rifles and ammunition in order
to arm the traders and loyal natives with h i n u ^ Basutoland merchants wanted
military security, because they were losing income from diminishing business,
and feared that troops would not relieve them soon.

Eventually, traders used

their remaining arms to defend Cape sovereignty in Basutoland, though they did

102

not relish risking their lives and losing profits in a thankless duty.

As disaffection spilled over the Basuto border, Magistrate Austen in Quthing, unable to stifle rebel activity and the beguiler Letsie, urged rein
forcement of the troop camps at Palmietfontein and Fort Hartley to hearten
Loyalists.

Because local rebels threatened to kill first natives who had ai

ded against Morosi and who subsequently had surrendered their weapons, Loya103
lists fled to the Masitisi station.
Thereafter, Lerothodi commanded Quthing
104
natives to join him in Basutoland or lose their cattle.
Magistrate Austen in
98
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Ibid.. 169, ltr. Griffith to Sprigg, June 23, 1880; Ibid., 273, ltr.
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^ ^Ibid. , 273, ltr. Surmon to Griffith, July 12, 1880.
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105
August noted that rebels preponderated in his district and guarded the drifts
on its borders.

Loyalists would fight back if supported, he said, but if the

106

rebels gained the first advantage, the rebellion would grow.

The magistrate

advised a large military offensive, because rebels were inciting the Herschel
District fingos and the T e m b u s ^ a n d Letsie had asked the Pondos^to help him
109
obstruct the PPA and rebel.
No natives, wrote Chief Magistrate Brownlee of Griqualand East, helped
him enforce the PPA among Basutos residing there.
Basutos living here into insurgency.

Rebels intimidated loyal

Brownlee at Matatiele held a meeting and

hinted that Governor Frere would no ; longer apply the PPA to Basutos in Gri
qualand if they disarmed voluntarily^^
The Orange Free State tookstrinaent measures as it again unfortunately
became subjected to Basuto annoyances as rebels hounded Loyalists into Boer
territory.

Across the frontier, Chief George Moshesh led 2,000 cattle, and

President Johannes Brancl^allowed these refugees to remain until colonial troops
105

Drifts: Glaciers formed these stratified or unstratified deposits of
clay, sand, gravel, and boulders in river beds.
, (1881), LXVI, 295, ltr. Austen to Ayliffe, August 5, 1880.
^ ^Ibid.. 297, ltr. Austen to Ayliffe, August 24, 1880.
IQ 3
Pondos: Suffering severely from Zulu incursions, this tribe almost be
came Zulu vassals.
After the Xhosa tribe disintegrated, the Pondos, though
primitive and factious, remained the only independent tribe in the Eastern
Cape Province.
Umquikela became paramount chief in 1867 and showed much hos
tility toward Cape Colony; therefore, Frere withdrew recognition of the leader
ship of this chief in 1878, Rosenthal, e d . , encyclopedia, pp. 397-98.
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^ ^ Brownlee, Basuto War, p. 8 .
A.jB., I, 111-13, 115.
Johannes Brand: Elected to the Cape Parlia
ment in 1854, Brand in 1864 was unanimously elected President of the Orange
Free State and subsequently was re-elected four times.
Though the ominous and
unresolved Basuto affairs in the 1 8 8 0 ’s damaged the rural Free State economy,
Brand stymied the Wodehouse attempts to use the Boer-Basuto wars as an excuse
to subjugate the Boers to Britain.
The president balked at joining a British

85
arrived, but only after consultation with Griffith, who admitted inability to

112

protect the Loyalists.

Governor Frere belatedly sanctioned the Loyalist

flight, their disarmament by the Boers after crossing the Free State border,
Loyalist occupancy wherever farmers allowed, Loyalist payment for grazing, and
113
their subjection to Free State law.
Rebels in August twice unsuccessfully
attempted to steal cattle which Loyalists were escorting from Mafeteng to
Korsberg in the Orange Free State.

The Republic then refused to admit these

L o y a l i s t s ^ ^ o r the Free State, argued the irritated Boer Executive Council, had
no room for the refugees, who burdened the citizens.

President Brand tried

to avoid placement of military forces on the Basuto border.

Volunteer Free

State cavalry posted in Basutoland might incite border Basutos, endanger Qoer
farms, and force the Boer Government to ring with troops the Basuto frontier
from the Grange River up to HarrisrnithT^rnstead, field cornets^enforced pass
rules to keBp cut r e b e l s ^ ^
The limited benefits of rearming harassed Loyalists became apparent.
After the Berea police warned one Hlubi. tribesman that Masupha would attack
South African confederation until London promoted justice for Boers in the
diamond fields, yet, at the same time, Brand obstructed Afrikaner nationalism.
In 1881,the provocative attitude of the rebel Basutos and the desire of Bri
tain to abandon this tribe revived in Brand his previous apprehension about
the tribe.
Anarchy in Basutoland caused frequent border violations; thus, in
late 1883, Brand pressured the Imperial Government to once again administer
Basutoland.
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^^^Ibid.» 200, ltr. Brand to Frere, July 26, 1880.
^ * V i e l d cornets: These Boer military officials raised commando units and
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gistrates, Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 167.
117±L-rL*£.* > (1881), LXVI, 267, ltr. Barkly to Sprigg, August 11, 1880.

86
him, he and his party, rearmed, drove back 600 rebel raiders but lost their
tangible property and themselves fled.

A Boer justice of the peace settled

118
some of the refugee group at Ladybrand.
One rearmed headman in the Berea
District lo 3 t his cattle but with his party escaped from an ambush on the way
119
to Maseru.
Although Leriba District Loyalists received 600 surrendered guns

120

to protect themselves, rebels attacking their villages beat and threatened
these tribesmen.

121

Masupha.

Some of these natives with the cattle of Molappo then joined

The Chief Magistrate finally ordered Magistrate Bell to fall back

on Maseru, because roaming rebel marauders were murdering armed Loyalists in

122

the northern districts.

Bell instead constructed a defense and asked for

123
arms, ammunition, and a 50-man infantry garrison.
Concerning Loyalist views and counteractions in the Civil War, Chief Koadi
indicated that only troops could save the Loyalists, some of whom already were
wavering.

Troops in Basutoland, long overdue, would induce natives to desert

the rebel chiefs, who would then surrender, whereas colonial apathy allowed
124
rebels time to fortify strongholds*
Another tribesman advised the Government,
to move in trained troops, not volunteers, and warned of Loyalist desertions
125
should Cape Colony not dispatch soldiers.
As Chief Sofonia and his followers
feared to travel because of the rebels, he threatened to go into hiding if

^ ^Ibid., 289-90, Tukuny before Bell, July 23, 1880.
1 1 9 Ibid., 290,
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Mokhitle before Bell, July 27, 1880.

Ibid., 216, Cape Argus reporting the July 29, 1880, House Assembly

session.
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Ibid., 291, Molupo before Bell, July 27, 1880.
Ibid,, 6b3, ltr. Griffith to Masupha, July 22, 1880.
Ibid., 287, ltr. Bell to Sprigg, July 24, 1880.
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Ibid., 2.96-97, Cape Argus reporting on message of Koadi Makhobalo,
August 6, 1880.
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Ibid., 660, ltr. Setha Matele to Griffith, August 23, 1880.
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126
Cape Town did not commit troops.
A compromise settlement, indicated other
127
Loyalists, would not insure their safe return home.
By giving intelligence
and exposing insurgent weak points to the Government, Loyalists hamstrung re-

228

bels.

One Loyalist advised Griffith of the rebel fortifications at Thaba

Bosigo and helped the Government supply fortified trading posts until forced
129
_
to flee because of threats.
One Loyalist chief with a turopean bodyguard
confiscated rebel farms^"3^ Rebel leaders themselves, according to Chief Tsekelo, had no specific goal, and cold, hunger, and guilty consciences supposedly
dominated at Thaba Bosigo.

The distressed rebels feared to plow fields or

sleep in their own villages, and captured cattle had insufficient fodder at
the sacred mountain.

Tsekelo asked for colonial troops in each district, re

quested ammunition for Loyalists, and warned that rebels must receive cautious
131
and generous treatment.
Therefore, Governor Frere, unable to estimate how
132
many Basutos supported the rebels, recommended clemency for the insurgents.
One angry Loyalist told Sir Bartle to relay to the London Government that Capa
Colony must delay the evil PPA for two years, as by that time, rebel power.
would have dissipated.

He added that Basutos would not fight their brethren

133
in behalf of Cape Colony.

126
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Ibid., 300, ltr. Sofonia to Griffith, August 6 , 1880.
Ibid. , 306, Cape Argus reporting on telegram from Maseru, August 25,

1880.
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Lagden, The Basutos, II, 511.
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j3.,5 .P., (1881), LXVI, 280, Daniel Mothlabane before Davies, July 27,

1660.
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Ibid. » 298, ltr. Sprigg to Frere, August 26, 1880.
Ibid., 659, ltr. Tsekelo to Griffith, August 14, 1880.

Ibid. , 197, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, August 13, 1880; cf., Ibid., 198,
Frere to Kimberley, July 27, 1880.
133
Ibid., 659-60, ltr. Setha Matele to Griffith, August 23, 1880.
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While one of these brethren, Masupha, remained obstinate, other rebels
also persisted.

This chief demanded the return of the guns that other chiefs

134
had surrendered without his permission.
He, as an example to others, refused
135
to give up Loyalist stock and killed some in front of Letsie.
Lerothodi ab-

136

ducted three policemen and incarcerated them at Thaba Bosigo.

Another rebel

chief declined to return Loyalist cattle, saying that he would lose his own in
. ,137
reprisal.
13 8
The Northern Post at Aliwal North, in editorial reaction to the outbreak,
w ro t e ,
It is painful to see the helpless and ineffective way in which the Go
vernment is allowing the control of affairs to slip out of their hands.
The utterly feeble and ineffective mariner in which affairs have been
conducted hitherto is bringing the colony into contempt and ridicule
and daily adding to the jj^portions of the difficulties which must be
coped with in Basutoland.
Asking the disarmed to calm the dissidents, complained the Cape Argus, was not
realistic.

The Cape Times, however, asserted that Letsie would disarm and

. 140
stressed that this chief, by occupying Thaba Bosigo, had confirmed his loyalty.
It was evident, after all, that Cape Colony was defaulting on its respon
sibility under the Second Treaty of Aliwal North (1869) to protect the Orange
Free State from Basuto harassment.
134

Governor Frere needed to deal with the re-

Ibid., 270-71, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, August 24, 1880.

135

Ibid., 650-51, ltr. Griffith to Ayliffe, August 18, 1880; c f ., Ibid.,
297, ltr. Austen to Ayliffe, August 24, 1880.
136
Ibid., 298, ltr. Sprigg to Frere, August 26, 1880.
137
Ibid., 287, ltr. Bell to Griffith, July 25, 1880.
13 8
Aliwal North: bir Harry Smith, to commemorate his victory at Aliwal,
India, over the Sikhs, founded in 1849 this chief town in its district on the
northern Cape Colony border, Rosenthal, ed., encyclopedia, p. 14.
139
The Times (London), September 2, 1880, p. 3.
^^^Ibid., September 6, 1380, p. 6.

bels harshly, and Prime Minister Sprigg, in view of the serious predicament,
should have arranged for funding to support a large mobilization and early
war.

The dissatisfied magistrates, who fortunately took precautions, could

not alone halt rebel aggression or protect Loyalists.

Surmon either should

have risked his position with his available forces or evacuated.

Barkly, who

falsely encouraged Loyalists, did not realize that Lerothodi negotiated in
bad faith and wanted the paramountcy through civil war.

Reliance on Letsie,

whose actions encouraged rebellion, was misplaced by the magistrate.

The pre

dicament of traders further indicated the need for troops in Basutoland.
Griffith could have evacuated trading posts which contained supplies valuable
to the rebels, but he had no force available to stop the looting.

The Cape

Government should have paid total compensation for losses to merchants who
stayed on, as they helped defend colonial authority.
Further, the Loyalists bore the disadvantage of having undergone disarma
ment.

They did not fight continuously or very successfully, were not dedica

ted, were not united under l e a d e r s ^ a n d .could not protect their magistrates.
Some loyal natives excused and underestimated the rebels and wanted the colony
to handle all the protective fighting, however, others fought gallantly to
uphold colonial law.
The rebels, on the other hand, envisioned specific goals in the civil
war and, despite ample time and opportunity to surrender, instead fomented
insurrection along the entire Cape frontier.
were the mobilizing rebel forces.

Large, powerful, and victorious

Masupha, falsely accusing Letsie while ta

king advantage of him as a symbolic stooge, attempted to usurp tribal authori
ty and would not alter his stand, because he spoke from a strong position.
Only to overthrow his brother Jonathan did Joel, who Masupha manipulated, turn

rebal.

Letsie fooled Griffith, because, while probably trying with loyal

chiefs to mollify Masupha, he could not protect Loyalists* conspired with Ma
supha at Thaba Bosigo, and had no intention to coerce the chief or hold the
mountain and dismantle its fortifications.

Realizing the rebels to be domi

nant, the paramount chief only superficially placated the Government and
feigned loyalty by symbolic actions.

He was a traitor; Frere should have de

posed him.

SPRIGS EXAMINES CONDITIONS IN BASUTOLAND

Sir Gordon Sprigg, initiating one final effort to avoid military confron
tation, asked Joseph Orpen, Commandant Frederick Schermbrucker^and BrigadierGeneral Charles Mansfield Clarke^flommandant-General of Cape colonial forces,
143
to accompany him to Maseru to restore order.
Sprigg also sought the help of
144
the Orange Free State in preserving the peace.
While the party left Cape
Town, the rebel Basutos were gaining strength.

The sight of the Prime Minister

traveling with no armed escort heartened insurgents; Greswell believes that

* P* 330.
Frederick Schermbrucker: a soldier and later Cape
Colony cabinet minister.
Born in 5chweinfurt-on-Main, Germany, he was invited
to Caps Colony in 1867 with military settlers.
In the East Cape Province, he
quickly assumed prominence and entered Parliament in 1868.
In 1875, he moved
to the Orange Free State and edited the Bloemfontein Express. He became a
member of the Legislative Council at Cape Town in 1082.
142
Who Was Who 1897-1915
(London: 1935), p. 140* Sir Charles M. Clarke:
Entering the British Army in 1856, Clarke served in New Zealand from 1861-66
and in the Zulu War and became Deputy Adjutant-General in Ireland from 188688 and at headquarters from 1892-93.
He later assumed the post of governor
at Malta from 19Q3-07.
1 4 3 Theal, 5outh Africa, XI, 60-61; c f ., B_.S_ . P y , (1881), LXVI, 270, ltr.
Frere to Kimoerley, August 24, 1880.
■*44
B.b.P., (1881), LXVI, 265, ltr. Frere to Brand, August 10, 1880.
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600 to 1,000 soldiers should have accompanied Sprigg.
Some Loyalists, falsifying the situation, sought to shackle colonial re
lief against the powerful rebels.

At a pitso at Maseru on August 25, 1880,

Sprigg spoke with Tsekelo, Sofonia, and Mtsane, all Loyalist sons of Moshesh.
Timidity by the colony, said Tsekelo, would endanger negotiations with insur
gents i^yet he warned the Government to act only by proclamation, because, if
Cape Colony employed troops, the tribe would think the rebels had a legitimate
grievance.

Other chiefs counseled Government patience, use of no unnecessary

force, and agreement not to take guns forcibly from villages, as this last ac
tion might precipitate a conflict.

Aware that younger chiefs prized arms,

Tsekelo feigned ignorance when told that chiefs had ordered their men to hoard
guns, yet Lerothodi and Bereng previously had visited the diamond fields and
had urged their men to buy arms.

Other Loyalists considered the PPA a pretext

for rebellion and asked Sprigg if Basutos who left their homeland might keep
their arms.
Tsekelo continued that he had stopped the migration of the people in his.
ward, who, because of fear, had almost,joined Masupha to help fortify Thaba
Bosigo.

Natives atop the mountain, who he considered as mere criminals, ru

mored that, if Sprigg wanted peace, he must offer amnesty to all, remove the
magistrates, and allow Letsie to collect the hut tax.

Tsekelo thought the re

bels weakening, and natives stopped sending grain to feed workers at Thaba
Bosigo.

At public meetings, however, chiefs still feared to speak honestly.

Chief Sofonia alone believed that the rebels would rejoice if not restrained
and that amnesty for them and no compensation for Loyalists would allow insur
gents to steal all Loyalist cattle after Sprigg departed^4**
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Greswell, Our South African Empire, II, 80-81.
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At Morija ^4 ?hief Letsie, further hindering colonial action, verbally cir148
cumvented Sprigg and stalled until Griffith arrived.
The paramount chief
complimented Sir Gordon for traveling without an armed escort and, alleging
149
that brandy caused the unrest, asked why the Prime P4inister allowed the illegal
importation of liquor into Basutoland.

Sprigg in turn asked Letsie why other

chiefs had surrendered no guns, why rebels built fortifications, and why loyal
natives lost their cattle.

Continually changing the subject from the PPA, the

chief grumbled that the tribe did not recognize his paramountcy, that his son
Lerothodi was insane from brandy, but finally announced that in two years the
Basutos would readily give up their arms.
Chief Letsie, furthermore, excused and would not adjudicate the criminal
conduct of Masupha.

Masupha, fearful of punishment, might not attend 3 3

planned, said Letsie, and as a madman was not responsible for his actions.
The paramount chief entreated that the Basutos were ignorant people and that
Sprigg must excuse their failings.
Masupha at Thaba Bosigo.

Letsie humbly advised Sir Gordon to visit

As the: .Prime-- Minister hesitated to go there without

an armed force, Letsie, guaranteeing safety to the company*, offered an escort
for courtesy and laughed that Sprigg feared a drunk.

Sir Gordon then asked

150
the chief to pacify the Cornat Spruit District.
Sprigg on August 30 next met with George Moshesh, now returned from the
Free 5tate, to discuss how to weaken the belligerent but apprehensive rebels.

1 4 6 3 . S .P . , (1881), LXVI, 317-19, Cape Times account of pitso at Maseru,
August 25, 1880.
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Ibid., 297, ltr. Sprigg to Frere, August 24, 1880.
Ibid., 298, ltr. Sprigg to Frere, August 27, 1880.
Ibid., 297-98, ltr. Sprigg to Frere, August 26, 1880.

Ibid., 311-13, Interview between Sprigg and Letsie, August 26, 1880;
In Berea District, Boers sold brandy without licenses, Ibid., 319, Cape Times
account of pitso at Maseru, August 25, 1880.
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Insurgents had fortified and supplied three mountains.

Masupha perched atop

Thaba Bosigo, Bereng atop Masitisi, and Lerothodi atop Kola.

Though Letsie

had stopped three assaults by Masupha against Chief George, the approximately
100 followers of George, feeling abandoned by the Government, began deserting.
Chief Masupha, learned the Prime Minister, refusing to meet Sprigg at Thaba
Bosigo, had not traveled to the pitso at Morija, because he feared his trea
cherous assassination, similar to an episode in the past (Supra, p. 42 , n. 82 ),
and CMR occupation of his fortress.

The CMR units camped on the Orange Free

State border reassured numerous Loyalists.
Chief George, in addition, indicated other preferences and views.

He

supported the 5prigg suggestion of placing 2 , 0 0 0 troops on the Basuta frontier
but advised only the arrest and punishment by magistrates of the rebel leaders;
Loyalists could return and receive compensation.

The Prime Minister next in

quired what reaction would occur if the CMR crossed into Basutoland and 2,000
Zulus entered from Natal.

The rebels would fight but eventually flee to the

mountains, replied George, and the Zulus would seize all rebel cattle.

There

were approximately 4,000 insurgents, and-numerous crestfallen tribssmen, because they would not desert their chiefs, turned rebel.

George said that scores

of Loyalists, who outnumbered rebels, would help against Masupha if Letsie
availed himself; sons of the paramount chief then might desert Masupha, who
announced that Letsie only feigned loyalty and instigated him.

As numbers in

the Masupha clan wanted to and their insurgency, the introduction of a large
military force could induce throngs to desert this rebel chief, and officials,
declared George, could not collect the hut tax that year or the next if rebels
remained armed.

He explained that the PPA perhaps did not cause the civil war

but that Masupha used the act to excite Lerothodi, Moletsane, Putsane. Smith,
and Bereng.

.

Basutos hoarded guns, because they wanted protection against in-
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vasion from the Orange free State, an wham they expected to wreak vengeance
should Cape Colony eventually fight the Boers.
Disarmament, continued George, was not the sole reason for disaffection,
as the rebels detested all European authority and would resist coercion in the
face of eventual defeat,

freedom from the magistrates and the & 1

hut tax,

which allegedly impoverished numerous tribesmen with several huts, elated in
surgents.

George confessed that prophetesses undermined the Government by

vilifying whites and the British army and by urging punishment for whites and
151
natives in Basutoland who aided colonial authorities.
Concerning the safety of the Prime Minister during his visit, Masupha an152
nouncsd that the killing of Sprigg would aid the rebel cause, and, if someone
murdered Sprigg, declared a prophetess, rebels could drive all the whites out
of Basutoland.

Sir Gordon had received threats not to attend the Maseru pitso,

but the insurgents did not attack the Prime Minister because of expectations
153
that he would not travel through rebel-controlled territory.
Joseph Orpen, after: the pitsos, brought Sprigg a letter from Letsie, still,
the rebel vindicator, saying that the rebel chiefs acknowledged their crimes
and begged for mercy; thus, the Prime Minister proposed the punishment of hos154
tiles by fines.
Rebels obtained for themselves the intercession of Chief
Letsie, who had recommended fines and professed that the PPA, which he now de155
clared would always defy realization, caused the furor.
151

Ibid., 314-16, Interview between 5prigg and George Moshesh, August 30,
1880; Orpen, Prince Alfred*s Guard 1856-1966. pp. 27-28.
152
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 142.
153
3_,S_.jP. , (1881), LXx/I, 316, interview between Sprigg and George Moshesh,
August 30, 1830.
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Ibid., 299, ltr. Sprigg to Ayliffe, September 6 , 1880.
155
Ibid., 319-20, ltr. Sprigg to frere, September 9, 1880.
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The Prime Minister, contemplating his evaluations, then traveled to Leribe
District to restore order.

The PPA, he adamantly asserted, had not caused the

civil war; Orpen and Griffith agreed that the rebel leaders had as prime objec-

156

tives independence and the expulsion of whites.

The Prime Minister on his way

home spoke with the Fraser brothers, prominent Basutoland traders, then pre
paring to fortify their main store.

Sir Gordon scoffed at their warning that

rebellion was inevitable 7 ^^owever, he believed that only a large force could
158
check the rebels and support Loyalists.
Newspapers hinged final appraisal of the Sprigg visit on future contin
gencies.

The Eastern Province Herald (Cape Colony), though censuring him for

bagging for psace, otherwise lauded Sir Gordon and urged the crushing of Masu159
pha before his position improved.
The Pall Mall Gazette (London) admitted
that if the mission resulted in the submission of rebel leaders, the Prime
Minister might avoid parliamentary t r o u b l e ^ ^ If the Sprigg journey seemed to
his opponents at: Caper Town and in England a sincere: effort to avoid war, an
nounced another tabloid,, he would have*rdismissed the sinister motive- attributed
/■ .
. . 161 *
to his mission.
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In retrospect, Sir Gordon should have requested an escort of versatile
colonial troops at the pitsos to impress upon rebels and Loyalists alike the
intent and capability of Cape Colony.

Sprigg took with him people who could

correctly assess the crisis and propose solutions, and, through^excellent ad-
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Ibid., 332, ltr. Sprigg to Ayliffe, September 15, I860.
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, pp. 142-43.

1 5 8 B,S.P., (1881), LXVI, 304, ltr, Sprigg to Ayliffe, September 1, 1880.
159~ *™
The Tiroes (London), October 1, 1880, p. 3.

~*~^^Pall Mall Gazette (London), October 8 , 1880, p. 5.
The Times (London), October 13, 1880, p. 4.
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vice given by traders and Chief Sofonia, he received sufficient reasons why
and assurances that troops would help restore order but still did not realize
the grave situation.

As the Government had a moral obligation to protect

Loyalists with troops, Sir Gordon should have ignored Chiefs Letsie, Tsekelo,
George, and othsrs who belittled the rebel threat, backed down, and wanted the
Government to do likewise.

THE RECALL OF GOVERNOR FRERE

Prime Minister Sprigg alone did not meet obstructions, as Governor Frere
had found his own policies condemned.

Prime Minister Gladstone recalled the

governor in May, 1880, because the position of Frere on the affairs of South
<Xo2
Africa conflicted with that of the Home Government.
Frere was condemned be
cause of his alleged design for an unjust and unprovoked Zulu W a r ^ l u l u wax
disasters, the failure o f confederation, and the Liberal Party search for peace
'

164

at whatever price- in South Africa.

'

’

"

Numerous people wanted to relieve Sir

'

Bartle^oscause of his involvement in iocai.party politics in support of S p r i g g ^
Godfrey Lagden says that the governor, had he remained, might have concluded
167
the Basuto war victoriously and quickly.
Frere, his performance frustrated, complained that people for partisan
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Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 252 (1880), 459, Mr. Gladstone speaking, May
25, 1880.
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Pall Mall Gazette (London), August 3, 1880, p. 4.
164
Greswell, Pur South African Empire, II, 90; cf., Pall Mall Gazette
(Londont, July 7, 1880, p. 4.
^~*Pall Mall Gazette (London), August 3, 1880, p. 4.
i 6 6 Ibid., August 11, 1880, p. 4.
^Lagden, The Basutos, II, 514.

purposes spread numerous rumors in England regarding the Basuto civil strife.
Troublemakers told the Basutos that he was a tyrant and that his recall illus
trated British governmental reprobation of his Basuto policy.

While Britain,

insisted Sir Bartle, could support the PPA, or, if it disapprqvad of the act,
could forbid subsequently required military action against the Basutos, the de
liberations of the Home Government convinced the colonists that the Crown was
shirking its military prerogative, thus leaving Cape Colony to act on its own
responsibility"^^ Sprigg would agree to London disallowing armed action against
the rebels, because, constitutionally, Queen Victoria as Commander-in-Chief
commanded colonial troops^"^
The Colonial (iffice, in addition, mistakenly excoriated Sir Bartle after
he had left

Cape Town in the autumn following the outbreak of the rebellion.

Kimberley blared that, "It is inconceivable that a Governor of Sir Bartle
Frsre's undoubted abilities could lend his support to such blunderings /colo
nial military intervention in Basutalanq/ as he appears to have d o n e , " ^ The
secretary hypocrized the following year: by admitting; that the Sprigg ministry
could rightfully combat the; Basutos,. because, though the natives were subjects'

^
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(1881), LXVI, 163, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, May 30, 1880.

Lagden, The Basutos, II, 503, 516. The British Undersecretary of State
for Colonial Affairs said in Parliament that the British Government could not
prevent the CMR from entering Basutoland, Hansard, 3rd ser,, Vol. 252 (1880),
645-46, Mr. Duff speaking, May 28, 1880.
170
Martineau, Frere, II, 383.
^ ^ T y l d e n , The Rise of the Basuto, p. 144. Major-General Sir Henry Clif
ford and Sir George C. Strahan served as administrators until a new governor
arrived.
Ibid. . Dictionary of National Biography (London: 1931), IV, 522.
Sir Henry Clifford: Clifford, born ..n Dorsetshire, England, came to 5outb Afri
ca with an army commission and fought the Gaikas and Boers in the 1840*s.
He
received the Victoria Cross in the Crimea, fought in China in 1857-58, and,
as he knew much about Bantu warfare, easily supervised all field communications
in the Zulu campaign of 1679.
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of the Queen, responsible ministers at Cape Town administered the tribe.
It is evident, in conclusion, that the Gladstone ministry either should
have announced formally its concurrence with Cape decisions or pressured their
revocation; Kimberley instead crippled official British credibility.

5ome

parties encouraged Basuto insurgents and undermined Sir Bartle, while some
British citizens falsified the Basuto crisis.

CAPE COLONY MOBILIZES FOR WAR

In regard to the background on colonial mobilization, the Cape Government
in Parliament never formally declared a state of rebellion in Basutoland.
Preparations for war began, and Tylden alleges that Griffith anxiously awaited
rebel armed resistance in order to start the war,
Theal, in the certainty of belligerent rebel intent, considers the rebel
lion the M . . .. most formidable attempt ever made by natives in South Africa
t o throw off European supremacy. . . .
tives had any respect for.”

It. was only British power that the na— "

The rebels, says Tylden, could mass 23,000 mounted

warriors, though each unit would not fight outside its own ward except on
raids.

173
Lerothodi built schantzen atop Hasitisi Mountain, which guarded on the

south and we 9 t tha village of his father.

Cooperation from other rebellious
j 74

tribes, however, disappeared after an initial accord.

It is controvertible if the Sprigg ministry took decisive measures against
17?

Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 259 (1881), 1792, Earl of Kimberley speaking,
March 24, 1881; cf., De Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 268.
173
Schantzen: three-sided ramparts on hillsides that guarded strategic
habitats or military positions.
174
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, pp. 142-45.
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the threat.

The Government, according to the Pall Mall Gazette, so confident

ly expected speedy rebel submission that it did not ask for a vote on military
expenditures before Parliament adjourned, as Opposition leaders had asked
(Supra, p. 76, n. 57), and for Sprigg to have sought consent for a Basuto war
would have meant risking a reversal of the favorable vote on his policy in
June.

Tha ministry, argus 3 the Gazette, though somewhat welcoming a war, ne

vertheless failed to prepare for hostilities despite warnings from officials
and missi onaries^^ However, the CMR, by July 7 placed on emergency f o o t i n g ^ ^
had a directive to enter Basutoland and to garrison Maseru, Mafeteng, and
Moh 3 les Hoek; 50 whites and 200 Fingos received orders to garrison the fort at
Palmietfontein.

The chiefs, believed Sprigg, would declare themselves after

the placement of CMR garrisons; then the ministry could determine the extent
177
of rebellion, which Sir Gordon thought small.
By July 27, 250 CMR had left
178
Queenstown for Aliwal North.
From here they sped on to a Free State camp
ground^'*

•.

Sir George Colley, who Frere had succeeded as High Commissioner, adverse
ly criticized the colonial military undertaking by pointing out the inept
discipline and poor preparation of thB Cape military, the inevitability of a
prolonged and difficult campaign, the vulnerable colonial lines of communica
tion, and the disadvantage of fighting a mobile enemy who held fortifications
in the remotest parts of Basutoland*
3 75

Despite warnings, asserts De Kiewiet,
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^ ^ Q r p e n , Prince Alfred’s Guard 1556-1966, p. 27.
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the Cape Government held too insignificant the military strength of the rebels,
who had ample time to store cattle and food supplies in inaccessible country.
To intimidate the rebels and protect the Loyalists, Cape Town dispatched very
few soldiers instead of a large army, and there were too few skilled officers
2.80
to handle the inexperienced troops, who had inadequate arms and ammunition.
Tylden contends that the warning of Wolseley (Supra, pp. 34-35, nn. 47-48),
who had scanned intelligence reports, was extremely accurate but that Gover
nor Frere did not allow this warning to alter arrangements, though both Frere
and Sprigg realized how inadequate and unprepared were colonial troops for
J.3X
182
offensive warfare.
Rebel chiefs noticed encouraging comments in newspapers.
A majority of the colonial press said that the Cape Government should not have
183
engaged the numerous and well-supplied Basutos with so few troops, and the
Pall Mall Gazette predicted that Basuto military success would excite other
tribes '!'84
Governor Frere, proceeding with his design to avoid confrontation but to
support magistrates, with the full, assent of Griffith moved a detachment of
50 CMR to Quthing, because Magistrate- Auaterr had complained that the CMR; al— •
ready in Quthing were insufficient to patrol the district and chase off rebels
and squatters ^ 8 8 Frere advised against sending troops to (Maseru, because none
were camped within several days marching distance, and news of a march would
186
excite the rebels.
Kimberley approved of Sir Bartle refraining from action
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187
which would increase tension and necessitate the use of more armed force*
Colonel Griffith, with that understanding, countered Letsie, who still
shirked his duty.

The paramount chief lied that neither had the rebels over

powered him rior had he officially received orders to fight them.

He begged

Griffith not to allow colonial troop 3 into Basutoland because of the expense
2.83
involved to the tribe yet declared that old age prevented him from engaging in
189
the civil war.
Cape troops, replied Griffith, would not intervene unless
rebels ovarpawered the chief, or until Letsie asked assistance^Rowever, the
Chief Magistrate said repeatedly that troops would deter rebel chiefs and
their followersi^^
The progress of colonial troops suddenly halted.

Through his country

192
President Brand allowed 300 CMR passage; the column marched to the west bank
of the Caledon River and waited at Jackman Drift for Griffith to order it
193
across.
Though Griffith rebuked Sprigg for intimating that magistracies
would have to suffer assaults before the advent of troops, the Chief Magis— ■ ,
trate refu 3 sd to take responsibility for-ordering troops across- the Caledon
River into Basutolandr despite-'the imnrinent rainy season threatening to make
the Caledon River unfordable for months and thereby restricting the troops to
194
Free State farms.
186
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Threatened and unmistakable resistance came into focus as colonial troops
neared the border.

Barkly feared investment, because ha had too few men to

guard the borderland his post, and now expected rebellion.

Senile Chief

Moletsane nurssd a phobia that the colony would abuse him after disarma m e n t ^
and, over eighty years old and a Christian, joined the rebels, saying that the
196
whites had long wanted and had now begun to exterminate the tribeRebel
scouting parties roamed the Basuto countryside and stopped or watched closely
magistracy messengers.

Rebel earthworks at a drift in the Cornet Spruit

197
blocked the route by which Colonel Frederick Carrington was to relieve Magis
trate Surmon from the Free S t a t e t ^ Rebel sympathizers, noted Surmon, barred
199
the road from his post at Mohales Hoek to Quthing.
The rebels doubled their
guards at all drifts as the CMR approached^and two regiments of Masupha,
which observed the CMR at the Free State border, had orders to engage troops
20 V
crossing the Caledon River. ..cBad weather and poor roads had delayed the two
202
'
' 203
relief columns under CoionelsrBayly and Carrington.
Of the 650 CMR, Bayly

Ibid. t, 268, 1 1r. Barkly to Spriggs Aug us t- 12L, .1880.
196

Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 272.

.'A.A-

197

~
, P* 60.
Colonel Carrington: Born in Cheltenham, England,
Sir Frederick Carrington came to South Africa in 1875.
He campaigned in Griqualand West, then against the Galekas in 1877, at which time he organized
and commanded the Frontier Light Horse.
As leader of the Transvaal Volun
teers, he stormed the stronghold of the rebel chief Sekukuni.
In the Basuto
Rebellion, he commanded at Mafeteng and was seriously wounded.
Carrington
was principal commander in the Matabele Rebellion in 1896 and during the Se
cond Anglo-Boer War led a Rhodesian force against the Transvaal from the north
198
3 . 5 . . , (1881), LXVI, 268, ltr. Barkly to Sprigg, August 12, 1880.
199
Ibid., 222, ltr. Surmon to uprigg, August 8 , 1880.
^ ^ Ibid., 307, Cape Times, September 1, 1880; cf., Orpen, Prince Alfred*s
Guard 1856-1966, p. 27.

201

., (1881), LXVI, 316, Interview between Sprigg and George Moshesh, August 30, I860.
202
S •A.D.N.B., pp. 21-22.
Colonel Bayly: Colonel Zachary Bayly was born
in England and came to South Africa, where he joined the Duke of Edinburgh’s
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commanded the left wing, and Carrington beaded the right wing, which arrived
at its destination in the Free State late in August.

Henry Shervinton, re

nowned adventurer and mercenary, led a third detachment of soldiers from Kokstadt to Basutoland by way of Umtata, as the direct route afforded no fodder
or wagon road.

At Palmietfontein, these troops sighted rebel pickets keeping

2q,
vigil in rifle pits and behind stone walls lying along the opposite river bank.
Natal officials at the same time acted resolutely.

After the Basuto Civil

War began, Natal colonists residing near the Drakensburg mountain passes
feared assault by rebel raiding parties; accordingly, the Natal police mobi205
lized under the command of Major J. G. Dartnell.
Griffith, suggesting a final arrangement to avert engagement of troops,
informed Letsie that colonial troops would garrison Maseru and Mafeteng to
support the Loyalists.

The magistrate would increase the number of native

police patrolling the countryside, especially the border, to prevent intimida
tion.

Rebels, continued the Chief Magistrate, must appear in the magistrate

courts, submit* to fines, and restore stolen- stack and goods to whites: and
Loyalists.

Though much would depend on Letsie farcing his tribe to disarm,

the Cape Government would reconcile itself with the rebel surrender of only
206
some guns and would allow Loyalists to keep arms for protection.
Own Volunteer Rifles,
In 1878, he commanded a detachment against the Korana
tribe and the next year operated against Chief Morosi in the upper Orange River
Valley.
After a lengthy siege, he led the attack up Morosi*s Mountain to ter
minate the campaign.

203

33.5^.P . , (1881), LXVI, 270, ltr. Frere to Kimberley, August 24, 1880.

204

Shervinton, The Shervintons, pp. 60-61; c f ., JB.EuP_., (1881), LXVI,
298, ltr. Sprigg to Frere, August 26, 1880.
205
H. P. Holt, The Mounted Police of Natal
(London: John Murray, 1913),
p. 91.

206
1880.

33.S_.JP., (1881), LXVI, 320-21, ltr. Griffith to Letsie, September 5,
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In fair judgement, the longer Governor Frere postponed enforcement of
colonial,l aws, the more rebellious and prepared became the dissidents.

Sprigg

and Frere should have immediately dispatched troops across the frontier, and
Sir Gordon too late showed his obliging intent towards Loyalists.

CHAPTER V

THE BASUTO REBELLION

SEPTEMBER 188Q

In September, 1880, the Basuto Civil War, now three months old, became
enmeshed in the Basuto Rebellion^- Basuto rebels legally were liable to prose
cution by the Cape Government, as they had defied both the central authority
as well as their own tribal hierarchy.

Because of colonial intervention, at

this time it is necessary to end discussion about the civil war, which never
theless continued to perpetuate itself during the much more alarming Basuto
Rebellion.

No official record dated the exact beginning and end of the rebel

lion, but it is plausible to say that the war commenced on September b, 1880,
when colonial troops first crossed into Basutoland, and terminated during
July, 1881, when both sides began to observe a military armistice.

The rebel

lion did not require an:, earlier, date,...because the rebels..;did^Jnjp.t.LCQmmitdr)vaxti.''.-

The material in the next few subchapters attempts to disprove some his
torical allegations, concerns the actual combat during the Basuto Rebellion,
indicates the major battles (most of which have no names), and discusses the
strategy, tactics, armament, logistics, and military appraisal of both sides.
The campaign fallowed a course of action in which colonial troops with limited
range battled highly mobile rebel forces.
Tracing the events of this war, the
text attempts to follow cohesively chronological progression in distinct geo
graphical areas.
In 1880, no adequate map of Basutoland existed; thus, the
few attendant maps show, perhaps inaccurately, only some of the terrain in the
campaign area.
Historians have always referred to the war, informally, as the
Gun War, thus perpetuating the fallacy that the PPA entirely caused the con
flict.
The colonial forces, history also recorded falsely, failed miserably
to win victory.
From careful scrutinization of the story, one must note that
a multitude of events in and surrounding this conflict bring to mind events
which occurred in the 1964-71 phase of the "Vietnam action."
105
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violence against the Cape Town Government until troops entered Basutoland.

The

3asuto Civil War, amalgamating with the rebellion, recognizably began about
June 1, 1880, and also terminated in July, 1881.

The 18B1 armistice ended

neither the tribal feuding nor rebel resistance, although the fighting there
after degenerated into the customary Basuto factious quarreling and did not
involve colonial troops.
The most serious initial combat involved the Carrington wing of the CMR
as it'marched across the Caledon River towards Mafeteng to relieve Magistrate
Barkly and his ZOO Basuto police.

About 2 miles from Mafeteng, 600 Basuto

cavalry under Lerothodi attacked the advance guard commanded by Henry Shervin
ton, which warded off the hostiles until CMR reinforcements arrived.

In their

subsequent defeat, the rebels lost 12 killed, and the troops, who sold the
2
captured enemy sheep and cattle for Government profit, suffered only 1 casualty.

3
Part of the Moletsane bataunq attacked at Lithleko's villgge some Loya-

4
lists who had previously surrendered their guns.

The CMR, after encamping at

Mafeteng, fought Chief Moletsane at Lithleko’s, killing 5 rebels.
~ Magistrate Barkly ^ in addition*-; actively participated in the^ initial, con-frontation.

He with others rode out to scout around and informed a CMR scout

that the hostiles blocked the road ahead.

The magistrate met with and re

quested Lerothodi to go home and said that the CMR, unless attacked, would not
molest the chief, but Lerothodi, insisting that he had sustained volleys,
would not return home unless the CMR turned back.

Darkly disclaimed responsi

bility for the CP-AR advance and warned Lerothodi of defeat if the chief attemp2

Shervinton, The Shervintons, pp. 61-62; c f ,, Theal, South Africa, XI,

61.
^Bataunq: clan.
^Theal, South Africa, XI, 61.

107
ted to halt the soldiers.

The magistrate then ordered out the Basuto police

as an advance guard with instructions not to fire first.

The courageous po

lice almost seized an entire rebel herd, but the enemy recouped most of the
animals^
Colonel Carrington, moreover, gave insight into the first few days of
4

campaigning.

Messengers from Lerothodi on the 13th advised him not to move

into Basutoland, and during the colonial advance on Mafeteng, rebel cavalry
shadowed the CMR flanks, front, and rear.
thodi, 3,400 more hid in nearby hills.

Besides the 600 warriors with Lero

The Carrington troops by crossing a

plain turned the flank of the rebel kopje on which stood Lerothodi and his
warriors; then the CMR and police withstood a rebel onslaught and scattered
it.

The hostiles tried in vain to rally as they fled pursuit over 3 miles, a

pursuit that initially sought to clear the road to Morija and Letsie.
The colonel, regarding further clashes, heard that rebels were attacking
Loyalists nearby at Rafshotosberg.

The CMR chased these hostiles 13 miles to

7
the nek of Maquaisberg,. killing 7.

On the 14th, when a search—and-destroy

patrol entered the village-of Martineng, one and a half miles from Mafeteng,
to prevent rebels escaping with grain, enemy resistance collapsed, and sol
diers confiscated 2 loads of grain after destroying the village.

On the 15th,

while 25 CMR attacked the kraal of Matsepe, Lsrothodi reinforced with 200
warriors the rebels defending a schantzen there, thus forcing the colonials
to retreat.

Captain Shervinton and Barkly with their reinforcements eventually

dislodged all the hostiles and burned insurgent villages nearby.

Lerothodi

5

3. S .P ., (1881), LXVI, 347-49, ltr. Barkly to Griffith, beptember 13,
1880; cf., Theal, bouth Africa, XI, 61.
^Kopje: a small hill, often covered by scrub, on the African veldt.
^Nek: a low point in a mountain range often used as a travel route.
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retained about 500 warriors at his fortified kraal; Moletsane resided close by
with 800-900?
On September 17, in a narrow escape for Shervinton in a following combat,
9
1,200 rebels battled 70 CMR, killing 3 of them.

As Shervinton with 40 CMR were

searching for enemy grain at an empty kraal 2 miles from Mafeteng, rebels sud
denly poured from the village of Lerothodi to cut them off, end about 800
enemy cavalry surrounded the colonials in the kraal.

3oth Shervinton and the

rebels received reinforcements, but 11 soldiers drove off the 800 hostiles to
allow the Shervinton patrol to escape back to camp with no casualties.

The

rebels, who lost about 50 killed or wounded, fired indifferently, would not
expose themselves to view, and always retreated when pressed"^ Later, Carring
ton himself joined in counter-attacking the rebel flank.
Rebel advantages became apparent in this latest encounter.

Shervinton

noticed that the Basuto ponies were superior to the CHR mounts and that the
enemy carried Martini-Henry and Westley-Richards rifles, better weapons than
the Snider carbines used by colonial troops.

The rebels could fire from po

sitions outside the-ranges of Snider carbines, which were useless immediately
after firing, and during this interval, reassured by the CMR indefensibility
in close combat, could attack with assegais and battle axes.

Prime Minister

Sprigg, returning to Cape Town, witnessed this skirmish, and Shervinton told
him of the mediocrity of colonial arms.

Shervinton estimated at 40,000 the

enemy forces, who at this time began to encircle and isolate Mafeteng, while
only 13,000 colonials were being mobilized againstthem^

3_._P., (1881), LXVI, 356-57, ltr- Carrington to Assist. Adj.-Gen.,
September 6, 1880; Orpen, Prince Alfred*s Guard 1856-1966. p. 28.
» (1881), LXVI, 307, ltr. Clifford to Kimberley, September 20,
1880.
^ Ibid., 330, ltr. Clifford to Kimberley, September 20, 1880.
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On the morning of the 21st, the date of the first attack on Mafeteng,
Captain Shervinton attempted to use a heliograp^he had constructed about 1
mile from camp.

Enemy cavalry attempted to capture colonial cattle and horses

grazing near Shervinton, who barely escapedthe 7,000 rebels advancing on Mafe
teng.

Meanwhile, 136 CMR, wagon drivers, European volunteers, Basuto police,

and a few Loyalists manned strong points in the town.

The enemy attacked

Mafeteng on all sides and swept off cattle and half the native police mounts;
then they charged the nearby village of Loyalist Mohapi, losing about 10 in
this assault.

Though colonial gunfire halted two more rebel charges, 200-300

14
15
enemy crept within 50 yards of the post and received 600-700 reinforcements.
Shervinton with 25 men mounted up and dislodged from under a schantz 400 of
these r e b e l s ^ w h o fired once at the charge and f l e d ^ The tribesmen, indicates
Barkly, used foot-long iron hooks with 2 sharp points to drag off their casual18
ties, although Tylden says that for this purpose every warrior possessed a
19
long rawhide rope with a grappling hook on the end.
iMumerous rebels on the

20

22nd returned home, but large; units still occupied every hill, around Mafeteng.

^ S h e r v i n t o n , The Shervintons, pp. 64-66; c f ., Orpen, Prince Alfred's
Guard 1856-1966, p. 29.

12

Heliograph: a device for signalling by means of a movable mirror, which
flashes beams of light to a distance.
13
Shervinton, The Shervintons, pp. 66-67.
.5^.P_., (1881), LXVI, 370-71, ltr. Carrington to Assist. Adj.-Gen.,
September 22, 1880.
15
Shervinton, The Shervintons, p. 67.
» (1881), LXVI, 371, ltr. Carrington to Assist. Adj.-Gen., Septem
ber 22, 1880.
17
Sharvinton, The Shervintons, p. 67.
IS
Barkly, Among Boers and Uasutos, p. 205.
19
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 151.

20

B_,S_.P_., (1881), LXVI, 371, ltr. Carrington to Assist. Adj.-Gen., Septem
ber 22, 1880.
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The rebel chiefs, in this ignoble failure, refused to allow all their war
riors to go home until Mafeteng fell.

The insurgents had lost so heavily that

they did not celebrate, as usual, after the battle, in which only 5 CMR had
been wounded, and became disenchanted.

21

sault.

Letsie had lost 1 son in the last as-

The hostiles showed magnificent cowardice at Mafeteng, according to

Barkly, and the famed Battle Axe3 Regiment of Lerothodi suffered inglorious
ignominy.
In the aftermath at Mafeteng, Magistrate Barkly boasted that his forces
had killed about 100 rebels around the residency, and he placed wire and mines
22
23
around his station.
Captured horses supplied replacement mounts.
Lerothodi
offered a £.100 reward for the capture of Barkly.
Some warriors sent by impotent Letsie to protect Barkly instead joined
24
the rebels.
The chief still proclaimed his loyalty and vowed that he would
25
prevent from entering his ward the warriors of Lerothodi.
As colonial forces made progress without -Letsie elsewhere, on September
26
6, the north column under Colonel Bayly crossed into Basutoland.
The force
moved to Maseru without incident and planned to march on to Mafeteng if Grif27
fith could raise enough volunteers to defend his post, Bayly, with Commandant
5chermbrucker as second in command, constructed an earthen fort and fortified

21
22

Ibid., 342, ltr. Sprigg to Treasurer-General, September 27, 1880.
Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos. pp. 155, 164, 187, 204, 191, 206, 170.

^J3.5..P.., (1881), LXVI, 356, ltr. Clarke to Sprigg, September 22, 1880.
24
Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos. pp. 155, 191-92.
25B.S.P., (1881), LXVI, 347, ltr. Letsie to Griffith, September 14, 1880.

26
27

Ibid., 327, ltr. Captain D. Hook to Ayliffe, September 17* 1880.

Ibid., 331, ltr. Clarke to Undercolonial Secretary Herbert, September
23, 1880.

Ill
28
the buildings at Maseru.
To the north, meanwhile, Natal aided against insurgents.

Rebels forced

Loyalist Chief Jonathan from his stronghold at Tsikoane Plateau in Leribe Dist29
rict, and he took refuge with Magistrate Bell at Thlatsi Heights, where a regi30 _
msnt of Loyalist volunteers guarded him.
Two hundred Natal Europeans engaged
by Cape Town marched to Ijelp Jonathan, who actively sought armed support.
Governor-General Colley of Natal permitted Cape Colony to raise a Natal native
31
police force to serve Magistrate Bell.
If rebels threatened Natal itself,
32
Colley agreed to aid Cape Town by direct military intervention, a possibility
which Aylward thought would delight the Cape Colony merchants and some politi
cians who thought that subjugation was the only method to bring black tribes
into the "very questionable paradise that canteen-keepers and petty grocers
call civilization."

33

To the south, at beleaguered Mohales Hoek, Magistrate Surmon with some
whites and a few Loyalists defended his station against attacks and encirclement
34
'■ - ■
by rebels.
The garrison during a rebel attack on the 20th drove 1,200 enemy
-35--'' 'L'
from the town and killed several^ chieLfs^^ On September, 25, over 1,500 rebels,
attacked again but fled after suffering a few casualties.
28

They falsely rumored

Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto. p. 150.

29

Thlatsi Heights: site of the Leribe magistracy and a military fort erec
ted in 1879.
Rosenthal, ed., Encyclopedia, p. 294.
^ L a g d e n , The Basutos, II, 521.
31
£[.!5.jP., (X881), LXVI, 342, ltr. Sprigg to Treasurer-General, n.d., r.
September 26, 1880*
32<Ibid. , 308, ltr. Colley to Kimberley, September 26, 1880*
33
Aylward, " B a s u t o p . 340.
34
Theal, South Africa, XI, b2.
3^
“’Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, p. 195.
36
_B.Su_P«, (1881), LXVI, 432, ltr. Surmon to Clarke. October 16, 1880.
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that Surmon was now "food for the crows."

37

Troops, in subsequent colonial defensive positions, by the end of Septem
ber garrisoned enclaves.

Approximately 650 native policemen and colonial

30
volunteers garrisoned Thlatsi Heights.
The north column under Colonel Bayly,
300 strong with some Basuto police, held Maseru; "Fighting Fred" Carrington se
cured Mafeteng with 250 soldiers and some Loyalists.

Magistrate Surmon defen

ded Mohales Hoek with 12 whites and 80 blacks, and Austen with 100 police and
39
some loyal Baphutis and Tesnbus had fallen back from Quthing town to Masitisi.
Simultaneous rebellious outbreaks in Tembuland and Griqualand East threa40
tened to strain both Cape Town forces and finances. Magistrate Austen routed
ab out 600 rebels under Chief Tyali, who had attacked the Palmietfontein magis—
41
tracy in Herschel District, and Magistrate D. Hook at this post wanted 100
Bantu stationed 10 miles below the town to protect Loyalists fleeing Basuto—
42
land.
Austen, after another skirmish with Tyali, promised that reinforcements
43
could crush the insurgent Tembus.
Brownlee from Griqualand East reported that
undesirables were exaggerating the Basuto Rebellion and that natives were de—
44
monstrating strong-sympathy for the rebels.
He wanted more troops if the

^ I b i d ., 327, ltr. Hook to Ayliffe, September 17, 18BQ.
^□rpen,

Prince Alfred's Guard 1856-1966, p. 29.

^^B_.5_.P_. , (1881), LXVI, 344, Memorandum of September 29, 1880.
40
Theal, 5outh Africa, XI, 62; cf., Orpen, Prince Alfred’s Guard 18561 9 6 6 . p. 29; c f ., j3.J5.jP., (1881), LXVI, 345, ltr. Clarke to Herbert, September
29, 1880.
J5._P. , (1881), LXVI, 334-35, ltr. Austen to Ayliffe, September 21,
1880; cf., Ibid., 335, ltr. Austen to Ayliffe, September 22, 1880.
^ I b i d ., 332, ltr. Hook to Ayliffe, September 15, 1880; cf.,
ltr. Ayliffe to Hook, September 16, 1880.
43
Ibid., 354-55, ltr. Austen to Ayliffe, September 29, I860.
44
Ibid., 322, ltr. Brownlee to Ayliffe, September 13, 1880.

Ibid., 333,
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45
situation there deteriorated, because Cape Colony had transferred all soldiers
46
from his district to Basutoland.
Problems arose in troop mobilization, for, while Cape ministers did not
want to specify a definite period of service for the CMR but wanted Clarke to
47
muster enough soldiers to keep 600 men in the field at all times, General
Clarke desired at least 2,000 permanent white troops, with 700 CMR from this
total at Maseru and Mafeteng.

Six hundred yeomanry and 700 volunteers would

constitute the remainder of the force.

From each regiment, Clarke wanted to

activate only a limited number of men, who would remain in the field perma
nently, because, if he called out all the yeomanry at once, Boer burghers and
other unreliable soldiers would have to replace them at the end of a six-month
48
term.
Burghers constituted the only reserve force, though many officers raised
49
additional white and Bantu units.
Burghers, believed the general, were mili
tarily useless, because, untrained and reluctant to mobilize, they would hamper
50
_ ..
a field force, and burgher anger at their mobilization, indicated Jan Hofmeyr,
made1the- w a r unpopuXar- in^ the-rural: areas?,:'whose^ Boer-inhabitants discussed - '
51
ways to avoid military service.
Clarke also, complained of regiments mustering
52
far below strength, and the Opposition in the Cape Parliament alleged that only
45

Ibid., 327, ltr. Brownlee to Ayliffe, September 16, 1880; c f ., Ibid.,
336, ltr. Brownlee to Ayliffe, September 23, 1890.
46
Brownlee, Basuto W a r , p. 9.
^j3.j5.P_., (1B81), 330, H. W. Pearson Minute, September 17, 1880,
48
Ibid., 323, ltr. Clarke to Acting Undercolonial Secretary, September 15,
1880.
49
50

Ibid., 345, ltr. Clarke to Herbert, September 29, 1880.
Ibid., 353, ltr. Clarke to Sprigg, September 17, 1880.
Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 273.

52

B.»S..P,», (1881), LXVI, 334, ltr. Clarke to Treasurer-General, September
21, 1880.
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53
half the CMY mobilized because the other half existed only on paper.
The volun54
teer system worked badly, as it could not field men for more than 6 months.
-55
General Clarke now decided to revisit Basutoland.
Administrator Clifford, disagreeing with mobilization procedures, was
disappointed that Loyalists had not received immediate protection.

He also

56
regretted that military delays increased rebel armaments and numbers and indi57
cated that only a large army could prevent increased rebellion.
From experience
in the Zulu War, he thought that all the CMR must serve for at least 6 months
58
so that the Government could employ them strategically.
Shortly after this rebuke, in attempts to resolve the mobilization and
Loyalist predicament, Clarke and Schermbrucker recruited and equipped Loya59
60
lists.
Sprigg, acknowledging that the rebellion had reached large dimensions,
activated 3 regiments of yeomanry for 3 months service^and called for volun62
teers for 6 months service, because he believed that only a large and staunch
63
"
'
white force could quash the rebellion in 3 months.
Sir Gordon, noting that the
rebels*perhaps^ numbered ^ O O O ^ . w ^ t e ^ t o p^claiRi: specific, areas;,for^ only Loya-»-

^ Pall Mall Gazette (London), October 28, 1880, p. 5.
54
Greswell, Our South African Empire, II, 83.
^£3.^5.P.., (1881), LXVI, 345, ltr. Clarke to Herbert, September 29, 1880.
c/J

Ibid., 325, ltr. Clifford to Kimberley, September 20, 1880.
57
58
59
60

Ibid., 324, ltr. Clifford to Ministers, September 17, 1880.
Ibid., 338, ltr. Clifford to Ministers, September 18, 1880.
Theal, 5outh Africa, XI, 62.
B_.J5.Pv, (18B1), LXVI, 336, ltr. Sprigg to Clifford, September 22, 1880,

^ I b i d .. 339, ltr. Clarke to Treasurer-General.
62
□rpen, Prince Alfredfs Guard 1856-1966, p. 28.
63
B .!5.f\ , (1881), LXVI, 329, ltr. Sprigg to Ayliffe, September 20, 1880.
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lists so that he could treat everyone outside these limits as r e b e l s ^
Despite the smoldering situation in the Transvaal, which alienated against
65
each other British and Boer colonists, Boars offered to help fight the rebels*
One Transvaal veteran of the War of 1065 proffered his services as a guide and

66

those of 200-300 other volunteers.

The Basuto Rebellion, he declared, had

assumed proportions that the Cape Government neither expected nor could han67
68
die.
Though President Brand volunteered 30 men,
Free 5tate farmers reluctant
ly loaned horses to carry ammunition to M a f e t e n g ^
It seems appropriate to examine the logistics, organization, armaments,
tactics, and strategy of the insurgents against whom the above mobilization
was directed.

General Clarke thought that the rebel mountain positions, unless

blanketed by artillery fire, were too strong to succumb to attack and that
Thaba Bosigo was the strongest point!*"* These impregnable mountain fortresses,
according to Greswell, were barriers to colonial victory!"*" The enemy had great
difficulty in storing provisions, because they lacked a war treasury and commisariat.

From their enormous numbersr nevertheless, they sent out 3 or 4

times as many merr to turn back colonial; columns numbering over 1,000 men- that:
72
ventured out beyond enclaves.
Not even a wagon could cross the Basuto border
64

Ibid., 339-40, ltr. Sprigg to Clifford, September 17, 18B0.

^Greswell, Our South African Empire, II, 83-84.
° IL'jL-Z.* t (1881), LXVI, 349-50, ltr. P. £. Raaff to Owen Lanyon, Septem
ber 20, 1880.
67
Ibid., 350, ltr. Raaff to Frere, n.d., r. September 28, 1880.
68
Ibid., 345, Troops in the field, September 25, 1880.
69
Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, p. 172.
70
J3.5^.P_., (1881), LXVI, 323, ltr. Clarke to Acting Undercolonial Secre
tary, September 15, 1880.
^Greswell, Our South African Empire, II, 83.
72
Lagden, The Basutos, II, 522.
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without a heavy escort, and rebel cavalry continuously watched camps and supply'
73
trains.
A military correspondent for The Times reported that the insurgents
had no military organization, lacked discipline, and were negligently coura74
geous. Regardless of the actual outcome of the smallest combat, leaders al- 75

way3 informed their warriors that they had battled victoriously.

The Basutos,

however, could ingeniously entrench themselves and had evolved a distinct
76
breed of small but strong horses adapted to mountainous country.
When ths
natives had only assegais, contends.De Kiewiet, soldiers could pursua them,
capture their cattle, and burn their grain.

With rifles, the Basutos stood

77
their ground.
The rebels, who were bad shots and hardly ever used gun sights,
valued highly Westley-Richards rifles but still used assegais, deeply indented

79

shields (Infra, p. 228, PI. XII), and a battle axe called the koakoa.

A

warrior could throw this battle axe (the shank of its blade was riveted through
a two-foot carved handle) up to 30 feet when it was impossible to grapple with
an opponent.
Regarding the abilities of Basuto military leaders, j-erothodi was a vul
gar, uneducated drunkard. ' An astute politician, he- had overcome all" his ene
mies, and though an excellent rider, he used limited cavalry strategy.

He

succeeded in his primary aim to prevent colonial troops from occupying Morija,
the village of his father and center for incitement of other tribes (also the
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headquarters of the PCS).

Lerothodi, who fought whenever and wherever he wan

ted, did not try to hold high ground in force but used a fluid defense which
melted away from each colonial attack, only to counter-attack apparent weak
spots.

His force moved in a quasi-square formation around the colonials,

shooting haphazardly and charging 2 or 3 times against selected points.

Masu

pha during the war never personally led 1 attack, although he besieged Maseru.
In the north, Chief Joel was anxious to fight, and his brother Jonathan, a
good tactician and cavalry leader, was the next ablest commander after Lero
thodi.
In regard to the competence and popularity of colonial leaders, General
Clarke, according to Tylden, was a better administrator than a commander.

Al

though an excellent leader in the Zulu War, and though his officers liked him,
Clarke lost 2 chances at Mafeteng to seize the initiative from Lerothodi, and
volunteers disliked the general.

Carrington, next in command, had led the CMR

against rebel natives since 1877 cut had achieved no notable victories.

The

troops worshipped this resourceful,_and very active officer, and the Cape Colony
QQ
''
press befriended him.
There was much discontent in military circles, however,
81
at the appointment of Carrington to command his senior officer, Colonel Bayly.
During the Basuto campaign,

’’Fighting Fred” never lacked initiative and even

82
during the armistices urged patrols to goad the enemy.
Colonel Bayly, who had
much political influence, refused to serve under Carrington or cooperate with
Clarke and unfortunately chained half the CMR at Maseru during the entire war.
In observation of colonial logistics, strategy, and organization, further-
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more, there was a shortage of experienced officers and reserve troops, and,
as the rebellions grew, colonial forces spread themselves over too large an
area.

5o many troops garrisoned Leribe, Maseru, and Mafeteng that the main

column at Mafeteng was never strong enough to capture Morija.

At every strong-

03
hold, detachments formed a laager, surrounded by a sod wall and a trench.
CHR signallers in the Orange free State prepared heliograph stations, and
Clarke and Carrington used Wepener as a staging area to provision Mafeteng.
84
Horses dragged artillery slowly over muddy roads, and to ship victuals to the
front was laborious, as the nearest railhead was at Queenstown, 200 miles
85
from Basutoland.
Be Kiewiet believes that colonial campaigning progressed
06
slowly and that attacks on hills and rocky ground provad useless.
To the detriment of the troops, there was evidence of PCS sympathy with
and helplessness in the midst of rebels.

The french whined of both their de

licate position and of misrepresentation by both sides, yet the rebels seemed
to enjoy chatting intimately with the missionaries.

Neither did these flun

kies sustain injury nor-did their buildings, suffer damage, but on the other
gy
hand, the Anglican missions sustained heavy destruction, and the Wesleyan

88

stations implored military intervention.

*
.

Insurgents fondly called Dr. Eugeha ;

89
Casalis "Letsie's Knife'* for helping the rebel wounded, and the pastor insis83

Laager: voortrekkers very successfully used this South African defense
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ted that the colony exaggerated enemy casualties.

When Masupha cordially in

vited Mr. Duvoisin to examine his encampment in the Berea District, the mis
sionary here expressed his views, but the natives only muttered in angry
disagreement.

The French were unable to prevent most of the Christians from

joining the rebels, and at Morija, school children finished their exams and
immediately embraced their guns and assegais.

The schools closed, Christian

congregations dispersed, and scores of loyal natives fled to the mountains.
Adolphe Mabille alleged that before he left Morija, he and local chiefs segre90
gated the Loyalists in a refuge.
Governor Frere maintained that the struggle matched civilization against
barbarism.

Colonial troops perhaps might not end the rebellion, but the figh

ting so far had shown that ten years of peace had not dissipated Basuto
91
courage or dulled tribal skill in surprising colonial forces.
Though some,
like Kimberley and Rhodes, opposed the war, the prospect of losing Basuto la92
bor in their diamond fields, contended Frere, motivated these two men more
93
than military necessity.
The Cape Argus wrote that the colony had involved
94'
itself in another costly and inglorious war, and tha Basutos, reported the-

'

Pall Mall Gazette, considered that the PPA was designed to instigate tribal
rebellion.

According to the Gazette, Frere, even if he did not directly cause

began Protestant mission training in Paris in 1830.
Arriving at Cape Colony
in 1833, he found no missionaries in Basutoland.
Chief Moshesh allowed the
PES to build at Thaba Bosigo a station, later relocated at Morija.
Casalis
returned to Paris in 1858 to becoma director of the mission for a time.
90
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•the war, at least stirred bitter Basuto animosity, and supposedly, Prime Mini
ster Sprigg thought the war would vitalize the patriotism and political inde-*95

pendence of Cape Colony.

The paper insisted that, while Basuto magistrates

had prepared for war, the rebels in the past had offered no resistance and now
fought only defensively?**
Prime Minister Sprigg, in conclusion, mistakenly believed that he could
end the war swiftly; he and his ministers mobilized too few men to cope with
the succession of sudden rebellions.

General Clarke justifiably did not want

set a definite term of service; thus, troops could not untimely leave the
battlefront.

In the Cape armed forces, deficiencies of manpower in mbbiliza-

tion and of other necessities, such as superior weaponry and swords, together
with inefficient mobilization procedures, hampered the colonial effort.

Little

military cooperation between Cape Colony and Natal existed to meat contingent
military situations.

In order to damage rebel morale, troop3 should have

attacked as early as possible Thaba Bosigo and Morija, respectively the mili
tary and administrative capitals of Basutoland.

By October, opposition to

the colonial military response-could have resulted only from ulterior motives
or from false information, as blatantly evidenced in the Pall Mall Gazette.
Chief Lerothodi, furthermore, sought to isolate his father from colonial
influence.

The hostiles, whose masses made dangerous long colonial pursuits,

nevertheless did not employ their guns to the best advantage and lost every
battle in September.

In refutation of De Kiewiet, the rebels cowardly fled

from Cape troops, and colonial attacks succeeded on difficult terrain.

Re

bels, in order to obtain allies and perpetuate aggression, fomented trouble

95

Pall Mall Gazette (London), November 8, 188D, pp. 2, 4.

^**Ibid., September 29, 1880, p. 4.

121
across their borders in Basuto clans and other tribes who thought it a good
opportunity to rebel.

OCTOBER 1880

97
On October 4, Colonel Southey evacuated Magistrate Surmon. With the 2nd
CMR of 184 men, Southey had marched to support another detachment at 01fant
Been in the Orange Free State, 8 miles from Mohales Hoek, where ha took over
command of 313 additional men.

The rebels did not appear as these troops

crossed the Grange River, but 1 mile further on, the enemy at long range fired
at the main force; the colonials then charged the hostiles and drove them
back.

The troops, upon reaching Mohales Hoek, loaded most of the Surmon pro

perty and marched back within three-fourths of a mile of the river, where the
2nd CMY checked about 100 rebels attempting to occupy a village on high ground
98
overlooking the road.
Only military necessity forced General Clarke to with■99

draw Surmon, who, with reinforcements, could have maintained his post.
Five thousand rebels under Masupha on October 10 attacked Maseru (Infra,
p. 231 , PJ.XVII), where Colonel Bayly commanded 239 whites and Schermbrucker
led 256 b l a c k s ^ ^ One hundred and thirty-eight whites, some police under
George Moshssh, and some Loyalists defended the residency, and Chief Koadi
with 154 warriors stood on a kopje between the residency and Trower’s store.
Sofonia, Nehemiah, Tsekelo, and Rampa manned the courthouse with their war-
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riors, and 46 men under Zitza Hoshesh and Mokhitle occupied the hospital.
Matheus with 35 natives and 13 whites held Trower's store; Philemoni with 18
warriors and 7 whites occupied Irvine’s store.

At dawn, a picket reported a

force of rebels approaching from the south-southeast.

The enemy occupied 3

kopjes in front of the residency, fashioned stone walls, and began shooting,
while 3,000 others under Bereng, Mama, and Theko poured out from Lestatse’s
village.

From Berea Plateau on the east, 2,000 more hostiles, commanded by

Lepogo and Martins, 2 sons of Masupha, marched towards Maseru; 1 column ap
proached the CMR camp, and the other started firing rapidly at the residency
and Koadi's kopje.

From the Caledon River, 500 more rebels approached from

the direction of the residency toward the old jail, opposite to and separated
from Trower’s store by a creek, but Safonia halted this onslaught.

An enemy

band from Lestatse’s village, however, joined this rebel group, forcing Sofonia to retreat from the church to the courthouse.

Koadi and 50 Loyalists, as

ordered by Schermbrucker, started to take a ravine aboue the stream and to
push the rebels towards- the church or Trower’s and the residency, but Les—
tatse’s warriors menaced them, so Schermbrucker rescinded the order,

trower

abandoned the knoll above his house as the main attack began, and, when the
enemy assailed Koadi's kopje, the Loyalists there retreated after using up
all their reserve ammunition.

Hand-to-hand combat occurred at Trower’s, and

rebels charged within 20 yards of the residency fortifications, from where
Basuto police recaptured a hill.

Hostiles stole Trower’s livestock from his

kraal and burned the church, school, police barracks, stable, and several
homes, but the Maseru garrison drove the rebels b a c k ^ ^

» (1^81)» LXVI, 426-2B, ltr, Schermbrucker to Bayly, October
11, 1880.
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In further examination, a 12 lbr. gun probably prevented the hostiles
during the entire day from attacking in masses, though the colonial force re
tired to Port Gordon’!’^

Colonel Bayly, imitating from Rorke’s Drift^Ejurned

104
the hospital buildings at dusk in order to illuminate the rebel positions.
While the enemy attempted to pull out the burning thatch on the hospital roof
105
so that they could use the place for shelter, a shell hit then squaraly.
Rebels attacked the Government House and feebly assaulted the fort, where the
first volley from the defenders drove the assailants back.

The hostiles

burned the district surgeon’s house, some offices, and part of the Trower
store; then they plundered the courthouse and stole some g u n s ^ ^
Continuing, one defender reported that, as the enemy was firing heavily
from behind the home of Griffith atop a kopje, he sent men into earthworks in
front of the Irvins store.

Then the rebels pinned down these men in a cross

fire from the police camp, forcing them to retreat to the store yard.

At

night, he regained the earthworks, killing about 40-60 rebels, built schantzen
107
on each side, and fired on Trower’s kopje after Trower had fallen back.
Mr. A. 5idwell, from another perspective, commanded the unit at Trower’s
store and at dawn had moved his men to Koadi’s kopje and also held a small
outpost which commanded the road from the Caledon.

The enemy, exposing them-

102J M ! ' » 380, ltr. Sprigg, October 13, 1880.
103
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selves by constantly changing positions, began shooting from a rocky hillside
position about 700 yards away from the colonial lines; others sneaked down
from the abandoned police camp and followed some sluits0? o the east.

Then

120 rebels dashed from the right front to the right flank, sustaining numerous
volleys but capturing Trower’s kraal, from which they fired at the outflanked
109
and outnumbered colonials, who abandoned Koadi’s kopje.
Before midnight,
the rebels departed, leaving scores of dead, and Schermbrucker, who lost 2
killed’j’^'was confident that the troops could hold Maseru^"1’

112

On October 25, rebels again unsuccessfully assaulted Maseru.

The enemy

entrenched themselves on rocks, d o n g a s ^ i n the school ruins, and on the Kloof14
to the left of Fort Gordon.

Bayly sent’out 20 CMR, 90 native troops, and

some Loyalists^whodislodged 400—500 hostiles on the rocky ledges of the Ca
ledon river bank and killed 20^&owever, not before the rebels had killed 2
117
whites and 1 Loyalist and had run off 45 horses and 42 cattle.
Near Mafeteng, in the meantime, the rebels, faring no better, assaulted
the Fraser store at Diphering on the 4th.

Carrington dispatched 50 CMR to the

surrounding area to engage the enemy, and these troops with Barkly and his

10 8

Sluits: deep ditches produced by heavy rains rushing through natural
fissures.
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Dongas: narrow, steep—sided ravines made by water erosion but usually
dry except in the rainy season.
U4„_
.
Kloof: a ravine.
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native police, the Barkly Horse, fired on the rebels, who retreated.

Lero-

thodi with about 2C0 warriors then raced to cut off Barkly and his police ad
vancing on the Fraser store, but the magistrate pushed them back.

The next

day, 2,500-3,000 rebels fired constantly at the store as their ranks increased,
and Shervinton and 25 men for defensive purposes occupied the kopje opposite
Fraser’s.

Carrington and Barkly with 25 soldiers prevented Lerothodi from

XX 8
cutting off Shervinton, evacuated Fraser, and then withdrew.
The rebels next in vain again sought to overrun Mafeteng.

Mr. Bradshaw

and 12 Basuto police, in a preventive measure, on the night of the 14th
sneaked up a hill behind Hogsback Ridge and destroyed enemy schantzen.

Other

colonials mounted to charge 800-1,000 aroused rebels soon storming out of
M as i u ’s hamlet but halted after they saw Lerothodi and his warriors on top of
Hogsback Ridge.

From Mohapi’s village sprung 1,000 enemy warriors, and from

a kloof behind Mafeteng struck another 500 rebels, who attacked colonial
schantzen above the courthouse from Hogsback Ridge and below.

The hostiles

after hesitating charged colonial trenches but lost 4-5 killed and retirecT^

120

to burn a trading post as revenge far the Carrington victory.

Letsie secret

ly encouraged the rebels and blamed Lerothodi for suffering heavy losses at

Mafetengl^
The rebels, next reported Carrington, had moved toward the border to
intercept General Clarke and the reinforcements which had assembled at

^*^Theai, South Africa, XI, 63.
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Wepener.
The force included the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd CMY, the Kimberley Horse,
123
and two 7 lbr. guns.
Captain Hunt*s Volunteers formed the rear guard, and
the Grahamstown Volunteers (1st City Rifles), Port Elizabeth Volunteers
(Prince_Alfred1s Guard

ereafter abbreviated to PAQ7), and the Mohales Hoek

contingent adjoined the left.

The Cape Town Volunteers (Duke of Edinburgh’s

Own Volunteer Rifles /hereafter abbreviated to DEOVR/) stood on the right
f l a n k l ^ The troops included 101 officers, 1,495 whites, and 75 natives^'*
In the momentous battle of Kalabani that followed (Infra, p. 232, PI. XVIII
), the force crossed the border and left the road to avoid ambush, where
upon Lieutenant Cochran with two 7 lbrs. placed on hifcjh ground dispersed
massed rebels towards the north-northeast.

The road then turned sharply to

the right and entered a short pass between Robatwani’s village and Kalabani
Hill, which the CMR had occupied, and the wagons passed through single file
and afterward resumed formation.

Clarke sent Colonel Brabant with the 1st

CMY to probe eastward, where a rebel array charged the unit, and hand-to-hand
126
fighting erupted.
Captain Dalgety dismounted his 120 men within 300 yards
of a few of these enemy and advanced firing.

One thousand hidden rebels

charged him and 2 following CMY troops, and before the yeomanry could remount,
300 rebels lad by Chief 5eiso sprung in among them, killing 36, mostly with
assegais and battle axes.

Carrington with part of his garrison sallied out
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and scattered some of these rebels, and Captain Nettleton rallied the convoy
and with the Dalgety unit helped drive back the enemy.

The 2nd CMY under

Colonel Southey then reinforced the crippled 1st Regiment, and together they
attacked a small village and killed about 40 fleeing rebels.
JL23

next joined the engagement.
repelled their left.

The 3rd CMY

As the enemy appeared on both flanks, artillery

From the right, of 7*000-8,000 massed hostiles charged

300-400, but several volleys from the DE0VR stopped them.
PAG and 1st City Rifles fought off hostiles on the left.

For 3 hours, the
Nguebe Letsie and

his brother Bereng then led an unsuccessful charge against the 1st CMY.
Clarke, in the wake of Kalabani, said that swords were invaluable to all
129
mounted troops, asserted that his force was insufficient, and wanted Martini130
Henry rifles for his soldiers.
Mrs. Barkly urged both Sprigg and rrere to
rapidly reinforce the troops, who always seamed numerically inadequate for
131
their undertakings.
The Pall Mall Gazette alleged that 100 soldiers had
been incapacitated at Kalabani and that Clarke had exaggerated the body count
132
of 300 rebel warriors.
Tylden adduces that the colonial forces were not
accustomed to such casualties and that additional setbacks would lead to
further parliamentary opposition to the war.

The "victory" of Lerothodi at

Kalabani, concludes Tylden, balanced his failure to take Mafeteng.
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Clarke, following his usual strategy, left Carrington with a force ina
dequate to hold Mafeteng, kept open lines of communication with Wepener, and
133
assaulted the hordes of Lerothodi.
He built a fort close to the Mafeteng
laager to house the garrison whenever his column returned to the bnrder for
134
supplies, but only after sufficient reinforcements arrived did Clarke decide
135
to bolster the garrison.
The general, in his next move, though the rebels foiled a surprise at
tack, decided to capture the village of Lerothodi atop a hill 3 miles from

136

Mafeteng (Infra, p.230 , PI.XV ).

On October 22, about 1,000 colonials en

gaged 6,000-8,000 rebels, and enemy prisoners later confirmed a body count of
137
about 600 dead from their force, which 5 sons of Letsie commanded.
Colonial
troops climbed the foothills, burned a number of native huts, occupied a
plateau and village east of the Lerothodi harnlet, and, notwithstanding the
fire from thousands of enemy cavalry below, dragged their artillery up to the
plateau.

On the colonial right, numerous hostiles by occupying a rocky gorge

precluded a colonial assault on the main village, and they also occupied an
adjacent donga, an obstacle that required clearing.

The CMR dismounted and

with the DEGVR under Shervinton charged towards the right to seize the rebel
JL38
donga.
A correspondent present at the battle thought it a miracle that a
large number of soldiers were not killed in this charge, however, the onset
133
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came swiftly.

When the DEOVR seemed a bit hesitant, Shervinton cast off his

jacket, rolled up his shirt sleeves, drew his sword, and raced ahead.

The

troops fallowed so fast that they jumped into the donga atop the rebels, and
1 exhiliarated soldier pursued and killed some of the panic-stricken rebel
horde.

Shervinton with 200 infantry then attacked about 1,000 rebels, killed

over 100, and captured numerous enemy horses and 200 rifles, which the hos139
tiles fired clumsily.
The PAG, in the first bayonet charge by a South Afri
can volunteer unit, drove the enemy in another sector back over a ridge in
hand-to-hand combat, killing many here and more in the upper gorge who were
fleeing to krantzes^and Lerothodi's v i l l a g e ^ ^ The escaping enemy offered ex
cellent targets for artillery.

A direct colonial assault then captured the

142
village, killing about 31 more rebels.
Thirty-one troopers were killed in
143
the battle.
To hold the village of Lerothodi was impossible, because the
hostiles occupied hills on the right and left; thus, the colonials initiated
144
an orderly withdrawal.
Barkly issued a Government proclamation which offered
145
protection to rebels who surrendered guns and ammunition.
Several warriors
of Moletsane after the battle fled to the Orange Free State to seek work.
General Clarke, in maneuvers after this battle, dispatched a search-anddestroy patrol to Maquaisberg (Moletsane's Mountain), Where Moletsane suppos139_
ohervinton, The Shervintons, pp. 72-73; Barkly, Among Boers and Basu
tos , pp. 240-41.
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edly hovered, and the unit saw few rebels and burned a village.
On October
147
30, General Clarke with 1,450 men left Mafeteng'to storm Maquaisberg again.
Nguebe, Mogela, and Zeko, all sons of Letsie, helped lead the opposing rebel
148
149
force, estimated at about 5,000.
As the enemy grew too numerous, the colo150
nials retreated from the Moletsane hamlet wrth 8 dead.
Moletsane, neverthe
less, afterwards hastened to Thaba Bosigo, and most of his men, short of
151
ammunition, fled to the Maluti Mountains.
During this battle, Shervinton
remained an duty for 19 consecutive hours.

The rebels, he said, were very

active and fought every tine the troops marched out, whereas the colonial
152
forces did little except make 7-day sorties to contact the hostiles.
Magistrate Bell, to the north in Leribe District, where the Molappo
brothers were campaigning energetically, reported that Chief Jonathan had oc
cupied a strong post at Thaba Patswa after driving away the warriors of Masu153
phaTwHo had fortified it.
; Near the end of the month, an attack by Chief
Joel on Thlotsi Heights miscarried, but ha successfully stole cattle from
Griffith going to the Free State.

The Government, thought Bell, must offer

154
a reward for the capture of Joal.
The rebellions outside Basutoland, meanwhile, hod assumed alarming pro
portions, but colonial troops greatly diminished the threats.
146
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Austen in Quthing District was concerned about Basuto rebels in the lower part
155
of his district and the rebellion of Tyali, but troops soon flushed the de156
moralized rebel Tembus from lower Quthing into mountainous country.
Cape
Town asked the factious Rondos to help vanquish the Basuto rebels.

The neigh

boring Pondo Chief Umhlonhlo, thought: Magistrate Hope at Qumbu, was unrelia b l e ^ I n d , as expected, the chief joined the instigating Basuto r a b e l s ^ ^
After Umhlonhlo cowardly killed Magistrate Hope, colonial troops defeated the
159
rebel Rondos, and Clarke believed that Watal regular troops could check the
entire Pondo t r i b e ^ ^ The most pernicious insurgent influence penetrated GriJL6i
qualand East District, where, on October 5, the Basutos around Matatiele re
belled.

Colonial forces faced 5,000 hostiles here and in Tembuland, and a

162
rebel victory could increase the enemy ranks in these places to 10,000.
The
rebel Basutos here had voiced no grievances but savagely slaughtered native
163
neighbors and almost murdered Chief Magistrate Brownlee for warning them
against rebellion.
155
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The Natal Government and Natal traders delivered arms and

389, ltr. Austen to Ayliffe, October 18, 1880.

156Ikil- > 385, ltr. Sprigg, October 19, 1880.
157
Ibid., 362, ltr. Hope to Ayliffe; cf., Ibid., 672, ltr.Davis to Ay
liffe,
October 29, 1880; c f ., Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 153.
I CQ
13.j5.P_., (1881), LXVI, 365, ltr. George C. Strahan to Kimberley, Octo
ber 29, 1880.
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164
ammunition to Brownlee, and Administrator George C. Strahan announced that
165
troops by the 19th had checked the Griqualand rebels.
On the other side of Basutoland during this month, Cape Colony and the
Orange Free State antagonized each other despite their good intentions.
Strahan desired friendly relations with the Free State, and he asked Brand to

166

halt the contraband trade, whereupon the president raplied that Free State
law punished severely persons who sold ;ammunition and guns to natives, and
he instructed the field cornets and other officials to strictly enforce the
167
law.
From Free State territory, Basuto hostiles captured 190 of Trowerfs
168
cattle; at the end of the month, numerous rebels crossed into the Orange Free
169
State at Jackman Drift, an act which facilitated their attacks in Basutoland.
Boers, said rebel prisoners, offered them military intelligence7and with rene
gade Englishmen sold them horses, guns, blankets, and liquor.

On the positive

side, President Brand refused Lerothodi permission to attack the troop camp
at Wepener, where the Bloemfontein Mission had erected a camp hospital for
171
the colonial wounded, and allowed 300 additional colonial troops to pass
through his country, wanting to know only by which corridor the contingents
172
173
would travel so that he could inform the landdrosts of the route.
Strahan,
164
165

Brownlee, Basuto W a r , pp. 10-13, 26.
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however, did not inform Brand of the troop itinerary through the Free Stated74
As troops from the other Boer state, the Transvaal, volunteered for the
war, President Brand rejected the proposal of a Transvaaler to raise Free
State volunteers, because such action would endanger the border area and com175
pel ^he country to mobilize a large army.
The British administrator at Pre
toria volunteered loot-hungry Transvaal officers and other personnel for the
176
campaign.
Clarke recommended acceptance of these 300 Ferreira volunteers on
the same terms as those issued by the Imperial Government during the Zulu
177
War, because, at this time, he did not want to mobilize more regular units,
but Strahan, lying that Clarke deemed the proposal unnecessary, rejected the

1T8

Ferreira offer.

Cape Colony, however, later accepted Transvaal volunteers

179
on the same terms as with Natal.
'.As'Natal, meanwhile, offered more aid, Major Dartnell mobilized 100
mounted natives from tribes along the border to W3tch the passes and upper
borderland, and another 120 natives left to combat the rebels.

Governor

Colley conferred with a dejected Brownlee and reinforced the Cape Colony post
JL 8 0

of Fort Harrison at 5t. John’s, because it was more accessible from Natal.

JL8JL
Strahan, in further mobilization, called up 2,000 burghers and purchased
X82
some second-hand swords from the Free State.
To Griqualand East, Sprigg
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dispatched 900 reinforcements.
The recruiting of volunteers was unsuccess
ful, because employers would not assuredly rehire most men mobilized in volun
teer units; therefore, some volunteers sent in drunken substitutes for mili
tary duty.

Cape Town wanted to field a large force to quickly stifle the re-

184
bellion.
In newspaper criticism of the combatants and their advocates, Reuters
falsely reported the devastation of Maseru and the danger of annihilation for
colonial troops besieged in enclaves, and the Pall Mall Gazette announced that
the troops were losing the war.

Much responsibility for the war, maintained

the Daily Telegraph (London), resided with people and newspapers who advocated
the rebel cause.

This paper questioned how far the guardians of the insur

gents could reconcile their interests with conduct that led to the massacre of
Loyalists and their allies and to the destruction of Loyalist hamlets.

All

5auth Africa held these instigators and Opposition agitators in the Cape Par
liament responsible for inciting the natives to resist European domination and
JL85

for starting rebellions that threatened the South African colonies.

In reflection, few troops often drove off numerous rebels, and the use
ful artillery seemed indispensable.

Colonial bravery, notably that of Sher

vinton, unfortunately did not alter the imbalanced manpower ratio between the
combatants, which precluded some colonial military action.
adequately demonstrated their bravery in October.

Active Loyalists

Because of his anger at

Cape Town handling of the crisis, the once active and much needed Colonel

^ ^ Ibid., 393-94, ltr. Sprigg, October 26, 1880.
184~
The Times (London), October 19, 1880, p. 4,
185
Pall Mall Gazette (London), October 14, 1880, pp. 2-4; Prominent Cape
politicians smuggled armaments to the rebels, Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto,
p. 146.
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Griffith now brooded in silence.
The rebels, moreover, continued to loss heavily in reckless attacks and
in defense postures, and rebel morale must have suffered, because some hostiles
quit the war.

It was unconscionable that rebel sympathizers and others both

instigated and heartened the hostiles, exaggerated enemy successes, and under
estimated colonial accomplishments.

NOVEMBER 1BB0

Despite rumors from still undaunted rebels that they had killed all the
troops at Mafeteng, colonial forays from this post encountered repeated suc186
cess.

Carrington sallied out on the 10th on a search-and-destroy mission

with 69 officers, 1,251 regulars, and three 7 lbr. guns.

The troops moved on

Hermon, then to Tsakholo Lcske, where advance units scattered about 150 rebels

187

from some villages, and soldiers burned these hamlets on the 12th.

Clarke

ordered Carrington to march through open country to Kolo Mountain to encourage

1.88

a battle, because there were not enough troops to search the mountains.

Slashing over muddy terrain, soldiers found that the moisture made their Sni
der ammunition jam.

Troops on this march did not hold ground taken and always

returned at night to their laager near Tsitsa*s Nek on the road from Mafeteng
to Kolo.

The enemy, as the colonials approached closely one day, pushed out

a black bull on high ground as a signal for a mounted charge on 3 sides of the
166
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ber 2, 1680.
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colonial square.
Carrington, thinking the hostiles hidden nearby in strength
after initial skirmishes, had barely positioned some of his units when 2,000
hostiles assaulted the colonial right, 800 the left, and 300-400 toward the
front.

The enemy charged fiercely, and only intense colonial rifle fire kept

them from overrunning the rear guard.

Artillery fire killed a dozen rebels

and would have dispatched more if the enemy had not come so close to the colo
nial ranks and if enemy shelter had been farther away.
lapsed, and the. hostiles retreated.

Their onslaught col

Of 5,000 attacking r e b e l s ^ o v e r 60t?J^cIied

192

along with 3 colonials, But the rebels could absorb such casualties and kept
193
Carrington permanently dependent on his laager.
The colonel moved east
again to taunt the rebels into exposing themselves and then returned to Mafe194
teng.
Magistrate Barkly, furthermore, burned 1 or 2 rebel villages near Mafe195
teng with Carrington, who conducted search-and-destroy operations against
several more rebel villages.

Massed at Kolo, 10,000 hostile warriors had

altered their plan to massacre a Wepener convoy and attack Mafeteng, because
Carrington had already defeated them and now occupied Hermon in order to
189
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cort the supply train.

On November 16, because rebels again occupied and had

196
fortified Lerothodi's village, a search-and-destray patrol marched out under
Carrington on the 21st, and troops captured the hamlet and drove off the re
bels.

Because the more numerous enemy continued to fire on them rapidly,

197
however, the colonials soon fell back.
On the 22nd, Colonel Brabant with
600 men and 2 guns sallied out from Mafeteng to contact the hostiles, shelled
5,000 who fled, and a few days later repelled 800 rebels who attacked his camp.
Continuing, Colonel Carrington moved out on the 28th with 1,200 men oh

198

a search-and-destroy operation.

Following skirmishing all of that day at

Boleka Ridge, a rebel night attack on Carrington failed.

On the 30th, a 600-

man column set out and engaged victoriously in several skirmishes with the
trailing enemy.

Later, at Tsitsa*s Nek, the soldiers successfully battled

the hostiles, and a colonial detachment assaulted a nearby nek to destroy ene->
my villages.

The rebels during these actions refused to charge or fight in

the open and fired their ample ammunition at too long a range.
The troops, despite these successes, advanced no further because of in
sufficient numbers to hold the ground.

Colonel Carrington wanted 600 men to

escort supplies from the Free State, 400 to garrison Mafeteng, additional
troops to form a mobile column, and at least 700 soldiers to maintain commu199
nications between the column and Mafeteng.
In Leriba District, moreover, the colonial position became tenuous.
196
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Chief Joel attacked the Leribe magistracy with 600 warriors on the 8 th* *burned
the police barracks, and stole 30 horses and all the Loyalist cattle, but
troops repelled the assault and killed 17.

200

only reluctantly.

Members of Jonathan’s clan fought

Enemy numbers increased under Chiefs Joel, Khetise, Kalsua,

201

Lesuana, and Masupha until over 2,000 surrounded the residency.

Magistrate

Bell, having predicted his encirclement, asked for the Kimberley Horse, the

202

Ferreira unit, and 2 howitzers in addition to the loyal Griqua West contin203
gent already in the district.
Chief Jonathan retired to fortified Thaba
Patswa, because his clan would not actively support him.

After Joel, Rama—

nella, and another rebel chief later drove Jonathan from Tsikoane Mountain and
204
confiscated his cattle, the Loyalist with 260 stragglers fled to Thlotsi
Heights, where Loyalists there and Chieftainess Senate’s clan nearby pledged
support, though scores left the post to protect their families who resided
elsewhere.

On the 12th, the enemy again made a futile attack on the residen

cy, aiming miserably, struck on all sides on the 14th and burned some houses,
and the following day fired from schantzen at long range.
As reinforcement of Thlotsi Heights promoted more active maneuvering,
1B0 Kimberley Horse force-marched there from Maseru and cut through enemy
lines.

Part of this unit and a garrison detail under Bell later forced the

hostiles from entrenchments and flattened rebel schantzen.

Chief Joel on the

205
20th lost numerous men in an attack from Bell, and the next day the Kimberley

JP., (1881), LXVI, 668, 'Summary of events in Basutoland since No
vember 10, 1880.
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206
Horse in another clash killed 30 more rebels.
While Masupha, enraged that
the Kimberley Horse had safely reached Thlotsi Heights, sent warriors to the
Caledon Drift to stop further colonial reinforcements, a CMR unit on the.27th
arrived at Ficksburg in the Orange Free State, where Bell requested it to

2Q7
await an escort by Captain Ferreira.

Ferreira had reached Thlotsi Heights

on the 25th, after his Transvaal Horse, the escorting Kimberley Horse, and
208
Loyalists under Jonathan had driven back a 3-sided rebel attack.
Colonial success in neighboring Griqualand East withstood native unre
liability.

Brownlee, because he suspected that half his 100 enlisted Basutos

were rebels, abandoned Matatiele.

Loyal Basutos here continued to join the

hostiles because of threats and confiscation of Loyalist property, and nu209
merous Griquas were questionable Loyalists.
The defeat of Chief Umhlonhlo,
besides other colonial military pressure, however, precluded the opportunity

210

for rebel success in Griqualand East and quieted adjacent Bantu tribes.

President Brand, on the opposite Basuto border, further evidenced his
friendly neutrality towards Cape Colony, despite friction over troop passage.
He wrote that "irregularities" forced him to advise sending the Kimberley
Horse to Maseru instead of to Leribe, because he feared another rebel incur-

211

sion if the Kimberley Horse traveled on his side of the Caledon River.

Two

weeks before, a detachment of the Kimberley Nstive Contingent, followed by
206
207
208
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rebels, and without Free State sanction, had escorted arms and ammunition from

212

Maseru to Thaba M'chu.

Administrator Strahan was unable to remedy this er-

r o r ^ u t apologized for the transgression of this Griqua West unit and asked
Brand to permit passage for the Kimberley Horse to Leribe, as otherwise, Ma214
gistrate Bell and Chief 'Jonathan would be endangered.
Colonel Griffith or215
dered the Kimberley Horse to march through, regardless of circumstances.
President Brand, unapprized of the Griffith command, allowed 200 Kimberley
Horse passage from Maseru to Leribe, provided the landdrost of Ladybrand sanc
tioned the route of march and the contingent avoided this town and Ficksburg,
and advised the detachment to pass through Madderpoort and to inform farmers

216

in advance where it proposed to camp.

Masupha asked Brand for permission to

217
purchase ammunition in the Free State.
Becausa aiding the rebels violated
Free State law, the president refused this request and replied that he could
not correspond with Masupha except through Colonel Griffith, to whom he for218
warded the Masupha letter and its reply.
By November 1, from additional mobilization to the rear, troops at the
219
front numbered 673 infantry, 1,828 cavalry, and 1,585 natives.
Strahan,

220

nevertheless^admitted that the rebels were winning.

Magistrate Barkly for

221

himself requested additional soldiers and a large native contingent.
212
213
214
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Opposition in the Cape Parliament derided the volunteer forces and scorned the

222

burghers for allowing Governor Frere to mobilize them; the tyrannical colonial
methods used to procure soldiers for the war, added the Pall Mall Gazette,
223
caused discontent.
In appraisal of the November campaigning, colonial troops to their ad
vantage systematically destroyed rebel supplies and shelter, and Cape Colony
finally mobilized a considerable number of men.

Faulty military reconnais

sance, however, allowed rebels to mass secretly and charge without warning.
The enemy reoccupied destroyed but nevertheless strategic positions like the
village of Lerothodi, because Cape troops could never secure these places.
Basutoland Loyalists,
support.

it seemed, could fight effectively only with colonial

It was impossible, however, to conceive how Strahan surmised that

the rebels were winning, because they neither had won battles so far nor
otherwise had severely worsted colonial troops.

The Opposition in the Cape

Parliament flirted with sedition by execrating the mobilization.
According to the Second Treaty of Aliwal North (1869), moreover, P r e s i - .
dent Brand acted correctly in his dealings with Masupha.

The president had

every right to curtail or restrict to specific routes colonial troop move
ments, because his countrymen were vulnerable to rebel harm, from which the
British Government noticeably did not protect the Free State as provided for
in the Aliwal treaty.

221
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DECEMBER 1880

As rebel masses continued to founder during colonial forays, on December
1, 600 troops and 1 gun left Mafeteng on a search-and-destroy mission south
east towards Thaba T ’soen.

The troops clashed with 1,500 rebels at the top

of a kopje, killed 4~5 in a skirmish there* chased the rest away, and held
the hill even though surrounded by hostiles.

Another rebel horde from the

Kolo direction charged at the rear of the colonial camp, but a howitzer scat
tered the onslaught.

Carrington then withdrew with 2 killed, because his

224
outnumbered troops were unable to take more enemy positions.
Continuing, after Carrington shifted his camp to near the strategic
Tsitsa's village on the 5th, about 8,000 rebels under the command of Mama,
Bereng, Seiso, Ramoroko, Lerothodi, Tsien, Masupha, and other chiefs appeared
in a line from Tangesberg to Tsitsa’s Nek in front of the 410-man column,

A

colonial detachment carried Tsitsa’s Nek and after dark swept up a steep and
strongly-schantzed hill in back of Tsitsa's hamlet.

At dawn, Carrington di

rected a frontal attack, and the soldiers soon cleared the fortified village,
burned it, and killed a few fleeing rebels.
On December 4, Barkly, counseling on future strategy, arrived back at
Mafeteng from Wepener with reinforcements of 830 burghers and 100 men of the
225
2nd CMY.
He advised the evacuation of troops from Leribe and Maseru and the
concentration of all forces at Mafeteng, because there were too few soldiers.
In a month or two, the necessary destruction of rebel crops would require nu-

224

3,5_.IP., (1881), LXVI, 719-20, ltr. Tennant, Assist, Staff Officer,
Mafeteng, Sprigg, December 1, 1380; cf., Orpen, Prince Alfred’s Guard 18561 966, p. 37.
225
33.b_.P_., (1881), LXVI, fl9, Summary of events reported since November
30, 1880; Grpen, Prince Alfred's Guard 1856-1966, pp. 37-38.

143
merous soldiers, as the harvest of enemy fields would provide 2 years of food
supplies, and,las without the yield, the has tiles would starve in 6 months.
The enemy strongholds, felt the magistrate, were too strong to allow capture

226

at this time;

Colonel Carrington on the 6th, in further action, related that 030 bur
ghers encamped at Dumas Lake had panicked and stampeded their mounts, allowing
the rebels to catch about 50 horses.

Colonel Brabant, on a search-and-destroy

mission with 400 regulars and 300 burghers, passed Szariel Nek on December 8
and later destroyed some enemy villages and crops at Tsakholo Lake, where he
clashed momentarily with a hostile force.

The next day, a 300-mon burgher

227
contingent patrolling near the border burned some rebel hamlets and skirmished
with hostiles.

On the 10th, about 8 miles from Mafeteng, Barkly fought with

rebels at a nek all day.
his camp.

Of the 1,200 soldiers with him, 400 always guarded

As the magistrate continued on patrol, 0,000 hostiles moved silent

ly in front of hirru^
The Battle of Tangesberg on the 13th offered an example of the success
of colonial formations.

The advancing infantry formed a square, ready to

march towards a ridge of low hills occupied by the rebels until artillery
drove them off.

The Loyalists, followed by the CMR, mounted and charged the

229
enemy head on; at this point, 200 burghers disobeyed orders to join the
charge.

As Carrington and 485 infantry neared one hill, more than 5,000 re

bels began stalking the rear and both flanks of the troops; therefore, the

226
227

Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, pp. 256-57.

J3.5_.P_., (1881), LXVI, 732-33, Summary of events from Basutoland since
December 7, 1880.
22 B
Barkly, Among Boers and Basutos, p. 221.
229
Cohen, Reminiscences of Kimberley, p. 433; Orpen, Prince Alfreds
Guard 1856-1966, p. 38.

144
hollow square with the horses in the middle fought its way through the enemy
for 1,500 yards.

The square then turned to a rise on the right near Tsitsa*s

Nek, where the CMR, PAG, and part of the DEOVR in the front rushed up the
slope in formation, killing several warriors and scattering the enemy in all
230
directions.
The hostiles never got closer than 150 yards to the square, and
the chiefs with difficulty induced their men to charge into the withering
fire.

At the end of the battle, Carrington ordered the CMR, PAG, and DEOVR

back from the hill and requested Colonel Brabant to abandon Azariel village
and assist him.
Brabant, meanwhile, in contraction of the victory, had received orders
to pass through Azariel Nek with 645 troops to near Pokwane Mountain in order
to destroy the laagers of Mama and Bereng while Carrington passed by this
mountain to draw the hostiles towards Boleka Ridge.

Brabant subsequently was

able to occupy only an insignificant hamlet 4 miles distant from the Tangesberg battlefield, and 2,000 hostiles prevented his aiding Carrington, who
then ordered the Azariel force back to its camp.

The rebels, nevertheless,

at Tangesbarg and Azariel suffered heavy losses, and their sporadic gunfire
killed only 2 colonials.
On December 12, in Government activity to the north, Chief Jonathan evac
uated his family to the free State, and Magistrate Bell enlisted 400 warriors
232
of the chief in a native contingent.
Colonial military operations in Leribe
233
District, indicates Tylden, had little effect on the course of the war.
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At this
with a large

point in the hostilities, remote Chief Letsie and other chiefs
neutral body of warriors congregated at Matsieng,

promised to surrender himself if the colonials approached.

where Letsie

Led by Lerothodi,

Mama, Bsreng, Ramoroko, Moletsane, and others, a hostile force of about 8,000,
234
howevar, held the heights blocking the road to Morija and Matsieng,
As effectual armaments for their adversaries arrived by the end of the
month, Martini-henry rifles reached the CMR and CMY, and the majority of the
cavalry now carried revolvers.
shipment for
The CMR
tion.

Most of the CMY possessed swords; another

the CMR was due from England.
and its promoted new commander, in addition, received commenda

The CMR, wrote Carrington, was becoming a more proficient fighting

force.

The rebels nicknamed Shervinton the "scatterer of armies,” and General

Clarke said that this hero, who later became adjutant to Carrington, had dis
tinguished himself several times in Zululand.
In reflection on the adverse conduct of the CMR, scores of them deserted
from Mafeteng, as the garrison was near the Free State border.
numbers of deserters and took prisoner others.

Rebels killed

The fact that the CMR was the

only unit at the front which had to pay for its own food and shelter motivated
235
desertions; discontent also may have arisen from other reasons, such as bore236
dom.
One man wrote The Times that his brother serving at Mafeteng had no
revolver or sword, only a Snider carbine, and could not purchase a revolver
on credit.
233

The writer contended that the Government profited from the sale
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of arms to its troops.
Some of the CMR sneaked away because of indebted
ness, and, as no extradition treaty existed with the Orange free State, some
of them ran away by way of Bloemfontein.
In this period preceding the Transvaal outbreak of 1881, discontented
burghers in the Cape North District were hostile to the Cape troops of Bri
tish extraction.

Mobilized Boer burghers had segregated themselves at Kala-

bani into a separate contingent, of which numbers were generously paid sub
stitutes for wealthy farmers^** These soldiers were tired of the war and
wanted to return home; they envisioned neither sudden victory nor an advan—
239
tage in losing more men and money in order to vanquish the Basutos.
Natal, more cooperative than these burghers, initiated limited counter
action against the rebel threat.

Officials thought that one rebel Basuto

incursion against a native village was retribution for a Natal native expe
dition against the rebels in October, because the hostiles wreaked the worst
240
vengeance on these natives.
Major Dartnell feared repetitive rebel incur
sions from a rugged area between two ranges of the Drakensberg along the
Natal border.

Though Governor Colley dreaded that one enemy success might

encourage more attacks and promised to guard the border in troubled sectors,
he refused to allow Dartnell to make a punitive raid into eastern Leribe, as
241
this act might draw Natal wholly into the war.
Rebels later ambushed and
massacred some Natal native scouts, but as the police approached, the raiders
242
fled and did not cross the frontier again.
237
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Examining colonial military efforts, by the end of the year, Cape Colony
had fielded 7,485 cavalry, 1,350 infantry, 9,320 Bantu, and 348 Hottentots
against the rebels*

These troops had pacified only a small area outside the

magistracies and troop camps and had not permanently occupied the numerous
243
rebel strongholds, and successful punitive patrols, maintains Orpen, had
244
failed to bring victory.
Administrator Strahan, ordered by London to remain
245
in the background and not interfere with Sprigg, advised that, so far, the
246
colony had not at all diminished the rebellion.
In impartial judgement, colonial formations proved effective in defensive
and offensive postures.

Contrary to Theal, troops did capture for a time

some secondary fortified rebel strongholds; notwithstanding Tylden, colonial
victories in Leribe must have affected rebel military posture, and, in oppo
sition to Strahan statements, rebellion had been lessened if for no other
reason than by heavy enemy losses in manpower and sustenance.

So many sol

diers guarding supplies at encampments, however, subtracted from the number
available for offensive forays.

For burghers to resent Cape troops was na

tural, as British soldiers garrisoned the Transvaal, though disobedience from
burghers endangered fellow soldiers.

242
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JANUARY 1881

Continued colonial victories, such as the hotly contested Battle of Twee-*
fontein near Mafeteng on January 7, did not daunt Lsrbthodi.

Here, the left

side of the colonial camp hurled back an initial enemy charge, after which
hostile reinforcements massed near Tsitsa*s hill.

Hundreds of hostiles

charged the colonial lines through an artillery barrage, fell back in the face
of the shellfire, and fired from long range.

Colonial artillery and rifle

247
fire later blunted a third enemy charge on the right.
Some CMY cut through
rebel lines and returned.

Rebel cavalry, on the other hand, disoriented 400

burghers and stunted another CMY charge, and his cavalry, believed Lerothodi,
248
with battle axes still could fight colonial infantry successfully.
Troops
249
subsequently pursued the hostiles to Pokwane Ridge.
On January 10, there was a large skirmish near Mafeteng in which Shervin
ton displayed heroism.

A^ssarch-and-destroy column of 850 regulars and 350

burghers under Brabant marched towards Lerothodi*s village.
dislodged some harassing hostiles from a ridge.

A burgher charge

Near the Lerothodi hamlet,

hostiles isolated and massacred a small number of 1st City Rifles, then cut
out their hearts and gleefully devoured them.

Opposite Thaba T*soen, a large

group of rebels fired from behind a steep ledge.

Brabant, failing to drive

off the enemy with artillery and rifle fire, and noticing more Basutos near
by, decided to storm the ledge.

After other fruitless colonial attempts,
v

Shervinton with reinforcements sneaked up undetected towards the enemy and
charged straight onto the krantz ledge so quickly that the hostiles had no
247
248
249
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time to mount up; multitudes leaped over the escarpment to escape, and the rest
savagely defended themselves to the death.

The colonial Martini-Henry rifles

impressed the enemy, who lost 60 killed in the charge.
Warriors of Lerothodi, furthermore, once more foundered despite penetra
ting the colonial ranks.

After Shervinton on the 14th marched out of Pokwane

camp with 960 men towards Thaba T*soen, an advance guard of burghers and native
troops charged a kopje from which the rebels had fired on them.

As the troops

reached the crest, 2,000 hostile cavalry appeared; the advance guard raced back
with 3,000-4,000 rebel cavalry close behind.
column turned aside part of the enemy charge.

A squad of CMR in a dismounted
The Native Contingent attempted

to stand with the 400 burghers, but the latter scampered off and allowed the
rebels to charge into the native ranks and with assegais and battle axes to
kill 26 natives and Commandant Erasmus during his attempt to rally his Boer
troops.

The enemy, their thrust finally blunted, raced to the left and right

and on the colonial right again charged the column, which turned and shattered
them.

Some CMR, the 3rd CMY, the PAG, and part of the DEOVR for almost a mile

advanced dismounted in a line to rout the rebels in the fiercest fight that
Shervinton had ever witnessed.

If the burghers had closed ranks, the hostiles

would have suffered more severely.

The regular troops lost 16-'killedf^?he

251
burghers lost 22, and the hostile force of 5,000 suffered 80 killed.
One rebel, in the aftermath of the battle, surrendered at Mafeteng and
said that his comrades were tired of the war and short of food and ammunition.
Soundly defeated Lerothodi, he continued, had executed several warriors who
250
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had refused to fight further and also had caused disenchantment by butchering
252
cattle belonging to followers for sustenance.
On January 6, in enemy failure further north, a large rebel force sur
rounded the magistracy at Thlotsi Heights and struck on all sides, but the
prepared defenses withstood the persistent attackers, who withdrew after kil253
ling 2 Loyalists.
Mixed fortunes, meanwhile, confronted colonial troops adjacent to Basu
toland.

As Magistrate Austen marched up the Orange River with 300 Fingos,

the rebels repelled them on January 28 on Mokochamel Plateau south of Morosi's
Mountain, killing Austen and 8 others.

In the wake of this action, Chief

Letsie accepted cattle stolen from Austen, and genuine fear of invasion swept
254
Cape Colony.
On the 3rd, reported Chief Magistrate Brownlee, rebel Basutos
255
attacked Matatisle unsuccessfully, and troops pursued the retreating hostiles.
Colonial forces at the end of January stalked 600 fleeing rebel Basutos and
258
Baphutis over Cngeluk's Nek into the mountains south of the Orange River.
Curing January, burghers and others for various reasons deranged the
mobilization, and colonial forces dwindled in size.

The Government Gazette

on January 12 listed 76 men, both yeomen and burghers, as absent without
257
leave, and Cape Town, to meet manpower deeds, enlisted some convicts.
One
group of burghers deserted from Maseru soon after arriving, others assigned
752
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258
to relieve the Transvaal Horse at Leriba quit before arrival at the post, and
burghers from Swellendam left the front because of a colonial non-looting
259
policy and personal desire not to fight for an English ministry at Cape Town.
One burgher unit which had fought excellently on January 10 complained of a
false accusation of flight that day and threatened to declare its enlistment
time expired and return home.

Discipline was difficult to enforce, as regu

lations forbade flogging and execution; thus, only 300 of the original 1,000
burghers remained at the f r o n t ^ ^ Although Undersecretary Duff in the British
House of Commons announced that no information pointed to discontent in the
Transvaal as motivation for the f l i g h t ^ i h e Pall Mali Gazette condemned the

262

burgher withdrawal as sympathy evinced for the Transvaal Boers.

The burghers,

adds De Kiewiet, thought that they had not received a fair share of confis263
cated rebel grain and cattle.
Theal says that the burghers questioned the
PPA, suffered by neglecting their regular employment, and in early February
left the war zone 500 strong with the sanction of their comrades, thus con264
vincing the rebels of governmental inability to suppress the rebellion.
Brookes contends that all the pleading of Theal does not excuse the numerous
265
burghers who acted cowardly and unpatriotic by absconding.
One hundred and
eighty-seven burghers who deserted from the Mafeteng force received six-month
258
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prison sentences.
Among the English-speaking troops, furthermore, the DEOVR
complained about its extended tour of duty without replacement as provided
by law.

The PAG term --of service having expired, most from this unit returned

u
267
h ome.
Lerothodi, his brothers, Joel, and the chiefs following them, presenting
another obstacle by still hawking pre-war nonsense, delivered a peace peti
tion to Cape Town.

Since 18b8, wrote the supplicants, they had tried to be

good British subjects and now promised their loyalty, future good behavior,
and defense of the Crown, and wanted the intercession of the Quean.

oprigg

allegedly had broken promises concerning the Quthing matter, the timing of
disarmament, and a strong Basuto constabulary.

Now, fields lay desolate,

268
homes lay ruined, and women and children starved in the mountains.
Letsie,
who refused to sign the petition even though he still wanted British inter
cession, asked 5trahan for advice and insisted that his sons and brothers had

269

been unprepared for and had not wanted a war.

270

Sir Hercules Robinson, the

new Cape Governor, receiving the rebel document which beseeched him to inter
cede for them and to relate their grievances to the Queen, found that, the hos-
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In 1880, he
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‘tiles had restated old arguments and, wanting to retain their guns, claimed
271
inability to fight the colony.
Robinson, in the setting for peace conditions, reported that his minis
ters, while they doubted the integrity of the rebels and wanted a guarantee
for peace before an armistice, had agreed to deliver the rebel petition to
the Queen.

The governor affirmed the disloyalty of the rebels, who, if sin

cere now, would surrender their guns and submit to the Cape Government.
Robinson, with the assent of 5prigg and his cabinet, promised the hostiles
272
generous terms within the law, and Kimberley agreed to this offer with minor
273
alterations.
Most of the enemy leaders, belift/es Theal, wanted peace and were
274
willing to accept moderate terms but not disarmament.
Good colonial strategy, in circumspection, concentrated rebel forces by
driving them into the Basutoland area, but Cape Colony fears of invasion sig
nified that rebels still might take the initiative and that colonists doubted
that their troops could protect the frontier.

The English-speaking troops

and the burghers, who were accustomed to fight for spoils, had some legiti
mate grievances.
Their antagonists, the rebels, who merely flirted with peace, desired
for British intervention to bypass Cape Town authority and would not pay the
consequences for rebellion.

Governor Robinson should not have offered lenient

terms to the rebels, because such action compromised the Loyalists.

.P.*, (1881), LXVII, 593, ltr. Governor Sir Hercules Robinson to
Kimberley, January 30, 1881.
717
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FEBRUARY 1681

Rebel obstinacy did not stop colonial persistence.

Although colonial

forces, reported Magistrate Barkly, seemed to make little headway against the
275
rebels, General Clarke with 4,000 fresh troops was marching towards the front.
On February 3, Carrington with a search-and-destroy column of 6bU men marched

2 y(j

to Pokwane Mountain and sighted 8,000 rebels, who refused to fight.

Colonel

Bayly two days later inflicted severe losses on a large rebel force near Ma277
seru, and Carrington, with Shervinton in the lead, on February 13 captured
3oleka Ridge, a key point in a lengthy enemy defense line.

After some of the

DEOVR, whose term of service had expired, had refused to march, CMY replaced
the obstinate.

A colonial charge then surprised the sleeping enemy, who fled

278
without fighting.
In the Battle of Ramadikwe on the 16th, furthermore, the enemy fervor
counted for naught.

Brabant, in order to reconnoiter a new camp location on

the road to Morija, made a reconnaissance maneuver towards Boleka Ridge with
570 men.

Spotting the rebels, Shervinton dismounted the CMR and marched them

ahead of the main column up a ridge in a hollow square with the horses in the
center.

As the entire column assembled in a square, about 300 rebel cavalry

ferociously attacked the front of the square, 300 under Lerothodi the left,
and 1,200-1,500 the right, but the CMR and CiMY dispersed those on the front
and right, and the infantry on the left scattered others.

The enemy attack

advanced so furiously that some rebels became skewered on bayonets like ka275
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babsf^lhus, some of the 30 hostiles killed in the attack kept their promise
made before the battle that they would die among the green—jackets, referring
to the PAG uniforms of green with red trim.

The colonial howitzer demoralized

the rebels and forced them to abandon villages below Tangesberg to which they
» .
,280
had Tx6u *
The Carrington column, on the march towards Morija, in another tactical
success captured on the 16th a fortified rebel position one and a half miles
long8£y surprising the enemy and thereby gained a base 6 miles ahead of the
282
283
previously occupied laager.
The troops, having killed 100 hostiles, uhen
destroyed naarby rebel crops?8^
Tha clash of Transvaal Doers with Imperial troops in the First Doer War
affected the Basuto conflict, as the success of the Boers encouraged the re285
bels.
Whereas Cape Colony considered prohibiting shipments of arms and ammu
nition through Free State territory to prevent their theft for use by the
Vaal 3oers^8^resident Brand probably would disallow further passage for colo
nial troops through his territory to the Basuto war zone if the Orange Free
2qt
State allied with the rebellious TEansvaal.
The rebels, though still fighting, replied to the Robinson offer of me279
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diation; therefore, Colonel Griffith, as ordered, proclaimed an armistice from
288
February 18 through February 24.
Thanking Sir Hercules for his generous
terms, Lerothodi, Joel, Masupha, and Ramanella placed themselves under his
direction but pleaded confusion over their proposed disarmament and submission
to the Government.

Though professing trust in Cape Town and hoping for an

end to the war and a concrete peace, they fretted about land confiscation and
deposition of chiefs, feared harsher terms should enforcement of the PPA con
tinue, and asked to see immediately specific conditions to be-afforded them
289
after disarmament.
Prime Minister Sprigg, in reaction to the enemy response, said that, b e 
fore his further discussion of proposals, the rebels would have to unilateral290
ly submit to the Cape Government.
Governor Robinson, still recommending
leniency, also deemed the belated reply unsatisfactory, as the hostiles alle
gedly wanted peace but refused to submit to the law until they learned speci291
fic peace conditions.
The Cups ministers, despite dissatisfaction with the rebel attitude, an
nounced their eight conditions for peace.

The terms ware as follows: 1) Rebel

submission to colonial Government and law, 2) immediate surrender of all arms,
3) amnesty awarded all except Masupha, Lerothodi, and Joel, who would stand
trial but not risk execution, 4) payment of a fine, 5) no confiscation of Ba
sutoland proper except appropriation of land for new residencies, 6} resolu
tion of the Quthing question by the Cape Parliament, and 7) acceptance or re287
288
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jection of these conditions within twenty-four hours after receipt by Lero
thodi.

Cape officials planned no further negotiations, and if the rebels did

not accept the terms, hostilities would resume at the end of the armistice.
Finally, 8) if fighting did recur, the existent offer would be subject to
292
change.
Colonel Griffith, who indicated his views of and efforts in these pro
ceedings, attempted to induce the rebels to accept the Robinson peace candi293
tions, but the hostiles were too loyal to their chiefs to act independently.
To allow Lerothodi time to answer -the eight conditions, Griffith extended the
armistice from the 24th to the 26th, but the rebels, who welcomed the exten294
sion of the armistice, gave no reply.
The Chief Magistrate vowed to protect
Letsie, who apologized for the Lerothodi pretense of ignorance, if the chief
295
demonstrated his loyalty by coming to Maseru.
The Robinson terms were much
too lenient, thought Colonel Griffith, and he believed that the colony must
punish the rebels before dispensing generous treatment, because the hostiles
were barbarians, regarded as a sign of weakness tha mild terms which a civi
lized government offered them, and thus acted accordingly.

The Chief Magis

trate prepared to enforce tha PPA with vigorous military a c t ion^^aving re
ported that the rebels, who disclaimed defeat and would not disarm, believed
the colony desperate for peace.
Governor Robinson, indicating the delicate position of his ministers and

292
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himself, had offered his services only after consulting his ministers and Kim
berley and then had thought it best to act as only an arbitrator, because
overt influence from his office might embarrass and anger his ministers, the
Cape Parliament, and the entire colony.

The sole reply of Lerothodi relieved

Robinson of unconstitutional responsibility which would have involved him had
the hostiles surrendered unconditionally, and tha ministers therefore accep
ted total responsibility for terms.

The governor believed that he could treat

the hostiles more leniently than his ministers, who wanted to offer precise
peace conditions to avoid parliamentary and public blame for continuance of
the war.

297
The ministers doubted that the rebels would accept precise terms,

though the eight-point peace program, agreed most knowledgeable Basuto offi
cials, seemed a deterrent to future war and a guarantee for future prosperi298
ty.
Although Robinson attempted to cajole the ministers, they remained ada
mant to satisfy the country and secure a lasting peace and thought a trial
for the three rebel leaders was necessary to protect Loyalists and future
299
rule over Basutoland.
Regarding the true enemy intent, Colonel Carrington reported the rebels
3 OQ
busily schantzing Bolak*a Ridge.
The enemy fortified their positions and,
pretending to negotiate until completion of the harvest, planned to fight
indefinitely^^
General Clarke, in view of the posture of his foes during the armistice,
revised his estimate to 8,000 soldiers, excluding garrison troops, needed in

297
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302
the war zone, yet colonial forces already stood prepared for a powerful and
303
final offensive.
The enemy abided in a worse situation than previously, yet
the Pall Mall Gazette observed that perhaps Carrington was successful in some
February operations only because the rebels believed the armistice was already
in effect and did not r e s i s t ^ ^ To the colonial headquarters camp near Mafe
teng came Lerothodi and other enemy chiefs, and, as they conversed with
Colonel Brabant and other officers about the campaigning, Lerothodi admitted
305
that he could not stop the killing of wounded soldiers.
Possibly during
this interim, Mama Letsie, educated at Cape Town and once a Government clerk,
invited Shervinton to his camp, where the officer drank champagne and met with
Chief L e t s i e ^ ^
The Transvaal war, in reflection, accentuated how tenuous was the basic
logistical lifeline of Cape troops in Basutoland.

The rebels still maintained

high martial spirit in February but were desperate for victory.

Their con

fusion about disarmament and submission was nonexistent; if the hostiles had
desired peace, they would have submitted.

Cape ministers magnanimously pub

lished fair, lenient, and specific peace terms but did not allow enough time
for enemy deliberations.

MARCH 1881

In March, the enemy could still fight effectively when they wanted.
302
303
304
305
306
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Carrington patrol on March 18 moved within 2,000 yards of rebel schantzen,
307
where the troops waited in vain for an enemy attack*
On the 22nd, rapid
firing from artillery halted a rebel assaull^on a Clarke patrol between 3oleka Ridge and Tangesberg, but the general did not want to fight the enemy at
309
close quarters while outflanked; thus, after 6 hours of fighting, the outcoms
310
was indecisive.
Two days later, about 600 hostiles attacked Mafeteng and
311
stole 195 horses and 192 cattle.
The enemy, reported the Pall Mall Gazette.
not only had halted the advance of colonial forces but also had stymied them
<

’

312
by stealing horses and cattle.
Colonel Wavell, commander of Griqualand East troop3, despite optimistic
battle reports and his opinion that the rebels were much overrated, was dis
satisfied with his commander, General Clarke.

The Brownlee force meanwhile

313
drove Griqualand rebels into the uninhabited Drakensberg mountain range.

MALEVOLENT MEDDLING BY FRENCH MISSIONARIES

During the war, the Paris Evangelical Society missionaries in Basutoland,
together with their English accomplices urging British intervention and fal
sifying colonial conduct of the war, advised Secretary Kimberley that if the
war continued, Basuto respect for Britain would vanish, and the rebels would
307
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flee to the mountains to start guerrilla warfare.

A delay by London until

the end of the rebellion to dispatch a commission to inquire about Basuto
grievances, offer peace conditions, and grant amnesties would protract Basuto
alienation.
relatives.

The Loyalists, continued the PE5, disliked fighting "friends'*- and
Unless the British formed a native reserve, the colony would con-

314
fiscate most of Basutoland.
The Aborigines Protection Society, which apolo
gized for interfering in colonial affairs, maintained that the Basutos were
victims of brutal party politics^and it protested the inhuman treatment of
the rebels and the alleged proposed confiscation of rebel land.

The APS dis

missed the reluctance of the Earl of Kimberley to intervene by its allegation
that there was sufficient reason for Imperial intercession at any time and
316
that everyone except political racketeers would welcome such action.
James
A. Froude, noted commentator on South African affairs in this period, signed
with others a petition which contended that the Basutos did not want Cape
Colony rule and that the war aggravated tribal administration.

Surmising that

the Sprigg ministry had caused the hostilities, he believed that the Basutos
were in danger of vanishing like other tribes, even though he admitted that
the militarily secure rebels outnumbered the troops, and he wanted British
317
rule for the tribe.
Froude also introduced APS-favared pro-rebel legislation
*to Kimberley, who answered that if London imposed itself at an inopportune
time, Cape Colony in the future would refuse to axpend the funds necessary to
govern Basutoland should it come under direct British control.

Great Britain,

more impartial and moderate than the colony, continued the secretary, must

314
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use its influence only at the proper time.
The miscreant Mabille, further justifying British intercession, declared
that responsible government had limits, that numerous knowledgeable inhabi
tants of the colony opposed the war, and that numerous soldiers fought only
because of duty.

The certainty of British intervention greatly pleased the

pastor, because the Sprigg ministry would probably collapse, and because in
tervention would justify rebel faith in London.

After other rebel tribes

319
learned of British leniency, they would submit to peace terms.
Tha "Mabille Gang," moreover, descended on the British Government like a
plague of locusts, because the pastor was determined to influence British
officials and the public to end the war.

Knowing well the position of rebel

chiefs, he suggested that the APS lobby for this position in Parliament.

Lon

don overruled the idea of Mabille accompanying a Government commission on the
Basutos to Cape Colony, whereupon the missionary distributed to churches in
Prance and Switzerland a petition which supported the PCS, subsequently han
ded the document with 24,000 signatures to Parliament, and next sent a memo
rial to the House of Lords.

To Lord Kimberley, the English branch of the

Evangelical Alliance offered a statement in which Mabille asked if Great Bri
tain would allow troops to crush and disperse the rebels, which was supposed320
ly the declared objective of the colonial commanders.
The English society
requested its Government to alleviate rebel grievances and to protect both
Christian Loyalists and missionaries and their property, condemned the harsh
ness of the war, and reminded London of the services that the missionaries
T1R
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321
had brought to tha natives, services which the PE5 specified in education and
322
religion.
War was ravaging the Basutos and endangering the missionaries,
wrote the Swiss Evangelical Society; thus, this community pleaded for a peace
323
settlement as insurance for their missions.
The PES, itself supposedly in a hazardous position, proferred possible
peace conditions.

While these churches alleged that they remained in the war

zone to aid Loyalists, find a refuge for the ill and elderly, preserve mission
stations, some of which the hostiles burned, and solicit the natives to seek
British protection and influence other tribes to do the same, the rebels sus
pected pacific French advice, and colonists accused the clerics of endorsing
the rebellion.

Because of suffering to the missionaries, the Frenchmen plea

ded for an end to the war, and they thought the Capa Government in a peace
settlement must disallow land confiscation, seek only rebel submission and a
tribal monetary and cattle fine, grant amnesties to all hostiles except per
petrators of atrocities, and allow the High Commissioner and magistrates to
324
administer the country and register and tax Basuto guns.
The misled Mabille, in addition, deliberated on a rebel peace proposal
in January, 1381.

Tha pastor secured a safe-conduct pass for his emissary,

who advised the rebels on formulating a peace offer. . As Mabille believed
that the rebels had won almost every battle, he thought.tha hostiles must
only promise not to fight the Queen, ask for complete amnesty for all, and
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seek identical living conditions as before the war.

He told Letsie to per

suade his sons to make peace; otherwise, troops would crush the paramount
chief and the rebels'?^
The PE5, to assist these hostiles, audaciously requested the English Red
Cross to send hospital supplies at British expense through the military lines
in Basutoland to the reprobate Oar. Casalis at Morija, who had directed other'
326
relief supplies to the rebels.
The PES, indicated Kimberley, must apply to
327
the Cape Government for such a worthy endeavor.
The PES and other societies, in honest judgement, among their succession
of errors might have consulted with colonial officials but instead waded into
colonial partisanship and politics and insidiously spread their version of a
colonial peace plan, together with Froude spread false rumors wnich enhanced
the rebel cause, and interfered in Cape military affairs.

The French mission

aries could have evacuated if they felt endangered, their peace conditions
were too permissive and presumptuous, and evangelical personnel compromised
their status as resident aliens of Cape Colony by deprecating colonial action
and by directly aiding the rebel forces with the sanction of Kimberley.
Adolphe Mabille, in addition, represented the rebel position and ignored
the tenets of responsible government at Cape Town.

His tunnel vision notion

of campaign results was a feat, and his peace proposal was much too generous
to the hostiles.

He and other tittering toadies in clerical garb influenced

the rebels to persevere for more favorable peace proposals, and the possible
prolongation of hostilities was the most catastrophic result of PES meddling.
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CONTEMPLATION OF BRITISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE

A question vital to Cape Colony during the Basuto Civil War and Rebellion
was that of active British aid in subjugation of the rebels.

Administrator

Clifford, reflecting official policy, in September, 1880, reported to Kimber
ley that whatever dimensions the conflict might reach, he would not employ
328
'
Imperial troops.
The British Government, replied tha secretary, concurred
329
in that decision, and he later admonished The Times that no one in a Natal
330
force raised by officers for the Basuto war possessed an Lnglish commission.
Administrator Strahan added that the Cape Government could and would suppress
331
the rebels alone if allowed to decide the future government of Basutoland.
Prime Minister Sprigg in November, 1880, announced the rapid response to m o 
bilization made by whites and blacks in the colony, which made the use of
33 2

British units unnecessary.

South African colonists, commented the Pall Mall

Gazette, always had tried to dispense with Imperial interference by declining
to accept military aid against native attacks, and if the colony without Im
perial forces could subdue the Basuto rebels, every colonist would agree that
it was solely a colonial privilege to deal with the defeated hostiles.

The

paper, however, thought it extremely doubtful that the colony could wage war
333
without British assistance.
Cape officials, in reality, sought British military aid, as they wanted
328
329
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assistance from Imperial officers while General Clarke was absent from mili
tary headquarters, and Clifford asked permission to use Imperial officers on
334
33 5
the Basuto battlefront, whereupon Kimberley refused this last request.
Cape
Town later requested the use of a Natal officer from a British garrison to
336
act as Assistant-Staff Officer under Clarke.
Sprigg in December thanked
337
Crown agents for promptly filling large colonial orders for ammunition. ‘
Sir George Grey, who wanted to redirect the use of British power, cau
tioned that, as the might of the Cape Government rested mostly on the support
of British troops, the colonial ministers could not excuse themselves from
responsibility to the Crown.

British power, he added, supported the colo

nials in a war which a majority of Englishmen thought unjustifiable and which
dishonored Great Britain.

Cape Colony, with British garrisons in reserve,

sent more soldiers against the rebels than otherwise possible.

Britain, be

lieved Grey, must either stop colonial prosecution of the war or use Imperial
troops to quash the rebels quickly, whatever the cost, because, if the war
338
continued, the Basuto tribe might disintegrate.
Queen Victoria, in the significance of the eventual decision on British
military succor, asked Kimberley why Imperial troops had not yet intervened
against the rebels.

Governor Frere, believed both the secretary and Glad

stone, had biased the Queen, though Kimberley later informed the APS lobby
ists that he could not refuse a heretofore unreceived request by Sir Gordon
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339
Sprigg for Imperial troops.
Though a few experienced officers would have
contributed invaluable service to the colony, asserts De Kiewiet, the British
Government did not offer troops, because Cape Colony had blocked South African
confederation.

The Basuto conflict was the first colonial war since early

in the century in which the British Government helped .neither militarily nor
340
financially.
William Greswell and English Liberals both assert that Kimber
ley and much of the English press opposed the war and that British reluctance
to help implied that, if the colonists could not fight their own battles, they
341
could not handle responsible government.
British failure to aid Cape Colony,
related one rebel prisoner, encouraged enemy resistance.

The Cape Times

noted that the refusal by London to help fight tha rebels was tantamount to
342
telling the frontier tribes to revolt then or never.
Colonial appropriation of a few Imperial officers, in conclusory judge
ment, did not violate the policy announced by Kimberley, who, despite his
assertions to the contrary, denied Imperial army personnel to Cape Town.
British failure to offer moral and military support to Capa Colony convinced
the rebels to seek more favorable consideration by prolonging the hostilities.

POTENTIAL BRITISH INTERVENTION IN THE CONFLICT

Having circumvented the military bolstering of Cape Colony, the Colonial
339
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Office refused to define for Cape Town the extent of the Imperial Government
role in the Basuto conflict.

Cape Colony, insisted the Colonial Office,

forced war on itself, and Prime Minister Sprigg, believed the Earl of Kimber343
ley, was intent upon hostilities.
Sir Gordon in September, 1880, had the
impression that Cape Town would be allowed to suppress the Basuto rebels
without British interference^^owever, Kimberley soon after said that the
Home Government would consider the program of the Cape ministry but could not
in advance agree to a settlement between the colony and the rebels because of
345
future contingencies.
The next month, Kimberley commented that Cape Town
would have much leverage in deciding the future government of Basutoland,
condemned the rebels, and wished Sir Gordon a rapid victory, but warned Sprigg
that London had considered the Basutos loyal until the application of the
PPA, which ha thought had caused the outbreak.

Kimberley, for fear of en

couraging the enemy to resist measures stated publicly, refused to discuss
346
British intervention further at the time.
Though one author indicates that
British concern perhaps signified London*s feeling of responsibility for the
34.7
tribe, Be Kiewiet believes further that Britain could not allow Cape Colony
to wreak vengeance and that, in native policy, responsible government was
subordinate to the Home Government.

The Crown was disposed to aid in a peace

settlement, Lord Kimberley told Governor Robinson, and certainly would if the
Cape ministry imposed too savere terms, and further, if colonial military
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344
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action failed, Britain would reconsider Cape control over all native terri. . 348
torres.
Sir Gordon, in rebuttal, in December, 1880, expounded his views on Bri
tish interference.

He condemned as encouraging rebelliousness and a victori

ous attitude among rebels the English parliamentary declarations distributed
in Cape Colony and circulated among the Basutos.

After troops had crushed

the rebellion, believed the Prime Minister, Britain would not interfere with
the peace settlement in Basutoland, and, according to the Cape ministry, would
give the necessary moral support to uphold law and order, because Cape Colony
had freed Great Britain from the burdens of administering native territories
in South Africa.

The colony in the war was making large sacrifices in men,

property, and money, and understood that only Cape Town would conclude the
349
final peace ax'rangemant.
5ir George Grey, moreover, in attaching blame for the manner of British
pressure, maintained that helpless Kimberley supervised Cape Colony too le
niently and that, unable to prevent Cape Town administrators from acting
350
against his will, he heaped all responsibility on them.
Sir Bartle Frere
countered this adversary by remarking that the radical members of the Liberal
Party who censured Fr.-re for participation in colonial politics ironically
demanded the forcible intervention of the Home Government in order to suspend
the colonial constitution and administer Basuto matters under the direction
of the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs.

The radical Liberals by their

abhorrent suggestion, asserted Frei'e, did not seek to uphold law or protect
348
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the lives and property of British subjects but only wanted to shield the re
bels from just punishment.

Upon receipt of responsible government, he con

cluded, Cape Colony had reached a social and political state which made the
351
slightest British jurisdiction inadvisable.
While Lord Kimberley, in clarification of prescribed procedures in March,
1881, warned that London had some control in making peace, because acts that
dealt with Basuto land, as all other land inhabited by natives under colonial
jurisdiction, had to receive British endorsement, he acknowledged that it was
impossible to carry on a government if the mother country constantly inter
fered.

Responsible government did not include control of native affairs un

less indicated by provision, mentioned Viscount Bury, an English member of
352
Parliament, and the High Commissioner normally administered native matters.
Prime Minister Gladstone declared that London would not suggest binding peace
conditions which Cape Town must offer the rebels but that the Home Government
. 353
would be a party to any armistice.
In condemnation of colonial presumptions and actions from the legisla
tive branch of British Government, Sir George Campbell, in the House of Com
mons, regretted that colonial troops systematically destroyed rebel property
354
and crops during the February armistice.
Sir Wilfrid Lawson, another mem
ber, in January, 1881, complained that Cape troops used dynamite charges
against the rebels.

He also vilified Cape Colony newspapers which reviled

Lord Kimberley for denying Sprigg the right to distribute spoils to the colo351
35?
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nials after the war, a denial which dampened colonial fighting spirits.
the war went badly, believed colonists,

If

Imperial troops would aid them; there

fore, swift British mediation, according to Lawson, would save Britain from
such danger and discredit and would protect the hostiles.

R. W. Fowler be

lieved that the Sprigg war policies would drive the Basutos back into savagery.
Other members, to the contrary, discussed the stipulations of British
intercession and colonial responsibility.

5ir Wanry Holland, who had served

in the Colonial Office, thought that the Basuto war was an internal colonial
matter.

To discuss the wisdom of British mediation while colonial soldiers

courageously fought the rebels was pointless, surmised Holland, for he be
lieved that the Imperial Government must intervene only if asked by the go
vernor, or if the colony confiscated large areas of Basutoland for white
settlement.

In the latter evantuality, into Natal, the Orange Free State,

and adjacent native lands would overflow Basutos in large droves.

Mr. Donald

Currie worried that news of British mediation would bolster the rebels and
contended that the colony had not desired war.

Cape Colony by itself still

might end the war, said Mr. Grant Buff, the Undersecretary for Colonial Af
fairs, and he could find no evidence that Cape Town would make a vindictive
settlement.

Britain, he declared, could not appear the enemy of the white

355
man.
Greswell comments that the British reproach alienated colonists, who
wanted to colonize some Basuto land, and bolstered the rebels, who hoped to
retain all their territory.

London gave the rebels moral support by refusing

either to disavow the FPA immediately or to help the colony enfurce the mea-

Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 257 (1681), 1068-69, 1071-72, 1077-78, 1081,
1085, 1087-88, 5ir Wilfrid Lawson, Mr. R. W. Fowler, Sir Henry Holland, Mr.
Donald Currie, and Mr. Grant Duff speaking, January 20, 1881.
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sure and conclude the war successfully, and the hostiles therefore thought
relations between Britain and Cape Colony were antagonistic, and, well-informed
of British posture, continued to resist.
fact, contends Greswell,

If Kimberley had known this last

he would have muffled himself, and if the Home

Government had not hampered and aggravated Cape Colony, the colony would have
grown wealthier, the settlers grown more loyal to Britain, and the natives
become more peaceful?"^
There were, furthermore, several reasons why the 5prigg ministry resented
further British interference.

Colonial Secretary Kimberley considered the

rebel peace petition important, urged Governor Robinson to pressure the Cape
357
ministers towards a settlement and to arrange terms to end the conflict, and,
as Kimbarley believed in January that the colony could not establish order
soon in Basutoland, suggested that the friendly intervention of London could
restore stability.

As a British settlement depanded on as yet unknown fac

tors but could resolve the war if the rebels placed themselves under British
supervision, the secretary offered to arrange for a commission to recommend
peace terms, even though he considered the direct intervention of the Crown
preferable, as the Basutos looked for advice to the office of High Commis358
sioner.
Lord Kimberley in February regretted that Robinson had failed to
interfere in a Basuto peace accord and condemned the eight-point peace pro359
gram, out the colonial ministers, hoped the secretary, would mollify their
356
357
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360
conditions, especially in regard to rebel leaders.
He furthermore announced
that Britain had neither contributed to nor promulgated the eight-point ulti361
tnatum offered the rebels.
No Cape Town officials, announced Sprigg, ques
tioned the right of the Imperial Government to instruct the governor to
disapprove of colonial actions.

The rebels, however, declared that they owed

no allegiance to Cape Colony and intimated to the ministers that, because
London considered the terms too severe, hostile forces could receive better
362
terms by continuing to resist.
The Cape Parliament promoted neither direct
British intervention nor formation of a British commission to recommend a
settlement; thus, Robinson, while he could try to influence peace terms, could
363
not deal directly with the hostiles.
The colonial ministers complained to
364
Robinson of the British parliamentary rejection of their peace conditions and
believed a statement made in the House of Commons by Mr. Duff, which falsely
related a colonial ministry desire for the hostiles to make peace arrangements
365
with Governor Robinson, would make peace more unattainable.
Although Gover
nor Robinson and his ministers formally protested British objections to the
366
eight points, objections that stiffened enemy resistance, the governor, ac
cording to Duff, did not enjoy enough trust from the hostiles to make peace
3 60
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arrangements'?67 The Cape Government pleaded for understanding and shunned
criticism, because a dissolution of the Cape Town Parliament meant the elec\

tion of numerous Afrikaner members, who, angered over Cape policy in the
Transvaal war and allied with the Opposition, might alter the balance of power
368
in Parliament.
If the Sprigg cabinet fell, an Afrikaner ministry might ac369
cede to power and make an unsatisfactory peace with the rebels.
Internal and external pressure, in conclusion, endangered the Sprigg
ministry efforts to honorably end the war.

Though shadowy British control

over native policy provided legitimate leverage for intercession, the Colo
nial Office used trickery in this jurisdictional presumption, because Cape
Colony administered Basuto rule.

The Colonial Office showed an unreasonable

negative bias towards the Sprigg ministry, indiscreetly conducted its activi
ties, and stabbed the valiant colonial troops in the back.

Even if Kimberley

did not intentionally support the rebel cause by continuing to discuss the
war, he crippled Cape Town faith in the Colonial Office by intervening and
seemed ready to appropriate Cape territory in the face of colonial military
defeat or, an the other hand, steal away the colonial fruits of victory.

It

was conventional for colonial governments to confiscate land and other valu
ables from a defeated tribal enemy and disperse the tribe.

The secretary and

British radical Liberals, by seeking to administer a peace settlement, rode
roughshod over responsible government, which might have ended the war honor
ably.

^6 7Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 260 (1881), 359, Mr. Buff speaking, March 31,
1881.
368
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CHAPTER VI

THE BASUTO RECONSTRUCTION

THE END OF THE WAR AND THE. ROBINSON AWARD

As the war staggered on to a close, further colonial military successes
did not impress everyone, and, although colonial forces beat back the rebels
from Leribe on April 10, killing 30-40 enemy while losing only 1 soldier^there was a complaint of lethargic, irresponsible, and stupid military maneu-

2

vering.

In a:skirmish at Maseru, after Colonel Wavell had joined General

Clarke in offensive operations, the rebels lost heavily, and the colonials
3
suffered only 3 killed.

During sporadic military action in May, colonial

troops flushed out enemy caves in the Drakensberg.
In April, 1881, both combatants were experiencing mobilization problems.
Only 3,000 colonial troops were stationed in Basutoland, 2,000 of them con
scripts.

In order to entice more volunteers to the front, t o :enforcerthe "I,

Commando and Levies Act, and to enable burghers to leave the front, Cape p'ar4
liamentary bills sought to raise infantry corps.

In desperation, Cape Town

5
armed and promised loot to several thousand Bantu.

Lerothoai also at this

6

time was having difficulty maintaining his warriors.
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During the next peace overture, Lerothodi ana the rest of the rebels, who
refused to disperse unless the colonial army left Basutoland, were still occu
pying Doleka Ridge and from there continued to besiege Magistrate Bell at
Leribe!

On April 9, a rebel delegation representing Chiefs Letsie, Lerothodi,

and Masupha met with Colonel Griffith at Maseru, and the latter two chiefs

8

promised to stop fighting but refused to surrender.

Lerothodi, jealous of

Masupha, waited until April 17 and then submitted to Governor Robinson, or9
dering his warriors to disarm and return home.

While some rebels refused to

scatter, they were not openly hostile to the troops and remained quietly in
villages in the war zone to await action by Robinson.
The governor, promulgating another peace initiative and considering the
alternative, drew up an award which he thought an honorable proposal that tes
ted rebesl willingness to accept reasonable terms.

Expediency meant announcing

the award quickly, because, if the negotiations foundered and the rebellion
continued, the enemy would never again have the opportunity to accept lenient
terms.

Also, it was necessary to learn immediately if rebels would reject the

award, so that a mighty military endeavor could be mounted to crush them.

The

present military situation in Basutoland was shaky, and a continued campaign
would mean moving the troops into winter quarters, resuming the fighting in
the spring, and expending 3L several million m o r e P The Gprigg ministry now
agreed that the governor must arbitrate immediately, with the provision for
rebels to eventually surrender their w e a p o n s ^ a n d assumed responsibility for

P_. , (1081), LXVII, 615, ltr. Griffith to Robinson, April 26, 1881.
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the award in the Capa Parliament.

Lord Kimberley willingly sanctioned the new

Robinson offerl^
Gn April 29, 1881, Governor Robinson offered the following award: 1)
Disarmament.

ihe PPA would continue, however, a liberal interpretation of its

provisions would apply to the issuance of licenses for the ownership and car
rying of arms.

Part of the annual license fees would help pay the interest

on the colonial debt incurred from the rebellion.

2) Compensation.

The rebel

portion of the tribe would pay compensation to Loyalists for property illegal
ly expropriated, restore land, pay for all losses and damages inflicted on
Loyalists and traders, and return all government property captured during the
rebellion.

3) Fines.

5,000 cattle.

The rebel section of the tribe would pay a fine of

After the enemy had complied with these conditions, a colonial

pledge would guarantee complete amnesty for all hostiles and no confiscation
of t e r r i t o r y ^
Although the hostiles publicly accepted some terms, and the crisis seemed
passed, there were portents of future problems.

The rebels paid part of the

15
cattle fine but refused to return expropriated land, land for which they were
waging a civil warf^they promised to surrender their guns but turned in only
a few m u s k e t s ^ The reverend Mabille spoke against disarmament; Masupha com18
plained about repayment to Loyalists.
Chief Letsie ordered Lerothodi to accept

^ Ibid., 617, ltr. Sprigg and colonial ministers to Robinson, April 29,
1881.

12
13
14

Ibid., 613, ltr. Robinson to Kimberley, April 30, 1881.
Ibid., 608-09, ltr. Kimberley to Robinson, April 6, 1881.
Ibid., 617-18, ltr. Robinson to colonial ministers, April 29, 1881.

15

Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 169; Vindex maintains that, the re
bels surrendered only scrawny cattle, Vindex, Cecil Rhodes, p. 47.
^ D e Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 290.
17
Walker, ed., South Africa, p. 491.
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all terms offered except disarmament.

Cape Town, believed the yet belligerent

19
hostiles, could not enforce the award provisions.
Cape parliamentary opposition to the Sprigg policy in Basutoland heralded
a change in government.

Thomas Fuller was leading opposition to the native

policy of Sir Gordon Sprigg.

20

His ally, Thomas bcanlen, who led the moderate

English faction in the House Assembly, was elected leader of the opposition

21

party, the party which during the war had exaggerated rebel victories and

22

colonial defeats.

As Imperial Government favoritism towards the rebels an

gered both Cape legislative houses, a strong legislative feeling arose to
disannex Basutoland.

On May 9, Scanlen assumed the offices of Prime Minister

23
and Attorney-General of Cape Colony, Johannes Wilhelmus 5auer became Secretary
for Native Affairs, J. C. Molteno accepted the post of Colonial Secretary, and
24
25
Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr was designated minister-at-large.
18
19

Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, pp. 289-90.
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 169.
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A*A*A*A,:[i* » P* 330. Scanlen: Born at Cape Town, Thomas Scanlen became
an attorney and represented Cradock in the Cape Parliament from 1870-96.
He
served as Prime Minister from 1881— 84.
Having become a legal adviser to the
British South Africa Company in 1894, he soon after moved to Rhodesia, where
he gained a post in the Executive Council in 1896 and was Acting-Administrator
of Rhodesia in 1898 and from 1903-06.

21
22
23

Pall Mall Gazette (London), May 7, 1881, p. 3; Fuller, Rhodes, pp. 3-4.
Frere,

!rThe Basutos . . .

Cape of Good Hope,” p. 194.

» P> 329.
Sauer: Johannes Sauer was born at Burghersdorp,
Cape Colony.
A lawyer at Aliwal North, he entered the Cape Parliament in
1876.
Although first a supporter of Sprigg, he served as Secretary for Native
Affairs under Scanlen from 1881-84 and as Colonial Secretary under Cecil
Rhodes;
A resolute defender of non-whites, he considered himself a philoso
phical radical.
Sauer later was a member of both the National Convention of
1908-09 and the Union Parliament and served as Minister for Native Affairs
from 1910-13, Robertson, South Africa, p. 141.
24
* PP* 171-72. Hofmeyr: Born at Cape Town and educated at the
South Africa College, Hofmeyr acquired fame as the editor of the Zuid Afrikaan
newspaper, became a political champion of the farmer, and merged his own poli
tical organization with the Afrikaner Bond, of which he became leader*
His
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There were a number of reasons underlying the collapse of the Sprigg mi
nistry.

Its attorney-general had resigned out of disgust for the repressive

26
Sprigg native policy, and his successor was regarded as being more underhanded
27
in native policy than the prime minister.
Most legislators believed that the
ministry was growing apathetic, and, early in May, the Opposition in tha House
29
Assembly voted against supply appropriations to troops at the front.
Sir
Gordon, on the other hand, had directed the entire Basuto war by himself, cal
ling out troops and personally raising money.

Colonial military failure, be

lieved the Pall Mall Gazette, had rendered unjustifiable the Sprigg snubbing
29
of Parliament during the war.
ueveral members of the Sprigg party no longer
30
voted with their leader, thus reversing his majority, and the prime minister
31
received a vote of censure on May 4.
Among presumptions of the new ministry, it expected the Basutos and other
32
rebel tribes to anticipate favorable treatment, considered the rebels their
33
friends, and foresaw immediate submission.
5canlen, however, who was an au
thority on native affairs, meant to prolong the war for the benefit of exgreatest achievement was forcing recognition of the equality of the Afrikaans
and English languages in Caps Colony, and he almost prevented the outbreak of
the Second Anglo-Boer War.
Hofmeyr later assisted in drafting a constitution
for the Union of South Africa.
^Theal,

South Africa, XI, 69-7G.

Pall Mall Gazette (London), May 4, 1881, p. 8; cf.,
1881, p. 3.

Ibid., May 11,

^ I b i d . , May 6, 1881, p. 4.
OQ
Ibid., May 5, 1881, p. 6.
29
Ibid., May 7, 1881, p. 3.
3 U Ibid., May 30, 1881, p. 8.
31
J. G. Lockhart and C. M. Woodhouse, Cecil Rhodes (New York: The Macmil
lan Co., 1963), p. 72.
3^Theal, South Africa, XI, 70.
33Pall Mall Gazette (London), May 17, 1881, p. 4.
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34
pansionist Free State intimates of Hofmeyr, according to one author.
The new
ministry asked if London was prepared to arbitrate further should the rebels
35
not accept the award.
The Home Government, answered Kimberley equivocally,
36
would not interfere with the Cape Government in Basutoland.
In the middle of May, to the satisfaction of the new ministry, Letsie,
Lerothodi, Joel, and their subordinate chiefs, but not Masupha, wrote that
they understood the award and would abide by it.

They apologized for rebelling

against a government which they had willingly acceptel^and began to register
therr guns.
Aided by the British and French Red Cross, the reverend Mabille, as the
PE5 continued to help these rebels, purchased medical supplies in England for
the hostiles.

Prime Minister Sprigg at Cape Town detained for six weeks the

supplies as enemy contraband and in vain advised the missionaries instead to
39
offer their services to colonial aid stations.
The Sprigg ministry, in appraisal, had accepted the Robinson Award because
of British pressure to end the war, and the Scanlen ministry was too optimi
stic about enemy submission.

Provisions of the award should have more strict

ly applied the PPA and should have provided for the trial of rebel ringlea
ders; the colonial eight-point program would have better served the situation.
Masupha instigated his cohorts to do all the fighting, while he hid out safe34

Ian D. Colvin, Cecil John Rhodes (London: T. C. and E. C. Jack, 1912),
p. 34; Pall Mall Gazette (London), May 9, 1881, p. 4.
33B_.5_.P_. , (1881), LXVII, 614, ltr. Robinson to Kimberley, May 22, 1881.
36
Ibid., 614-15, ltr. Kimberley to Robinson, May 23, 1881.
37
lb id., 613. ltr. Robinson to Kimberley, May 16, 1881.
38
Theal, South Africa, XI, 70.
39
Smith, The Mabilles of Busutoland, pp. 290-91.
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ly in his lair.

The parliamentary apposition stabbed the troops in the back,

as did the gross misconduct of the English and French Red Cross.

COMMENTARY ON AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL AND
REBEL MILITARY CONDUCT IN. THE REBELLION

Historians agree that either Cape Colony suffered defeat or at least
failed to win military victory over the rebels for various reasons in the Ba
suto Rebellion, whereas I found Cape Colony falsely and unjustly maligned in
its combat role against the rebels.
40
Colonral troops, says De Kiewiet, retreated from Basutoland in defeat,
and R. T. Hall, official historian of the PAG, terms the war disastrous.

South

African historian F. Perridge indicates that the unsuccessful conflict evi
denced a waste of more than

,000,000, political incompetence, bickering in

the officer corps, lack of campaign management, lethargic combat, and public
apathy.

He also notes the effect of poor equipment, improper hygiene, and

41
illness on the soldiers.
No documentation, however, shows that colonial troops
fled from Basutoland in defeat, notwithstanding strategic evacuations and with
drawals to base camps from the battlefield whenever the rebels surrounded or
vastly outnumbered colonial forces.

Though some burgher units along with

other volunteers deserted from the front, these men fled from their awn army,
not from the rebels.

Colonial forces never lost a battle; at Kalabani in Oc

tober, 1880, troops after the initial shock drove off the hostiles.

^De

Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 290.

^□rpen,

Prince Alfred*s Guard 1856-1966, pp. 26, 45-46.
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42
Cecil Rhodes alleges that, in this unnecessary war, the rebels worsted
43
Cape Colony, which made no impression on the aggressive and victorious enemy
44
entrenched in mountains.
Rebels, in reality, after serious setbacks fled to
the mountains, where it was logistically impossible for a large army to fallow,
and where the enemy had definite advantage in trapping or ambushing the sol
diers.

Available troops could not have dislodged hostiles strongly scnantzed

in mountain strongholds, positions which provided ample defense, shelter, and
food for fleeing or tired rebel warriors.
Colonial forces, believes Stevens, were stymied in a war which cost the
*
45
colony 3l5,000,000, and Thomas Fuller maintains that colonial troops never pene46
trated further than 8— 10 miles into iiasutoland and that their campaign failed.
Cape Town, contends Lagden, abandoned some magistrate stations, and its army
never advanced more than a few miles from Mafeteng.

Actually, the assumption

that the colonials never pacified much rebel territory does not reflect badly
upon the troops, because, at some points, only 8-10 miles from the border
stratched the Maluti Mountains to the eastward, terrain largely uninhabited and
wherein impossible to locate rebel positions without more manpower than avail
able to Cape Town.
Th3 hostiles, continues Lagden, resisted an irreproachable military power
having ample funds, manpower, and scientific inganuity to enforce its rule.
Rebels mistakenly exalted their military prowess, whereas lack of colonial mili47
tary organization and political strife actually insured their advantage.
Eric

42
43
44

Vindex, Cecil Rhodes, p. 211.
Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 297.

Colvin, Cecil John Rhodes, p. 35.
45.
'
Stevens, Lesotho, e tc., p. 27.
46
Fuller, Rhodes, p. 3.
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Walker and George Theal declare that rebels successfully thwarted the colonial
48
soldiers and inflicted a much resented blow to white prestige in South Africa.
49
Troops fought only defensively, according to another source, and A. Aylward
50
believes that the hostiles held colonial troops in contempt.
Catastrophic re
bel losses, in actuality, greatly outnumbered colonial casualties, not so much
from the difference in weaponry, but because the rebels were careless about
their protection, and it seemed odd that rebels should hold in contempt sol
diers who consistently beat them.

European pride indeed received a shock, be

cause white troops did not militarily vanquish a black rebellion, and because
the war ended unsatisfactorily for Cape Town.
Concerning the quality of manpower available for the cumbersome mobiliza
tion, enough trained soldiers were never mobilized for the war, and those mo
bilized were not equipped properly at first or sent to the front quickly, as
army transport was primitive.
tary service were ineffectual.

The recruitment laws and inducements for mili
Prime Minister 5prigg from necessity personally

mobilized units for the front, because, if he had convened the Capa Parlia
ment, debating would have slowed or disallowed the movement of troops.

Accor

ding to Louis Cohen, with the exception of the CMR-and Loyalists, the Carring
ton force was inefficient.

The volunteers were seedy characters, especially

those recruited from Kimberley, and partly consisted of foreigners and Cape
51
Colony naval deserters.
Pretoria and the diamond fields supplied mercenaries
who relished war as a pastime, valued the life of a native as less than a dog,

^ L a g d e n , The Basutos, II, 525, 561.
48
Walker, ed., South Africa, p. 491; cf., Theal, South Africa, XI, 80.
49
v
?The Nation, XXXI
(July 1-Dec. 31, 1880), 435.
50
Aylward, "Basuto,” p. 340; cf., Lagden, The Basutos, II, 561.
51
Cohen, Reminiscences of Kimberley, p. 431.
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and desired booty.
Strategically, the troops fought offensively, in that they struck out from
fortified enclaves, and only by necessity fought defensively.

Too few troops

in the field precluded a sweep of the entire Basuto lowlands, and logistics
wasitoo primitive to supply and feed soldiers for such an operation.

A heavier

concentration at Mafeteng might have permitted the pacification of a larger
section of the country, but troops systematically pacified only smaii areas,
because, as soon as the troops marched through a location, hostiles would reoccupy the territory.

General Clarke never captured his prime objective of

Morija, and Colonel Bayly by vegetating at Maseru hampered the campaign.
In guerrilla warfare, pitted against these men, the rebels chose battle
sites to their own advantage, reluctantly engaged in pitched battles, used hitand-run or surprise tactics while trying to split colonial ranks, cut supply
lines, and capture horses, and could afford more combat losses.
Although Cape Town blundering, in reflection, caused most of the failure
in the campaign, there was no substitute for military victory, and domestic
and British hindrance of the war effort ultimately produced a no-win war policy
which in turn generated poor morale in the army.

RECONSTRUCTION: FIRST PHASE

Rebel words and deeds did not signify total acceptance of the Robinson
Award.

Secretary for Native Affairs Sauer visited Basutoland, held pitsos be

tween June 21 and 25, where Chief Moletsane and others registered their guns,

*^Pall Mall Gazette (London), October 2B, 18S0, p. 4.
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53
and said that rebels had paid more cattle toward their fine (Masupha later
54
sent in 405 cattle), thus paying almost the entire fine.
The rebels, however,
felt that the results of the colonial military campaigning had justified their
struggle.

The burgher volunteers so vociferously demanded their relcaoo that

they were discharged, and most other volunteers and the yeomanry received per
mission to leave the front; thus, Sauer had no force to back his authority and
to protect Loyalists.

Meetings held throughout the country accomplished lit-

55
tie. Most rebel chiefs, lying purposely to the contrary, did not observe the
award.

They did not restore Loyalist property, surrendered few guns, and paid

little hut tax; thus, the colonial treasury had to provide foodstuffs to Loya
lists.
Chief Magistrate Griffith, now that the war was over, asked to retire be
cause of ill-health, and on August 25, 1861, Joseph Orpen assumed the post at
56
Maseru upon invitation from Secretary Sauer.

Gmil Rolland, brother-in-law to

Orpen and also a good friend of the Basutos, became resident magistrate at
Maseru.

Griffith actually quit out of pity for the unfortunate Loyalists, and

his absence from the inequities which presently transpired comforted Loyalists
57
George and Tsekelo Moshesh.
At a pitso in August, where Orpen was introduced to the tribe, the rebels
58
still seemed powerful.
Cape Town, alleged George Moshesh, did not adequately
protect loyal Basutos, who had to submit to the rebels.

Loyalists could not

53
j3.5_.F\, , (1681), LXVII, 620, ltr. Robinson to Kimberley, June 30, 1881.
54
Ibid., 620, ltr. Robinson to Kimberley, July 2, 1881.
■55
Lagden, The Basutos, II, 525; Theal, 5outh Africa, XI, 71.
^ T h e a l , South Africa, XI, 70-71.
57
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, pp. 172, 176; Brookes also maintains
that Griffith feigned his illness, Brookes, History of Native Policy, p. 104.
58
B.5.P., (1882), XLVII, 200, ltr. Sauer to Scanlen, August 29, 1881.
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reclaim their homes and land, and a councilor to one chief said that Loyalists
had no plows or oxen to till fields and that the hostiles refused to lend such
items.

One Loyalist asserted that there was still no peace in the country and

that Cape Town was unable to enforce the Robinson A w a r d ^ The rebel chief's
felt superior to the whites and ignored magistrates and their summonses, as
Cape Town would not force compliance, and Orpen, because of stubborn Masupha,
feared to reopen the magistracy at Teyateyaneng^
Secretary Sauer, with others optimistic and intent on subduing Masupha,
also attended the pitso and told the natives either to coerce Masupha to sub
mit or face direct government intervention.

Events were progressing satisfac-

62

torily, believed both Orpen and 5auer, and the latter thought that Loyalists
63
from Maseru appeared on good terms with the rebels.
The secretary, trusting
Letsie to coerce Masupha, refused to personally negotiate the return of cattle
with the rebel leader and judged that Masupha from his own clan and the re
mainder of the tribe derived no support.

Paid by the Cape Government, Letsie,

assumed Sauer, could ’’eat up" Masupha, eject him from Thaba Bosigo, and poli
tically isolate him should that rebel resist, and should the paramount chief
not restrain Masupha, Sauer warned that Basutos might not receive sanction to
64
settle in Quthing and Matatiele Districts.
According to O r p e n , m November*
65
Letsie probably would not act unless supported by soldiers, and Smith contends
59

Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, pp. 174-75.

^ P a l l Mall Gazette (London), October 31, 1881, p. 8.
6lTylden, The Rise of the Basuto, pp. 177-78.
~B.S_.J3. t (1882), XLVII, 200-01, ltr. Sauer to Scanlen, August 30, 1881.
63
Ibid., 200, ltr. Sauer to Scanlen, August 29, 1881.
64
Ibid., 201, ltr. Sauer to Scanlen, August 31, 1881; Ibid., 205, ltr.
Sauer to Scanlen, September 5, 1881.
^ I b i d ., 233, ltr. Orpen to 5auer, November 19, 1881.
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that the tribe would not fight Masupha, because even the Loyalists respected

66

the chief.

Sauer, considering the Basutos naturally indolent, waited patient

ly for their implementation of the Robinson Award provisions.

The secretary

trusted Masupha to comply with the award, and the chief did rob his own clan

68

to pay his cattle fine.

In that the rebels remained predominant, the Loyalists remained hapless,
and some colonial officials misinterpreted the situation, Chief Joel reigned
supreme in Leribe District, and, flushed with his victory in the rebellion,
promised to assist Cape Town if the latter legitimized his position.

Cape

Colony here was rationing food to refugee loyal natives, who returned to
Thlotsi Heights because of insults from their headmen and confiscation by re
bels cf their fieldsf^yet Orpan insisted that rebels were surrendering Loya
list cattle^and that all the reliable natives in the Leribe and Mohales Hoek
71
Districts had returned home.
Masupha, reported newly-promoted Magistrate Da
vies, was the most obnoxious influence in Basutoland and while at Thaba Bosigo
72
precluded peace progress.
Masupha, insisted Magistrate Bell, ruled supreme in
Thaba Bosigo District, harassed loyal chiefs and headmen hitherto protected by
magistrates, as conditions after the armistice had allowed no refugee Loya
lists to return to Thaba Bosigo District, vowed to injure Loyalists attempting
to claim their cattle, and divided Loyalist fields among his own clan.

66

Natives

Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 292.

^ ] 3 . J 5 . , (1882), XLVII, 206, ltr. Sauer to Scanlen, September 9, 1881.
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Ibid., 202, ltr. Sauer to Scanlen, September 2, 1881.

69

Ibid., 250, 253, ltr. Acting magistrate in Leribe District to drpen,
September 30, 1881.
^ Ibid.,

217, ltr.

Sauer to Scanlen, October 2, 1881.

^ ~Xbid.,

226, ltr.

Sauer to Scanlen, October 17, 1881.

^ I b i d .,

259, ltr.

Davies to Orpen, November 26, 1881.
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73
here relapsed into barbarism, and numerous Loyalists left to work in the dia
mond fields.

While Masupha did not follow terms of the Robinson Award, the

chief, indicated Orpen, was rumoring that Scanlen had acknowledged the chief*s
74
full compliance with the award, and Governor Robinson had informed the Colo
nial Office that Masupha had accepted all the peace conditions, which alleged75
ly were being implemented everywhere in Basutoland.
Chief Magistrate Orpen, decrying further obstacles to peace, believed
that Loyalist weakness and rebel resistance stemmed from outside interference
which Cape Town must thwart.

The rebels presumed that Cape Colony, the Orange

Free State, and Great Britain were bickering over Basutoland and that, if the
award failed,

the colony would abandon the Loyalists; therefore, declared Or

pen, the three governments must agree on one course of action.

While colonial

newspapers accentuated dissension in the Scanlen ministry and proposed offer76
ing sanctuary for Loyalists in Quthing and abandoning Basutoland, white agi77
tators warned the hostiles of imminent death and expropriation of rebel land.
Magistrate Alexander C. Bailie, who replaced Arthur Barkly at Mafeteng,
in November reported further rebel illegalities, as did Magistrate Bell, who
suggested remedies.

Bailie deplored the soaring illegal whiskey trade around

78
Mafeteng.
Rebel chiefs, argued Bell, had recovered from the hardships of
their rebellion and defied Cape Town, which must use coercion to restore its
rule, even though the hostiles, who refused to return more stolen Loyalist
73
74
75

Ibid., 254, ltr. Bell to Orpen, October 4, 1881.
Ibid♦, 227, ltr. Sauer to Scanlen, October 17, 1881.
Pall Mall Gazette (London), September 16, 1881, p. 6.

76S.S._P. , (1382), XLVII, 233, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, November 19, 1881.
^ I b i d ., 234, ltr. Grpsn to Sauer, November 29, 1881.
78
Ibid., 261, ltr. Alexander C. Bailie to Orpen, November 29, 1881.
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cattle and once again were employing passive resistance, would meet Government
force with martial resistance.

To sufficiently intimidate Chief Joel and

other rebels and to encourage Loyalists, Magistrate Bell requested 150 more
79

Europeans at Thlotsi Heights.
Chief Joel, regarding further friction in Leribe District and the reac
tion of the Chief Magistrate, reviled Letsie for blocking his inheritance and
80
prompting his rival, Jonathan.
Orpen advised against reinforcing Thlotsi
Heights and hoped that a "new impartial" magistrate would be assigned cases
81
involving disputes over ownership of cattle, whereupon, Magistrate Bailie re82
lieved the disgusted Bell.
Magistrate Surmon, commenting on rebel activities and intimidation of
Loyalists in Mohales Hoek District, alleged that Lerothodi had allowed his
clan to harvest Loyalist crops, had not recovered all Loyalist cattle as pro83
mised, and only belatedly had forced rebel Tembus to return stolen Free State
84
cattle, which Surmon had not attempted to recover because of probable hostile
resistance.

Hostiles and Loyalists still despised each other.

The former

threatened natives who sought to reclaim stock, and rebel chiefs redistributed
Loyalist land to their followers.

5ome returning district Loyalists, after

receiving a sullen reception, migrated out of the country*

Basutos at a

pitso held to discuss war lasses actually connived to aid Masupha, and all

^ Ibid., 258, ltr. Bell to Orpen, November 30, 1881.
fin
Ibid., 237, ltr. Orpen to Molteno, December 2, 1881; Ibid., 246, ltr.
Orpen to Molteno, December 10, 1881.
81
Ibid., 262, ltr. Orpen to 5auer, December 4, 1881.
82
Ibid., 246, ltr. Orpen to Molteno, December 11, 1881.
83
Ibid., 259-60, ltr. Surmon to Orpen, November 30, 1881.
84
Ibid., 263, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, December 23, 1881.
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attending warriors carried unregistered guns.
Concerning the post-war situation in Quthing, Magistrate M. Clarke at
Quthing reported that lands between the Telle and Silver Rivers and cattle
posts further up the Orange River were occupied by Loyalist refugees.

Rebels

86

were encroaching on the inaccessible parts of northeast Quthing.

Secretary Sauer in December, 1881, in relation to Loyalist grievances and
his consequent actions, was startled to see a Loyalist petition accusing him
of inadequate help, and some trustworthy Basutos feared that the Robinson
Award would unfavorably alter their position in the tribe.

Sauer thereupon

insisted that rebels vacate stolen land, did not force Loyalists to return
home, and told loyal natives at Maseru, most of whom desired to return safely
to their original homes, that they might settle in Quthing.

He alleged that

his actions were making more progress against the rebels than had the military
.

87

Campaign.

In December, views of colonial officials focused on how to stifle the re
bels, the situation of whom observers saw differently, and how to handle the
Loyalist predicament.

88

5auer dispatched border patrols to capture smugglers,

89
who Masupha aided.
Magistrate Davies angrily quit, as be believed that only
90
a colonial army by vanquishing the rebels could restore peace.
Letsie and
Lerothodi, according to Davies, refused to coerce Masupha, because the major—
pC
Ibid., 259-60, ltr. Surmon to Orpen, November 30, 1881.

86

Ibid., 267, ltr. M. Clarke, Magistrate of Quthing District, to Orpen,
December 3, 1881.
ft7
Ibid., 234-36, ltr. Sauer to Scanlen, December 2, 1881.
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Ibid., 237, ltr. Sauer to Scanlen, December 4., 1881.
The Times (London), December 6 , 1B81, p. 5.
R,.^.JP. , (1082), XLVII, 262, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, December 4, 1881.
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91
ity of chiefs supported this rebel leader, however, the Chief Magistrate be92
lieved that Letsie and Lerothodi were sincere about restraining Masupha, who
93
allegedly was on unfriendly terms with Lerothodi, who in turn mobilized some
warriors to overawe Masupha,

Orpen reported that Masupha had failed to rally

94
95
a force on Thaba Bosigo, that the Masupha clan had dispersed, that the chiefly
96
household was quarreling, and that Masupha had informed Letsie that the Masu97
pha clan would cooperate, yet Lepogo with 267 warriors joined his father to
98
resist Letsie, and Masupha, contended The Times, harbored a large band of war99
riors and offered to supply anyone with a gun and assegai.
The Chief Magis
trate doubted that the rebel chief even with an armed force could withstand a
siege^and,

until the neutralization of Masupha, legal cases involving cattle

would take a longer time to s e t t l e ^ ^ Disbelieving that the Government would
feed them if they left refugee camps or would keep other promises, the Loya
lists, some of whom exaggerated the rebel influence, by their attitude ham
pered r e conciliation^^ Cape Town, though failing to encourage Loyalists, urged
them to return home to Thaba Bosigo, because compensating them from the cola91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Ibid., 266, ltr. Davies to Orpen, December 6 , 1881.
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(London), January 10, 1882, p. 10.
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nial treasury was proving burdensome.
Chief Bereng, meanwhile, was usurping
authority over the clan of George Moshesh ^ 4
Chief Magistrate Orpen, in that the 5canlen ministry failed to quash re
belliousness in the first phase of reconstruction, definitely had some influ
ence over the Basutos.

Letsie, nevertheless, easily tricked him, while Orpen,

consistently accepting the excuses of the paramount chief for failing, deluded
105
himself into considering his own methods successful.
Cape Town, on the other
hand, had purposely undermined Letsie*s authority because of his duplicity

106

during the war, whereupon, his power over the entire tribe had plummeted.

Lerothodi insolently insisted on the right to grant gun licenses^and Masupha
refused to register his guns, acknowledge his magistrate, and pay taxes.

Tra

ders illegally carted brandy into Basutoland and peddled it openly to desirous
chiefs, and Basutos without passes crossed over the Free State border to visit
numerous Boer saloons, while the helpless magistrates could not enforce the
108
pass law or prevent increased border raids by hostiles.

Cape Colony prestige

109
in Basutoland disappeared, although The Times reported that most of the tribes
men and chiefs wanted peace and the return of the magistrates'^^
Prime Minister Scanlen, not quite realizing the true situation and wary
of future alternatives and British interference, announced that his ministry
did not believe the Basuto situation critical, although rebels had not abided

Ibid., 245-46, ltr. 'Orpen to Molteno, December 7, 1881.
~^ 4 Ibid., 266, ltr. Davies to ®rpen, December 6 , 1881.
105
Theal, South Africa, XI, 71; c f . , Lagden, The Basutos, II, 532,
^ ^ S m i t h , The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 298.
10 I
The Times (London), September 20, 1881, p. 7.
1 0 8 Theal, South Africa, XI, 71-72.
109..
Stevens, Lesotho, etc., p. 28.

^~^The Times (London), September 20, 1 8 8 1 , ^ .
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by the award, mostly because of Masupha.

If Chiefs Letsie and Lerothodi failed,

the ministry by other means would enforce the a w a r d l ^ Cape Colony ultimately
had the following three alternatives: 1) abandon Basutoland, 2) militarily en
force colonial authority, or 3) appeal to.Great Britain to re-establish its
own rule with Imperial troops.

The colonial ministers disliked the first and

third alternatives and, according to Robinson, dismissed hope of success unless
London promised to allow Prime Minister ocanlen without restriction to handle
binding peace terms with the rebels; otherwise, Cape Colony would make no heavy

.-.112

sacrifices.

In appraisal of the first phase of reconstruction, Cape Town should have
cancelled the Robinson Award immediately after initial rebel intransigence, be
cause the hostiles refused to comply with some terms, only partially complied
with others, and promised to but did not fulfill other conditions.
lief in their supreme position was the major obstacle to peace.

Rebel be

Moral force,

as had repeated Gx~iffith at an earlier date, was useless against the Basuto
tribe, and Cape Colony used this policy too long in reconstruction.

The weak

policy made it appear that the rebels had won the war and enhanced their tri
bal position.

No actual reconstruction of the country occurred.

Magistrates

had little power; the more intelligent hard-line magistrates quit in disgust
over the impotent reconstruction policy.

Robinson, Sauer, and Orpen all were

overoptimistic and misunderstood x-ebel motives, and the Secretary for Native
Affairs should have negotiated directly with the fearsome Masupha.

The sanc

tioning of Loyalist emigration to Quthing, and the partial abandonment of loyal
natives, evidenced the timid Scanlen ministry approach.

Exile and disposses-

illB>.S.P., (1832), XLVIX, 264-65, ltr. Scanlen, December 29, 1881.
11?
Ibid., 242, ltr. Robinson to Kimberley, December 29, 1881.
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sion seemed the reward for native loyalty.

Orpen unfairly censured the Loya

list attitude, which he unintentionally helped formulate.

RECONSTRUCTION: SECOND PHASE

The futile colonial efforts during the first phase of reconstruction car
ried over into the second phase.

Chiefs Lerothodi and Joel, in the January,

1882, Basuto expedition planned by Orpen against Thaba Bosigo, assembled their
113
warriors and began to march.
Though native public feeling was amenable to
such a solution and thought Masupha would not resist^^etsie vacillated^and
116
Loyalist Jonathan, contending that other chiefs unanimously supported Masupha,
117
refused to join the expedition.
Tribesmen around Thaba Bosigo joined the ex
pedition as it neared its objective, and Masupha; having begged Letsie for leJ.X8
niency, by the time the expedition had climbed Thaba Bosigo nonetheless had
119
moved his cattle northward.
Orpen, in investigation of and consequent to the useless expedition, re
tained only about one-third of his force after2?he others, fearing reprisals,

121 The Times thought that all the military preparation by Ma-

fled to Masupha.
113
114
115

Ibid., 270, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 4, 1882.
Ibid.. 271, ltr. Urpen to Sauer, January 10, 1882.
Ibid., 271, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 11, 1882.

^ ° The Times (London), February 10, 1S82, p. 3.
^ "^Editorial, New York Timas, February 11, 1882, p. 4.
^"^B..S_._P., (1882), XLVII, 272, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 14, 1882.
119
^
Ibid., 274-75, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 16, 1882.
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Editorial, New York Times, February 11, 1882, p. 4.

J3. S_._P« , (1882), XLVII, 275, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 18, 1882.
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supha merely allowed Letsie to defy the Cape Governmen^and that the rebel chief
123
probably had agreed to allow Letsie to scale Thaba Bosigo.
Gn January 19,
Orpen admitted that Letsie, mouthing ’’empty froth,

124
had shown the cowardice

125
that mostly caused failure for the expedition.
The Chief Magistrate there
upon suggested that other natives pay the fine of Masupha.

Though Orpen or

dered Chief Letsie to seize the cattle herded away by Masupha, Letsie would
not advance unless his sons, some of whom were still in league with Masupha,

126

and others accompanied him, and the paramount chief later refused to attack
127
123
Masupha.
Though the failure of the January expedition had disgraced Basutos,
the loyal chiefs complained of the prolonged hostilities and refused to combat
129
Masupha.
The Chief Magistrate, lashing out and suggesting further action, condemned
Basuto chiefs who collaborated with white troublemakers.

He could not tell

Lerothodi or Joel what, if any, Government assistance to expect should the
130
chiefs fail to subdue Masupha.
He insisted that, with a resolute policy from
Cape Town, he could subdue Masupha in three weeks with only natives, that ano
ther expedition, for which the rebels would have to eventually pay, would at
tract to it Loyalists seeking to reclaim their property, and that declarations

122
123
124

The Times (London), January 10, 1882, p. 10.
Ibid., January 25, 1882, p. 5.
Lagden, The Basutos, II, 526.

125

H.«,S.£L , (1883) , XLIX: ’’Further Correspondence Respecting the Cape Colo
ny and Adjacent Territories,” 12, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 22, 1682.
126
B_.S_.FL, (1882), XLVII, 275-76, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 18, 1802.
127
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Ibid., 49, ltr. Loyal chiefs to Orpen, February 8 , 1882.
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of support from London and the Orange Free State would prevent renewed f igh131
ting.
Orpen still believed it wiser to allow Letsie rather than regular
troops to coerce Masupha’!’^
Governor Robinson, moreover, reporting new Scanlen ministry proposals in
the face of British hindrance, informed Lord Kimberley that British restric
tions on Cape Colony, with which the rebels were acquainted, prohibited the
colonial ministry from submitting to the Cape Parliament a proposal for pos
sible renewal of hostilities.

Regarding the present situation as intolerable,

the ministry therefore offered to the Cape Parliament the following sugges
tions: 1) abandonment of Basutoland north of the Orange River, 2) repeal of the
Basutoland Annexation Act of 1S7I, and 3) satisfaction of Loyalist claims by
land grants in Quthing, which would remain an integral portion of Cape Colony,
and elsewhere, together with colonial compensation for their losses.

The ef

fect of withdrawing colonial rule over Basutoland, especially the effect on
Basuto-Free State relations, weighed on the ministers, however, to uphold au
thority was impossible while rebels believed themselves protected from the con133
sequences of their rebellion, and the ministry believed useless further attempts
to assert in Basutoland rule which the governor was forbidden to enforce or to
burden itself with the expenses of maintaining order under severely restricted
134
responsible government.
Lord Kimberley, disagreeing with some of the proposals, advised Robinson
not to withdraw colonial rule from Basutoland, because London would not res131
132
133

, (1883), XLIX, 12-13, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, January 22, 1882.
Ibid., 32, ltr. Orpen to 5auer, February 4, 1882.
B_.S_._P., (1882), XLVII, 268, ltr. Robinson to Kimberley, January 25,

1882.
^^Theal,

South Africa, XI, 72-73.
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tore order north of the Orange River, and because abandonment would endanger
the security of other 5outh African Bantu, cause problems with the Orange Free
135
State, and nullify the colonial efforts to civilize the Basutos.
Governor Robinson, in the revision of colonial policy and with only par
tial British cooperation, reported that after his ministers had confiscated
all of the territory south of the Orange River, proceeds from the disposal of
Quthing as waste Crown land would compensate Loyalists, traders, and others.
Morth of the Orange River, Cape Town would confiscate land of the rebellious
and reluctantly enforce the law, as otherwise, in subsequent fighting, the
Free State would annihilate the Basutos.

The Scanlen ministry asked the Home

136
Government to allow just colonial punishment for Basuto offenses, but Kimberley
agreed only to possible cancellation of the Robinson Awarci^followed by punish
ment of offenders by reasonable confiscation, and did not grant freedom of ac133
tion to Cape Town, which therefore could not force the Basutos to obey.
Objections attended to forced Basuto collective acceptance of the Robin139
son Award and its deadline on March 15.
Loyal chiefs affirmed their accep140
tance of the award and alleged that Robinson ignored their advice.
The ulti141 _
matum, announced Magistrate Bailie, made Letsie disconsolate.
ihe Chief
Magistrate complained that this short notice seemed impractical in the con—

^ * ^ 3 . P * , (1882), XLVII, 268-69, ltr. Kimberley to Robinson, February 2,
1882; c f ., Theal, South Africa, XI, 58.
136
B .S^.P,., (1882), XLVII, 273, ltr. Robinson to Kimberley, February 6 ,
1882; cf., 13.EL
, (1883), XLIX, 25, ltr. Scanlen, February 6 , 1882.
137
B_. _P«» (1882), XLVII, 2 6 8 , ltr. Robinson to Kimberley, February 2,
1882; Ibid., 274, ltr. Kimberley to Robinson, February 9, 1882.
13 8
Theal, South Africa, XI, 74.
139
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XLIX, 37-38, ltr. Sauer to Orpen, February 13, 1882.

Ibid., 49, ltr. Loyal chiefs to Orpen, February 8 , 1882.

^ ^ I b i d . , 40, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, February 17, 1882.
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fused tribal situation, in which the only viable tribal government consisted
of a few desperate rebel leaders who jealously commanded a factious mob and who
could not enforce the award; some either refused obedience outright or slyly
142
hid their spoils.
Although pleading that the tribe feared other alternatives,
143
Orpen received no extension for the ultimatum.
While the Chief Magistrate, faced with the possibility of militarily
handling the crisis, noted that the deteriorating situation might soon neces»
sitate the recall of small garrisons from Basutoland via the Orange Free State,
which probably would not allow more troops passage after this withdrawal be144
cause of anger in the Volksraad over the Basuto situation, a military predica-*
ment would arise if the Free State did not furnish a troop corridor.

As the

Basutos were as resolute against confiscation as disarmament, Orpen wanted to
evacuate all the magistrates from Basutoland before troops entered the terri—
145
tory in force and evacuate all whites, Loyalists, and ammunition from Mafeteng,
146
which he believed an untenable position.
Moving forward a regiment of Im
perial troops would restore confidence and quash Masupha, and Jonathan approved
147
of dispatching Loyalists to Berea Mountain to act as a military reserve.
Cape
Town use of armed force to reorganize and protect the tribe, said the Chief
Magistrate, would cause opposition to vanish without inordinate expense or
148
risk and seemed the only method to gain Loyalist support.
142
143

Ibid., 38, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, February 15, 1882.
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In addition, as the noxious ’'Mabille Ring” in this dire crisis again
meddled, the reverend Mabille supposedly asked Masupha to surrender^^dvocated
ejection from Basutoland of whites who incited violence^and allegedly aided
151
the position of Orpen.
All the chiefs, according to Mabille, feared that
abandonment would lead to their fighting the Orange Free State.

The pastor

condemned the proposed confiscation of Quthing and rebel land and suggested a
policy of patience.

He considered the award successfully completed but dis-

152
liked the compensation provision.
Still assuming that Basutoland was a
directly-ruled British possession, the PES in July, 1B82, requested London to
have elected a Cape Parliament which would accomplish the Basuto reconstruction
and to allow the French missionaries to halt the liquor traffic and again
teach schooll^^
As affairs further degenerated, war became imminent except in Leribe Dist
rict.

The hostiles, willing to die to retain their ancestral property and

believing that the Queen wanted a resumption of hostilities, again contrived
154
to rebel against the unprepared Cape Colony.
While Masupha was fighting Joel
for paying the hut tax^and was urging Basutos to fight^ 5£bief Mama and other
chiefs operated saloons in their villages and were not permitting officials
to fine liquor smugglers.
149
150
151
152
153
,354
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Magistrates were unprepared to repel assaults^^nd

Ibid., 40, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, February 18, 1882.
Ibid., 63, ltr. Mabille to Sauer, March 25, 1882.
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 179.
I3.5_._P., (1883), XLIX, 55, ltr. Mabille to 5auer, March 12, 1882,
Ibid., 82, ltr. Pt5 to Colonial Office, July 5, 1B82.
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The Times (London), April 1, 1882, p. 7.
5_.JP. , (1083), XLIX, 52, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, March 5, 1882.
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Chief Jonathan was placed in "protective custody.”
Furthermore, land speculators told the Basutos not to trust the colony or
159
pay fines, and rambunctious whites from disbanded irregular array units promoted
renewed conflict by intriguing and influencing the press against the Scanlen
ministry.

The Opposition in the Cape Parliament used the anarchy to undermine

the ministry^and ridiculed Scanlen and Sauer as negrophiles^^
Regarding new ex-rebel initiatives and the criticism by Orpen of colonial
policy facing the odious outlook, Chief Lerothodi maintained that only puni
shing the recalcitrant by fines could restore control^lnd sought Government
support for himself to coerce Masupha without confiscation.

Chief Letsie, who

163
stalled for more time, desired support from Imperial troops.
Orpen wanted to

164

revoke the confiscation orders but discouraged further amnesty.

The Robinson

Award, he maintained, was unconstitutional, recognized colonial power that did
not exist, and enforced taxes strange to the t r i b e ^ ^ Some chiefs obviously
with reservations had accepted the award, others had accepted unwillingly or
under duress, and some like Masupha, gaining sympathy and halp from other
166
chiefs all the while, had awaited the first opportunity to resist the award.
He refused to respect Letsie, appeared mentally deranged^and later informed

159
159
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a delegation of Letsie, Lerothodi, Mana, and Mabille that he would make peace
but not pay his hut tax, §fter which the delegation denounced h i n u ^ A l l the
Basuto chiefs felt confident of subduing Masupha with only the help of the
• + * 169
magistrates.
Frustrated Prime Minister Scanlen, in new steps, disavowed confiscation
of land and renewed hostilities except as reluctant and remote alternatives.
A commission would investigate Loyalist grievances and the advisability of
both Basuto local self-government and their representation in the Cape Parlia170
ment.
For allegedly showing cowardice in these latest steps, the Cape Argus
171
condemned the ministry.
Climaxing this period of reconstruction, Scanlen
cancelled the Robinson Award and repealed the PPA on April 6 and determined to
172
colonize Quthing with whites and abandon the remainder of Basutoland.
Never
theless, while the Legislative Council at Cape Town voted 14-6 to repeal the
Basutoland Annexation A c t ^ i h e House Assembly by a 34-23 vote rejected aban174
.
175
donment, and London refused to relieve Cape Colony of Basuto responsibility.
Concerning alleviation of Loyalists and further misconduct by rebels after
these announcements, though Chief Jonathan in May ejected a rebel wardmaster
1T6
from Leribe District and redistributed rebel land to Loyalists, and although
16 8
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169 t
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(-erothodi reassigned village rights to Loyalistsf^eorge Moshesh collected 100
loyal Basutos to migrate to Matatiele.

Cape Colony already had settled Loya-

178
list refugees from Mafeteng and Mohales Hoek elsewhere.
Disgusted natives
detested such chiefly tyranny as the embezzlement by Chiefs Bereng and Mama of
179
most of the hut tax paid these chiefs.
Masupha in June overran the village
ISO
of Loyalist Chief 5ofonia.
Letsie, who wanted colonial protection without
loss of more independence, secretly encouraged Masupha.
As Basuto magistrates watched helplessly, a year-long cattle and inheri-

181

tance conflict erupted between Chiefs Jonathan and Joel in November, 1882.

Numerous Basuto refugees fled into the Orange Free State, whose inhabitants
they aggravated, and the rival clans destroyed villages, stole cattle, and en182
gaged in armed clashes.
Masupha threatened Jonathan so seriously that the
183
latter abandoned most of Leribe District, and in May, 1883, President Brand re
fused to allow Jonathan to herd cattle, many of which were diseased or stolen,
184
into Boer territory.
Basuto magistrates, according to Chief Magistrate Orpen,

^ ^ Ibid., 77, ltr.

Deputy-Acting Chief Magistrate to Sauer, May

17, 1882.

^^ I b i d .,
178r
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Ibid.,
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29, 1882.

81, ltr.

92, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, July 2, 1882.
81, ltr. Deputy-Acting Chief Magistrate to Sauer, May 29, 1882.
91, ltr. Orpen to Sauer, July 2, 1882.
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Lagden, The Basutos, II, 539.
104
,

* (1883), XLVIII, 349, ltr. Brand to Blyth, May 17, 1883.

203
185

deserted Jonathan and advocated abandonment of Basutoland.

The Scanlen ministry, in conclusion, still treating the rebels too le
niently, neither could expect tribal self-government in view of divisiveness
and anarchy in the tribe and colonial abandonment of Loyalists nor could seek
to employ British troops without accepting more British interference.

Chief

Magistrate Orpen did not realize for too long, and the Loyalists with justifi
cation detested, the futility of using a "Basuto against Basuto'* method to
bring peace.

The rebels were still as rebellious as before the war and waited

for exasperation to undermine Cape rule.

Lerothodi aided reconstruction only

because he feared the paramountcy of Masupha.

Ignorant Pastor Mabille betrayed

the Loyalists.
British interference with the restoration of strict colonial rule made
Cape Town weary of Basuto responsibilities and eager to find a simple, if ex
pedient solution.

Lord Kimberley restricted colonial options yet unfairly ex

pected Cape Colony to handle the necessary responsibility and control over the
Basutos.

tfCHINESE" GORDON AND BASUTO RECONSTRUCTION

Colonel Charles G. Gordon, who came to Cape Colony on a military mission
in 1881, had produced a plan for the reorganization of and economization in the
Cape army, a plan never acceptecl^DecausB of opposition by Prime Minister Scan187
len.
Scanlen on March 3, 18B2, contacted Gordon about the reconstruction
i pir

_B.5_.FL, (1883), XLIX, 163, Annual Report of Chief Magistrate Orpen for
1882, January 12, 1883.
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Archibald Forbes, Chinese Gordon (New York: John B. Alden, 1884), p.
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situation in Basutoland and requested his assistance.

The Scanlen ministry,

189

alleges Tylden, wanted to shift some of its Basuto responsibility onto Gordon.
"Chinese '1 Gordon, in his initial views of the Basuto crisis, denounced

London for allowing Cape Colony to annex Basutolancl^and contended that the Ba
sutos had unjustly lost land notwithstanding treaties of guarantee and had
lost rights.

After a colonial commission examined Loyalist claims, Gordon

wanted the Imperial Government to pay indemnity to Loyalists at a tribal pitso
191
in order to rid Cape Colony of one burden.
Scanlen ignored these suggestions.
An admirer of the Basuto tribe, Colonel Gordon believed that the Cape Govern—
192
ment was trying to sow dissension among the chiefs in order to stifle them.
From Basutoland he wanted immediately to withdraw military forces and magis193
trates, leaving only three officials to advise the chiefs.
To maintain
troops in Basutoland was too expensive, and the Orange Free State could block
the only line of retreat.

Though isolated garrisons, in the opinion of Gorr? -

194
don, could offer little resistance to the Basutos, bcanlen expected a large
18 T
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officials, in order to crush the tribe, secretly wanted to escalate the rival
ry between Lerothodi and Masupha into another civil war, De Kiewiet, The Im
perial Factor, p. 290.
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Bisuto war in the future and intended to refortify Basuto magistracies.
Gor
don in July planned to visit Basutoland under the guise of inspecting the re
maining troops in order to make peace v/ith M a s u p h a ^ ^
Regarding the initial reception, ideas, and warnings of Gordon upon his
arrival in Basutoland on September 2, 1882, he bewildered, then angered offi
cials.

Secretary for Native Affairs Sauer, Orpen, Gordon, Magistrate Rolland,

the Reverend Mabille, Letsie, Lerothodi, Mama, Tsekelo, Nehemiah, and other
chiefs attended a pitso at Morija on September 16.

Sauer insisted that Basu

tos act peacefully, obey their magistrates, and pay their

hut tax.

He berated

Letsie for not controlling his sons or explaining disorder but endorsed the new
military stance of the paramount chief against Masupha.

Gordon explained his

own desire to make peace and advised that Cape Town would crush Masupha if that
197
chief resisted.
Basutos in thousands converged on the pitso to meet "Chinese''
198
Gordon, and, although he told the tribesmen of his auxiliary role under Sauer,
the natives regarded Gordon as of superior rank and ignored the Secretary for
199
Native Affairs.
Colonel Gordon criticized Cape Town for not motivating the.
paramount chief and believed that Lerothodi would assume an attitude like that
of Masupha if the former crushed the rebel chief.
the rivalry between Lerothodi and Masupha.

The colonel sought to end

In a future Basuto war, Cape Colony

would have to fight embittered Loyalists; thus, Gordon cautioned that Cape
Town, to pacify the tribe, not press Letsie to attack Masupha, replace all Ba
suto magistrates, allow Basuto police to replace the CMR garrisons, and allow
195
19b
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198
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200

the tribe internal self-government.

Colonel Gordon, according to Smith, con

sidered the Basutos as persecuted "dear black lambs of the Savior."

Alleging

201

that Chief Magistrate Orpen evoked almost no confidence from the Basutos,

202

Gordon suggested the removal of the chief magistrate.

"Chinese" Gordon, next visiting Chief Masupha atop Thaba Bosigo, voiced
unwillingness there to fight the tribe and promised not to incite other chiefs
against Masupha.

The colony, said Gordon, would allow the Boers to overrun

2^2
204
Basutoland if the tribe refused to pay its taxes.
The chief stalled.
As the conduct of Gordon and colonial officials alienated each other,
205
Secretary Sauer relieved him from the Basuto mission.
Gordon simultaneously
quit all his dutiefPover the objections of S a u e r ^ ^ Believing the Gordon posi
tion not conducive to the colonial welfare, Prime Minister Scanlen gladly ac2 qq

cepted the resignation.

According to Sauer, Gordon had offered Masupha bet-

209

ter terms than the Government had promised.

Colonel Gordon, in turn, denied
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Ibid♦, 300, ltr. Gordon to Sauer, September 27, 1882; cf., Forbes,
Chinese Gordon, p. 187.
2 G ^3_.S_-i
P. , (1883),

XLVIII, 301, ltr. Sauer to Gordon, September 28, 1882.

hnQ
Ibid., 302, ltr. Scanlen to Gordon, October 5, 1882.
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Ibid., 299, ltr. Sauer to Garcia, Peptember 26, 1882.
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that Sauer had a set policy or that the secretary had given him written instruc
tions which limited negotiations^Sut later admitted to purposely disregarding
2XX
Government orders and acting on his own initiative.
Gordon, contends Lagden,
improperly consulted the French missionaries, was ignorant of Basuto affairs,
and sent notes to Masupha which compromised the Cape position.

The meeting

between Gordon and Masupha angered Lerothodi, the royal heir-apparent^ who,
with Secretary Sauer, in the meantime had led an armed force to crush Masupha.
213
Cowardly attendant chiefs, however, caused the expedition to fail.
Though
Sauer, felt Gordon, had betrayed him by disavowing warlike intentions and then
marching against Masupha, the colonel offered to remain as magistrate with Ma214
supha for two years.
While Sauer was alleged to have consented reluctantly,
Gordon indicated that the secretary had persuaded him to visit Masupha.

Smith

condemns Secretary Sauer for launching an assault on Masupha before realizing
the results of the Gordon visit but denies that this strategy endangered the
215
colonel, who received notification.
Masupha, according to one author, did
2X 6
not kill Gordon for suspected treachery, despite advice to the contrary, out
another author reveals a threat by the chief to murder the colonel?"^ Chief

210

Ibid., 303, ltr. Gordon to Scanlen, October 11, 1882.

211

Ibid., 308, ltr. Gordon to Scanlen, October 16, 1882; cf., Theal, South
Africa, XI, 76.
21 ?
Lagden, The Basutos, II, 534-35; c f ., -B.SLP., (1883), XLVIII, 303,
Memorandum of Hook, October 16, 1982.
213
Theal, South Africa, XI, 75; cf., Wortham, Chinese Gordon, p. 237; c f .,
Lord Godfrey Elton, Gordon of Khartoum
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955),.p.
255.
, (1883), XLVIII, 306, 308, ltr. Gordon to Molteno, October 8 ,
1882.
J5mith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, pp. 311-12.
2l6

Sir William F. Butler, Charles George Gordon
Ltd., 1099), p. 183.

(London: Macmillan &. Co.,

208
Magistrate Orpen later warned Gordon to stop interfering in the renewed figh2X8
ting between Jonathan and Joel.
Cape Town, despite this friction, later in219
corporated Gordon proposals to support Lerothodi and isolate Masupha.
The Government, in reflection, from the beginning thwarted and compromised
the position of Gordon, who, although he intelligently sought to bargain with
the supreme Masupha, wanted Cape Town to capitulate to the rebels and abandon
Loyalists.

THE BASUTOLAND LOSSES COMMISSION

In handling the prolonged predicament of white traders in Basutoland, who
had resided under the control of Basuto chiefs since the end of the war and
had made little profit22?he Scanlen ministry on July 24, 1882, appointecl2a
four-member Basutoland Losses Commission, which included Colonel Charles Griffit£2!nd Cecil Rhodes, to investigate wartime losses of Loyalists and white
traders.

The commission subsequently recommended payment of 3LlQ4,156 to Laya223

lists and £.42,316 to the traders, after traveling to Maseru, Thlotsi ^eights,
Mafeteng, Mohales Hoek, and Alwyn's Kop, and the deputation on May 16, 1883,
made its recommendations to Governor Robinson.

Rhodes, in a minority report,
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Lawrence and Elizabeth Hanson, Chinese Gordon
(New York: Funk 8. Wagnalls Company, 1954), p. 175.
218
2 1 8 B .h .P . , (1883), XLIX, 107, ltr. Orpen to bauer, December 2, 1882.
219
Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 181.

220

221
222
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Ibid.,

pp.

183-84.

Michell, Rhodes, II, 132.
5mith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 303.
Theal, South Africa, XI, 74-75.
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objected to proposals for compensation to traders.

Traders, he continued,

in

native wars always had undergone hardships, and their military and material aid
in the rebellion did not warrant reimbursement, because Prime Minister Sprigg
had not guaranteed compensation to traders who sustained losses in the war
zone, and because other states in such circumstances had not compensated mer224
225
chants.
Rhodes prevailed; the traders received no indemnification.
As these traders, in impartial appraisal, helped maintain order and of
fered protection until colonial troops arrived to handle the rebellion, the
merchants deserved reimbursement, and Cape Town shamefully abandoned them once
more to the mercy of Basuto chiefs.

224
225

Michell, Rhodes, II, 137-40; c f ., Williams, Rhodes, p. 64.
Williams, Rhodes, p. 64.

CHAPTER VII

BASUTOLAND REVERTS TO BRITISH RULE

De Kiewiet, in that temperament persisted in Cape Colony to relegate more
Basuto obligations, believes that Cape Town wanted to disannex Basutoland, be
cause London had prohibited colonial farmers from seizing rebel land, and be
cause Basutoland traders only under British protection could regain native
customers!- As early as May, 1881, a motion in the colonial legislature had
called for the disannexation of Basutoland, and another had proposed the Im-

2

perial takeover of that territory.

When in the January, 1833, Cape Parliamen

tary session, the Scanlen ministry, having been rebuffed in 1882, proposed
«

that Cape Colony unilaterally abandon responsibility for the internal govern
ment of Basutoland and only retain control of Basuto external affairs because
3
of responsibility to the Grange Free State, the legislature accepted the pro.4
posal.
As Cape Town sought to apply its new system of management over Basuto af
fairs, on March 17, 1883, Captain Matthew Smith Blytf? replaced Joseph Orpen as
Chief Magistrate, an action necessitated by the change in colonial policy.

To

Basutoland traveled both Prime Minister Scanlen and Secretary Sauer to secure
peace, and at Matsieng and Thlotsi Heights they held pitsos in order to sample

^Be Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor, p. 291.

2

_B.]3._P. , (1881), LXVII, 614, ltr. Robinson to Kimberley, May 22, 1881.
3
_3.S_._P. , (1883), XLIX, 117, ltr, Robinson to the Earl of Derby, January
19, 1883; c f ., Lagden, The Basutos, II, 540; c f . , Theal, South Africa, XI, 76.
4
Lagden, The Basutos, II,'540.
5
» P* *^2. Blyth: Born in Norfolk, England, Blyth joined the
British Army, served in the Indian Mutiny and in the West Indies, and fought
in Cape Colony frontier campaigns until his retirement in 1866.
He later be
came a British magistrate in Fingoland, Griqualand East, and Transkei.
210

211
Basuto opinion.

While Masupha and his supporters ignored the pitsos, Letsie

and his upholders attended, complained about abandonment, and requested Impe
rial rule?

After numerous indecisive pitsos and much patience, Bcanlen threa

tened to abandon all Basuto responsibilities if the tribe did not act orderly
and accept the following terms: 1 ) a constitution to govern the tribe, 2 } a
council of just and humane chiefs and headmen to administer internal selfgovernment, 3) the judgement of civil and criminal cases involving only whites
by the chief magistrate, 4) the judgement of cases involving whites and Basu
tos and murder cases by magistrates and chiefs, 5) the expenditure in the
country of all Basuto tax money, 6 ) reduction of the ;Ll hut rax to 10s. if the
council and economy would permit, and 7) the inclusion of Quthing District in
Basutoland.

On April 25, at a national pitso held by Blyth to obtain an an

swer to the conditions, Letsie accepted, but the absent Masupha insulted the
Chief MagistrateJ other chiefs ignored the terms, and'one-third of the tribe
remained recalcitrant; thus, the Bcanlen mission failed?

Although Pastor Ma-

9
bille urged acceptance of the terms and condemned Masupha, according to Chief
Magistrate Blyth, Basutoland

was financially bankrupt, and Cape

Colony by set

ting chief against chief had alienated the t r i b a l
The Scanlen ministry, regarding the British reaction to the colonial de
sire to hand over Basutoland to Imperial rule, sent John X. Merriman, in his

^Theal, South Africa, XI, 77; c f ., Lagden, The Basutos, II, 541.
^Lagden, The Basutos, II, 541-42; c f . , Theal, South Africa, XI, 77; cf.,
Ashton, The Basuto, pp. 217-19; cf., Brookes. History of Native Policy, p.
105.
°Theal, South Africa, XI, 77-78; cf., B .5.P., (1883), XLIX, 149, ltr.
Blyth to Sauer, April 25, 1883.
9
Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 315.
1 0 3.S_.P. , (1S83),

XLIX,

148, ltr. Blyth to Sauer, April

7, 1883.
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capacity as Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works, to England^wh e r e ha
suggested that the Imperial Government administer all native dependencies of

12

Cape Colony and that this colony and Natal help enforce the law.

The Earl of

Derby, having succeeded Kimberley at the Colonial Office, warned that Cape
Town would have to furnish officials and pay Basuto customs duties to the High
Commissioner.

Though at first he agreed to only temporary British control of

13
Basuto obligations, Derby on June 4 told the British Parliament of his fear
that anarchy in Basutoland would spread to other native districts and did not
want to expel the tribe from the British Empire just because the Basutos pre
sented a problem.

Cape Town and the tribe, he added, would pay for most of

14
the alteration in rule, and Basutos would enjoy internal self-government.
Merriman, because Cape Colony on British-condoned Basuto policy already .had
15
spent vast sums, balked at the British stipulations.
British sanction received, the Cape Parliament on June 27, 1883, formally
disannexed Basutoland, thereby provoking dissatisfaction^ Cecil Rhodes on
July 18 spoke in the House Assembly against Basuto home rule, which he believed
would further anarchy and alienate the Orange Free S t a t e d The conservative

, (1B83), XLVIII, 323, Scanlen minute, April 30, 1893.

12

pp.

Ibid., 338, Merriman memorandum; c f ., Brookes, History of Native Policy,
105-06.

_P., (1883), XLVIII, 341, ltr. Derby to Acting-Governor L. Smyth,
June, 1883; c f ., Theal, South Africa, XI, 78; cf., Lagden, The Basutos, II,
551; c f ., Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 318.
^ Hansard, 3rd ser., Vol. 280 (1883), 522-24, Earl of Derby speaking,
June 14, 1883.
15
B_.J5._P. , (1883), XLVIII, 343, ltr. Merriman to Colonial Office, June 11,
1883,
Theal, South Africa, XI, 79.
^Vindex,

Cecil Rhodes, pp. 45, 48, 50.
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Afrikaner faction in the Cape Parliament deplored the spread of British author
ity in South Africa, especially in Basutoland.. Jan Hofmeyr so virulently op
posed disannexation that he plotted, though unsuccessfully, with the Free
State to overrun Basutoland so that Boers could seize farmland end extend their
18
influence in South Africa.
A native administration in Basutoland was repug
nant to Hofmeyr, whose faction became dominant in the newly-elected Parliament
19

and ultimately caused the fall of the Scanlen ministry.

The Colonial Jffice in November, 1883, with admonition from within, lis
ted the conditions under which Britain would manage Basutoland.

The tribe

would have to acknowledge British rule, pay taxes, and obey the laws and com
mands of the High Commissioner, and the Grange Free 5tate would have to promise
not to allow raids into Basutoland and to arrest by itself Basutos who commit
ted crimes in Boer territory.

Cape Town would have to pay in quarterly in

stallments to London £.20,000 annually for Basuto administration, provide 2 or
3 magistrates at a total cost of i.5,000 a year to help the High Commissioner,
and pay a mounted police force about £.15,000 annually?*"* Governor Robinson,
however, counseled Lord Derby that Cape Town must provide at least £20,000 and
the tribe &JLD,00Q a year for Basuto administration, £.20,000 for the police, and
£.5,000 for the jails?'*'
Chief Letsie, in the tribal reaction to the British offer, called a na-

22

tional pitso on November 29, 1883, where Aciing-Governor L. Smyth informed the
18

Williams, Cecil Rhodes, p. 6 6 ; New York Times, August 10, 1883, p. 6 ;
c f ., Smith, The Mabilles of Basutoland, p. 313.
19
Smith, The Mabilles. of Basutoland, pp. 313, 319.

20

> (1884), LVI: "Further Correspondence Respecting the Cape Colony
and Adjacent Territories," 544-45, ltr. Herbert to Robinson, November 12, 1883.

21
22

Ibid., 546, ltr. Robinson to Herbert, November 13, 1883.
Ibid., 548, ltr. Smyth to Derby, November 16, 1883.
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notables that London had given the tribe the choice of either reverting to
British rule as proclaimed in 1868 or returning to independence.

Derby in a

telegram censured the tribe for its lack of gratitude and broken promises and
said that, though Britain had no obligation to g W e r n the Basutos, he feared
23
for a Basuto future without British protection. Letsie, his sons, and thirtythree other chiefs signed an agreement accepting 3ritish rule, and Chief Joel
accepted belatedly.

Chief Magistrate Blyth believed that Masupha, who with

his followers snubbed the meeting, represented about one-third of the tribe
24
that wanted independence, and the chief on December 5 at his own pitso preven
ted from speaking those natives who desired British rule and promised to de25
fend himself against Imperial troops.
Tribal misbehavior during the alteration in Basuto rule once again annoyed
the Orange Free State in the face of British dereliction and Cape Colony in
dictments of Doers.

Derby absolved himself of responsibility towards guarding

the Basuto-Free State border as prescribed by the Treaty of Aliwal North

’.

26

(1869), even though the Boers captured Basuto offenders in their territory

27
and helped maintain order on the frontier.
Though President Brand complained
about British failure to uphold the Aliwal treaty, Derby insisted that Cape
28
Colony enforce the pact.
In April, 1883, a band of warriors threatened to
23

Ibid., 549, ltr. Derby to Smyth, November 24, 1883; cf., Stevens,
Lesotho, etc., p. 28.
2 4 3 .S .P ., (1884), LVI, 551, ltr. Smyth to Derby, n.d., r. December 2,
1S83; Ibid., 552, ltr. Smyth to Derby, n.d., r. December 5, 1883; c f ., Theal,
South Africa, XI, 79.

» (1884), LVI, 553, ltr. Smyth to Derby, n.d., r. December 12,
1883; c f ., Tylden, The Rise of the Basuto, p. 185.
^ k j j . , (1883), XLVIII, 340-41, ltr. Derby to Smyth, June, 1883.
2 ^ Ihid., 342,

ltr. Merriman to Colonial Office, June 11, 1883.

^ L a g d e n , The B asutos, II, 542, 547, 551.
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29
cross into the Free State to recover cattle stolen by Chief Jonathan, and Basuto marauders, complained Brand in May, were depositing their families in the
30
Free State and returning to fight in Basutoland. While one Boer field cornet
/

considered the border predicament intolerable, as Basutos encamped on Boer
31
farms and, armed and insolent, incited Free State natives, Magistrate Bailie
said that some Boer farmers encouraged Basutos across the frontier and that
the native refugees, their numbers decreasing, had paid for their refugee
32
sites.
After Chief Magistrate Blyth compiled a list of Boers who sold whiskey,
33
some of it poisonous, to Basutos in the Free State, Brand in August acted
34
against his countrymen illegally selling whiskey on the border. Blyth further
35
charged Boers with arming the dissidents against Letsie, and Cecil Rhodes ac
cused irresponsible Boers living on the border of encouraging Basutos to rebel
36
again.
President Brand in November prepared but hesitated to dispatch an armed
37
fores to the border.
Dn March 18, 1884, concerning the implementation of British rule and its
consequences, a British Order-in-Council promulgated the Basutoland Disannexa-

, (1883), XLVIII, 354, ltr. Lepogo Masupha to W. H. Van Andel,
April 4, 1883.
^ Ibid♦,

352, ltr. Brand

to Smyth, May 10, 1883.

3 1 B .S .P .,

(1884), LVI, 526, ltr. Brand to Smyth,

July 12, 1883.

^ Ibid., 529, ltr. Bailie to Blyth, July 23, 1883.
33
Ibid., 534, ltr. bauer to Molteno, July 26, 1883; Ibid., 535, ltr.
Blyth to 5auar, June 11, 1883.
34
Ibid.,
537, ltr. Brand to Smyth, August 27, 1883.
^~*Ibid. .
538, ltr. Blyth to Sauer, September 30,
1883.;
36
Vindex, Cecil Rhodes, p. 49.
37
J3.5_._P. f (1884), LVI, 562, ltr. Smyth to Derby, n.d., r. January 15,
1884.
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tion Act (Infra, App. A, p. 221), and Lieutenant-Colonel Marshal James

38
Clarke,

in the establishment of direct Imperial rule, became resident commissioner of
39
Bssutaland.
Clarke, sympathetic to the Basutos, earned the respect of both
40
natives and the Cape Government.
Directly responsible to the High Commissioner,
he held the chiefs to account by allowances and initiated external British
control as the price of protection.

The Basutos, however, lost their right of

41
42
individual land ownership, and Masupha still sought independence and, trium43
phant, ignored commands of his new rulers, who excused his stubbornness.
Greswell, in Commentary on the British resumption of rule in Basutoland,
says that London believed that British rule was more beneficial than colonial
administration for nativss.

As colonial authority in the future undoubtedly

would control South African natives, Greswell considers the reversion to Bri44
tish jurisdiction as regressive, and Aylward indicates displeasure that British
taxpayers had to protect natives with whom they had no interest and from whom
45
they could gain no advantage.
Bcanlen, in conclusion, offering Quthing to the Basutos as a bribe and
TQ

Who Was Who 1897-1915 (London: 1935), p. 140.
Clarke: Starting his po
litical and military career in South Africa, Clarke served as resident magis
trate at Pietermaritzburg, Natal, in 1874, fought in the First Anglo-Boer War,
and became Commissioner of the Cape Police in 1882.
After his army retire
ment in 1882, Clarke became resident commissioner of Basutoland from 1884-93,
acting administrator in Zululand from 1893-98, and resident commissioner of
Southern Rhodesia from 1898-1905.
^ T h e a l , South Africa, XI, 79.
40
Lagden, The Basutos, II, 559.
4 1 Tyiden,
4 ^Theal,

The Rise of the Basuto, p. 186.
South Africa, XI, 80.

4 ^Lagden,

The Basutos, II, 5S8.

4 4 Greswell,

45

Aylward,

Our South African Empire, II, 98, 104.
''Basuto,'* p. 341.
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otherwise capitulating to the tribe, nevertheless failed.

Frustrated, and ham

strung by British interference, the Cape pushed final Basuto responsibility
back onto Britain, much to the delight of some Basutos, who perceived British
rule as lenient.

London wanted to rule Basutoland, as before, without the

burdens-of financial and local administrative responsibility and evidenced
weakness by assuming Basuto obligations without gaining control over the entire
tribe.

Loyalists and internal tribal reforms were sacrificed to the whims of

chiefly tyranny.

The Boers and their Cape supporters, moreover, were justi

fied in opposing renewed British rule, as London ignored its treaty commit
ments.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This work examines a significant period of Basuto relations with Capa Co
lony and the British Empire.

In 1883, as in 1868, the Basuto tribe success

fully called for and received British protection in order to escape merited
punishment for causing troubled

Overwhelming evidence points to a premeditated

2

civil war and rebellion a 3 the true nature of the conflict, which did not re3
medy either Basuto or colonial grievances.

In the confused aftermath of the

war and in the complicated peace negotiations, the rebels won much that they
had lost before and during the war and manipulated Great Britain against Cape
Colony or took advantage of the divisiveness between Cape Town and London in
4
order to regain lax Imperial rule.
Of further significance is the failure of the Imperial Government and Cape
Colony between 1868 and 1884 to enforce their rule in Basutoland, causing de5
jection among loyal natives, recalcitrance in disloyal Basutos, and anarchy,
and making the much lauded and much debated British policy of indirect rule,
which applied to Basutoland from 1884

to eventual independence in 1966, seem

^Supra., p. 1 , n. 3; p. 2, n. 5;p. 152, nn. 268-69; p. 162,
211, n. 6 ; p. 214, n. 24.

2

n. 319; p.

Supra., p. 20, n. 89; p. 29, n. 24; p. 43, n. 8 8 ; p. 57, n. 19; Chap.
specifically the first, second, third, and fifth sub-chapters.
3
5upra.. Chaps. VI and VII.

IV,

^Supra., pp. 171-72, n. 356; p. 173, n. 362; p. 187, n. 69; p. 188, n. 76;
p. 211, n. 6 ; p. 214, n. 24.
5
Supra., p. 8 , nn. 38-39, 41; p. 12, n. 56; p. 15, n. 65; p. 17, nn. 7374; p. 40, n. 72; p. 55, nn. 9-10; pp. 55-56: n. 11; p. 60, n. 35; pp. 60-61,
n. 39; p. 64, n. 52; p. 65, nn. 59-64; p. 6 8 , n. 8 ; p. 76, n. 57; p. 82, n. 96;
p. 87, n. 132; p. 8 8 , n. 139; p. 94, n. 154; p. 99, n. 175; pp. 99-100, n. 180;
218
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like a reluctant and expedient British afterthought.

Cape Colony had numerous

opportunities to depose and replace the sly and treacherous Paramount Chief
Letsie, who, by his deceit fooled the Cape Government into perpetuating its
irresolute and disreputable lenient policy towards the rebels and added to

6

complications faced by that government during and after the war.

The Sprigg

ministry discovered, as an American administration discovered in the following
7

century, the difficulty of fighting a war to victory on the battlefield and at
the peace table when its constituents are emotionally divided, with part,
through misguided counsel or mischievousness, hindering the war effort and gi-

8

ving aid and comfort to the enemy.

Britain and Cape Colony together made the

fatal mistakes of not coming quickly and strongly to the aid of the Loyalists
and later of abandoning those Basutos who were willing to cooperate to at least
9
some degree with Imperial and Cape rule.
Regarding issues of broader historical importance, Great Britain, already
thoroughly detested by the voortrekkers, abused, misuded, and allowed to be
mistreated by rebels the Boer government and populace in the Orange Free Stated
p. 100, n. 183; p. 185,
n. 55;p. 186,
n. 61; p. 189, nn. 81-82; p. 190, n*
87; p. 195, n. 130; p. 196, n. 133; p. 203, n. 185; p. 216, nn. 42-43.
^Supra., p. 58, n. 27; pp. 58-59, n. 28; p. 62, n. 44; p. 73, nn.35-37;
p. 78, nn. 68-69; p. 80, nn. 82, B5-86, 88-89; p. 81, n. 90; p. 84, n. 109;
p. 92, nn.
148, 150; p.
93, n.151; p.
94, n. 155; p. 101, nn. 188-89;
n. 121; p. 150, n. 254;
p. 178,n. 19;
p. 192, n. 105; p. 194, n. 115;
nn. 124-27; p. 200, n. 163; p. 202, n. 181.
^The Johnson Administration.
8

Supra., p. 51, n. 134; p. 100, n. 184; p . .134, n. 185; p. 141, n. 222;
p. 151, n. 259; p. 178, n. 22; p. 179, n. 28; p. 200, nn. 159-60.
9
Supra., p. 85, n. 112; p. 8 6 , n. 124; p. 93, n. 151; p. 139, n. 209; pp.
185-86, n. 59; p. 187, nn. 69, 73; p. 188, n. 74; p. 189, n. 85; p. 190, n.
8 6 ; p. 191, n. 103; p. 2 0 2 , n. 178.
Supra., p. 4, nn.16-18, 20;
112, 114-15; pp. 85-86, n. 118; p.
211; p. 140, nn. 212, 215; p. 192,
213, n. 20; p. 214, nn. 26, 28; p.

pp. 4-5, n. 21; pp. 6-7, n. 32; p. 85, nn.
132, nn. 168-69; p. 133, n. 174; p. 139, n.
n. 108; p. 198, n. 144; p. 202, n. 182; p.
215, nn. 30-31.

p.125,
p.195,
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who aided the forces of law and order employed in the Basuto Civil War and Re
bellion without expectation of gain or reward‘d

Furthermore, the Imperial

Government used its constitutional right to intervene in native affairs any
where in the Empire as a lever to hinder and discredit responsible government

12 Lon

in Cape Colony and thus undermined the authority of the colonial troops.

don offered little help when constitutional requests were made yet insisted
upon having the final word in Basuto affairs without assuming administrative
13
and financial responsibilities.
The assumption of the financial and admini
strative burden by Cape Colony, and later shouldered by the Union of South
Africa and the Republic of South Africa, today provides the main basis for the
mutual social and economic intimacy expected and desired by the Republic of
South Africa with Lesotho.

Supra., p. 76, n. 56; p. 65, nn. 112, 117; pp. 85-86, n. 118; p. 99, n.
179; p. 101, n. 192; p. 115, nn. 6 6 , 68 69; p. 132, nn. 167, 171, 173; p. 133,
nn. 175-76; p. 140, nn. 216, 218.

12

Supra., p. 22, n. 1QQ" p. 23, nn 102-03; p. 37, nn. 59-63; pp. 37-38,
n. 64; p. 97, nn.169, 171; pp. 97-98, n 172; p. 1 6 8 , nn. 343, 345, pp. 168-69,
n« 348; pp. 169-70, n. 351; p. 170, nn 352— 53; pp. 171—72, n « 356, p » 172,
nn. 357-59; pp. 172-73, n. 360; p. 173 nn. 361-62, 365-66; p. 178, n. 25; p.
188, n. 76; p. 193, n. 112; p. 196, nn 133-34; p. 197, nn. 137-38; p. 201, n.
175; p. 210, n. 1.
13
S u pra., pp. 3-4, n. 14; pp. 161' ■62, n. 318; p. 166, n. 335; pp. 196-97,
n. 135; p. 201, n. 175; p. 212, nn. 13 •14; p. 213, nn. 20-21.
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APPENDIX A

ACT FOR THE DISANNEXATION■OF BASUTOLAND FROM THE
COLONY OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE

Whereas it is desirable that Basutoland should cease to form part of the
Colony of tho Capa of Good Hops; and whereas Her Majesty’s Imperial Government
has expressed its willingness to provide for the future Government of Basuto
land upon certain conditions; and whereas it is expedient that due provision
should be made for relieving this Colony from all responsibility for or in con
nection with the Government of Basutoland: Be it indicated by the Governor of
the Caps of Good Hope, with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council
and House of Assembly thereof, as follows:
I. The Act No. 12, 1871 intituled /sic/, "An Act for the Annexation to
the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope of the Territory inhabited by the tribe of
people called the Basutos," shall be and the same is hereby repealed.
II. From and after the taking effect of this Act, there shall be paid an
nually to Her Majesty’s High Commissioner, or such other officer as Her Majesty
may be pledged to appoint in that behalf, as a contribution towards any defi
ciency that may arise in the revenues of the Government of Basutoland, out of
the public revenue of this Colony, such sum, not exceeding twenty—thousand
pounds, as may be hereafter from time to time agreed upon by and between Her
Majesty’s Imperial Government and the Government of this Colony.
III.
This Act shall come into operation when the Governor shall by pro
clamation declare that Her Majesty has been pleased to allow and confirm the
s ame.
IV.
The short title of this Act shall be the ’’Basutoland Disannexation
Act, 1883.”
PRO.
C.O. 50/7

^G. W. Eybers, ed., Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South Af
rican History 1795-1910
(London: Geo. Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1918), pp. 67-68.
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